Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Dan Wood

A principal-agent perspective has been employed in recent studies to rediscover the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping public bureaucratic outputs. I test the robustness of the hierarchy model for explaining outputs from an agency that has often been cast in the image of bureaucratic independence, the Environmental Protection Agency. Examining the effect of the Reagan presidency on EPA outputs for clean air, Box-Tiao models are constructed to explain shifts in the vigor of air pollution enforcements between 1977 and 1985. The analysis shows that the influence of elected institutions is limited when an agency has substantial bureaucratic resources and a zeal for their use. Moreover, under these conditions, bureaucracy can even move outputs in directions completely opposite from what a model of hierarchy would predict. The implication is that for some agencies it is necessary to give greater consideration to the agent in explaining implementation outcomes through time.

2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Al McGartland

When the modern era of environmental policy began with creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and passage of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, economists and economics were little used. Over time, economics became a major contributor to formation of environmental policy. Executive Order 12291 pushed economics into the policy process but also rendered benefit-cost analysis controversial. I report on economics’ role in the policy process over time and examine contributions by economists to environmental policymaking. Advancing benefit-cost analysis is an obvious contribution. I describe other areas in which economists have contributed and highlight milestones for economics at EPA.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Currie ◽  
Reed Walker

Air quality in the United States has improved dramatically over the past 50 years in large part due to the introduction of the Clean Air Act and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency to enforce it. This article is a reflection on the 50-year anniversary of the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency, describing what economic research says about the ways in which the Clean Air Act has shaped our society—in terms of costs, benefits, and important distributional concerns. We conclude with a discussion of how recent changes to both policy and technology present new opportunities for researchers in this area.


Author(s):  
Gabriela Maria Filip ◽  
◽  
Valeria Mirela Brezoczki ◽  

Global warming and climate change represent the most important problems of society. These are manly caused by air pollution and the increase of greenhouse gases. This paper presents a synthetic analysis of the evolution of greenhouse gases in the county of Maramureş over a period of 10 years, between 2006 and 2015, based on the data taken from the Environmental Protection Agency Maramureş, regarding the main greenhouse gases at county level, as well as the emission sources and their effects.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (8) ◽  
pp. 2558-2585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Blundell ◽  
Gautam Gowrisankaran ◽  
Ashley Langer

The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses a dynamic approach to enforcing air pollution regulations, with repeat offenders subject to high fines and designation as high priority violators (HPV). We estimate the value of dynamic enforcement by developing and estimating a dynamic model of a plant and regulator, where plants decide when to invest in pollution abatement technologies. We use a fixed grid approach to estimate random coefficient specifications. Investment, fines, and HPV designation are costly to most plants. Eliminating dynamic enforcement would raise pollution damages by 164 percent with constant fines or raise fines by 519 percent with constant pollution damages. (JEL Q52, Q53, Q58)


2021 ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Charles Halvorson

By the mid-1980s, as the nation confronted new problems such as the ozone hole and long-standing issues such as acid rain, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faced reduced political support for direct mandate interventions. Harnessing growing support for market-based strategies among environmental advocates, the EPA increasingly turned to incentives, tradable allowances, and other market-based policies in the 1980s. This shift culminated in the development of the nation’s first cap-and-trade program to address the problem of acid rain in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. As the nation looked forward to new concerns including global warming, an era of direct mandates informed by natural rights to clean air and a healthy environment seemed to be at a close, supplanted by a new environmentalism that held out market-based policies and a monetary conceptualization of environmental value as a new model for governance.


Author(s):  
John Thornton ◽  
John MacArthur ◽  
Husam Barham

Transport refrigeration units (TRUs) powered by integral diesel engines provide necessary temperature control for temperature-sensitive freight. TRU engines on trucks or trailers run while parked for temperature control (known as idling)—commonly for 40 to 60% of engine run time while at a home base distribution center. TRU engine idling is a sizable source of fuel consumption, causing air pollution, negative health effects, noise, and unnecessary cost. Electrification is a viable alternative to engine idling in TRUs parked at distribution centers, cold storage warehouses, truck stops, public rest areas, packing houses, terminals and other goods-movement facilities by adopting plug-in electric transport refrigeration units (eTRUs) with grid-supplied electricity. While electrification promises environmental and economic advantages over engine idling, adoption of eTRUs with grid-supplied electricity in the United States is slow. This paper presents results from a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency technical assistance pilot project to address market and behavior barriers of electrification of transport refrigeration to reduce TRU idling. The project findings revealed fleets often underestimate idling time and cost, while being skeptical about the long-term savings and benefits of electrification. The paper introduces a technical assistance approach to work with businesses to reduce operating costs while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions and toxic air pollution of temperature-controlled freight.


2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-49
Author(s):  
Charles Halvorson

In the late 1970s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unveiled the bubble policy as a central part of Jimmy Carter's plan to reform environmental regulations that many believed had grown too proscriptive and too costly for American industry. Since the EPA's formation, regulators had dictated method and means for reducing air pollution. The bubble returned the prerogative to business. But despite bipartisan support, the bubble never took off. Drawing on EPA records and interviews, this article shows how skeptical regulators intentionally made the bubble unwieldy, driving away businesses wary of uncertainty. Though Ronald Reagan's election seemed to lift the bubble's fortunes, his undiscerning assault on the administrative state ironically deflated the EPA's development of a viable alternative to the proscriptive model.


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