Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925

1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 853-879 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. R. Baxter ◽  
Thomas Buergenthal

In his policy statement of November 25, 1969, on chemical and biological warfare, President Richard M. Nixon declared that the Administration would ask the Senate for advice and consent to the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. At the same time, the President reaffirmed the renunciation by the United States of “the first use of lethal chemical weapons” and extended “this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals.” With regard to biological weapons, the President renounced the use of all biological weapons and methods of warfare, declared that the United States would confine its biological research to defensive measures, and ordered the Defense Department to make recommendations for the “disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons.” On February 14, 1970, the President extended the ban on biological weapons to include toxins.

2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiwei Chen

AbstractChinese allegations that the United States used biological weapons against Chinese troops and Korean civilians is one of the most shocking episodes of the Korean War. While the Chinese government repeatedly reprimanded the U.S. government for its uncivilized combat behavior, the U.S. government vigorously issued denials, treating the charges as an extreme propaganda maneuver applied by China in that moment of military crisis, ideological fervor, and political passion. Since then, a huge amount of scholarship has been produced on the allegation.1 None, however, provided a persuasive conclusion on the incident, mainly due to the lack of reliable sources.


1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Isabelle Chevrier

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effective” verification and argues that the treaty falls under the definition of adequate verification in the United States. For other countries, however, the lack of verification measures is of greater concern. The article describes measures that should be added to the BWC to detect violations and promote compliance with the treaty. These include improved methods of resolving allegations of noncompliance, increased reporting requirements for activities permitted under the treaty, greater openness in biological research, and inspections of laboratories and other facilities.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

Chemical and biological weapons represent two distinct types of munitions that share some common policy implications. While chemical weapons and biological weapons are different in terms of their development, manufacture, use, and the methods necessary to defend against them, they are commonly united in matters of policy as “weapons of mass destruction,” along with nuclear and radiological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons have the potential to cause mass casualties, require some technical expertise to produce, and can be employed effectively by both nation states and non-state actors. U.S. policies in the early 20th century were informed by preexisting taboos against poison weapons and the American Expeditionary Forces’ experiences during World War I. The United States promoted restrictions in the use of chemical and biological weapons through World War II, but increased research and development work at the outset of the Cold War. In response to domestic and international pressures during the Vietnam War, the United States drastically curtailed its chemical and biological weapons programs and began supporting international arms control efforts such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. chemical and biological weapons policies significantly influence U.S. policies in the Middle East and the fight against terrorism.


1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-112
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Crump Hanson

On November 25, 1969 Richard Nixon announced that because of the “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences” of biological weapons, the United States would never use these weapons, would destroy all existing stocks, and would confine its research to strictly defined measures of defense (Harris, 1987:193). This unilateral renunciation followed an extensive review by the National Security Council of U.S. chemical and biological warfare policy, which lasted six months and involved every relevant agency in the U.S. government and which concluded that U.S. biological warfare capabilities provided no compelling military advantages (Tucker, 1984-85:61). Three years later the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed; it was the first postwar arms control agreement to elminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of states (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982:122). The treaty was ratified unanimously by the U.S. Senate in 1974, and over 100 nations have acceded to it. This arms control achievement has been attributed in part to the serious doubts which many countries, including the United States, shared about the military value of biological weapons (Harris, 1987:205-6). Within a decade of the signing of this treaty, however, the development of recombinant-DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technology had raised the possibility of a new and more effective form of biological warfare.


2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-344
Author(s):  
Anzhelika R Sakhipgareeva

This Article is devoted to the theoretical ideas about the features of state control in genomic research and medical applications in the United States of America. The purpose of this study is to examine the legal aspects of the interpretation of genomic research and medical applications in the United States of America, to study the features of the state control of medical applications, as well as companies providing services in the field of genomic research. As a result of the review, the author provides with the information about several features of the state control of the US Food and drug administration (FDA), degree of regulatory intervention in the activities of genetic research companies, identify classification of medical applications apps.


Significance Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on November 29 called for action "now, not later" to "deter" Russia. The same day, US Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the Pentagon was watching Russian troop movements near Ukraine "with great concern". Fears of imminent conflict stem not just from the number of troops and tanks moved closer to Ukraine, but from Moscow's more than usually hostile rhetoric and its deliberate ambiguity, through hints that Ukraine may provoke it into some form of action. Impacts The threat of Russian action will accelerate and expand the defence assistance Ukraine gets from the United States and other NATO members. Moscow would hope its importance as a gas supplier mitigates EU sanctions imposed for military action against Ukraine. The Ukrainian government will be tempted to use the Russian threat to curb domestic opposition.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge A. Bezerra ◽  
Theodore H. Stathos ◽  
Burris Duncan ◽  
John A. Gaines ◽  
John N. Udall

In 1985, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) published a policy statement on the treatment of infants with acute diarrhea complicated by mild to moderate d ehydration. To determine how closely physicians in the United States follow the AAP's treatment guidelines, a questionnaire was sent to 457 pediatricians and 360 family practitioners. The questionnaire presented a hypothetical infant with acute diarrhea complicated by mild to moderate dehydration and included questions regarding the number of such patients seen yearly, length of time used to rehydrate the infant, and how formula or solids are introduced following rehydration. Complete responses were received from 53% of pediatricians and 40% of family practitioners. The number of patients with acute diarrhea seen per year did not affect physician's treatment. Pediatricians and family practitioners responded similarly to most questions. Contrary to the AAP's guidelines to rehydrate in 4 to 6 hours, 62% of responding physicians extend the rehydration period to 12 to 24 hours. Also contrary to the AAP's recommendations, 62% of pediatricians and family practitioners use a lactose-free formula. The majority of responding physicians do follow the AAP's treatment guidelines to initiate feedings with diluted formula. Significantly more pediatricians than family practitioner advance to a full-strength formula within 1 day (P = .011). Fewer than 50% of physicians polled started solids within 24 hours as suggested by the AAP. Overall, the findings suggest that very few pediatricians and family practitioners follow all aspects of the AAP's treatment guidelines for infants with acute diarrhea complicated by mild to moderate dehydration.


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