Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis S. Signorino
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Interaction Model ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Monte Carlo Analysis ◽  
Discrete Choice Models ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
True Values

Although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory, it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field. Typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories. I demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction. I show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use Monte Carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values. Finally, I reanalyze a well-known game-theoretic model of war, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) international interaction game. My results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model.

scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction Using Advertising: Simulating the Evolution of the Cournot Nash Equilibrium under Different Competitive Scenarios

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Malcolm Brady
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Analytical Model ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Advertising Effectiveness ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Over Time

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where firms can influence demand through use of advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. The evolution over time of the Nash equilibrium is graphically displayed for a number of different competitive scenarios. The results show that there exist threshold levels of advertising effectiveness at which duopoly behaviour bifurcates, that perfectly cooperative advertising can lead to competitive disadvantage, and that perfectly predatory advertising can lead to stagnation or losses.

scholarly journals Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1251-1277 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Hollyer ◽  
B. Peter Rosendorff ◽  
James Raymond Vreeland
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Satisfaction With Democracy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Democratic Stability ◽  
Rules Of The Game

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.

Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Rauchhaus
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
New Information ◽  
Effective Form ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

This article examines mediation in conflicts using both a game-theoretic model and a quantitative analysis. The game-theoretic model suggests that mediator effectiveness rests primarily on the ability of third parties to provide critical information about the disputants’ reservation points. The empirical analysis finds that mediation that targets asymmetric information is a highly effective form of conflict management. Moreover, the results suggest that mediation outperforms other forms of third-party intervention, including those that entail coercion. Both the model and quantitative analysis indicate that impartial mediators will generally outperform biased ones. Along with providing new information on conflict management, the quantitative analysis also has broader implications for IR theory. The results provide empirical support for the rationalist claim that asymmetric information is one of the root causes of war.

scholarly journals Globalization mitigates the risk of conflict caused by strategic territory

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (39) ◽  
pp. e2105624118
Author(s):  
Quentin Gallea ◽  
Dominic Rohner
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Trade Openness ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Baseline Risk ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Globalization is routinely blamed for various ills, including fueling conflict in strategic locations. To investigate whether these accusations are well founded, we have built a database to assess any given location’s strategic importance. Consistent with our game-theoretic model of strategic interaction, we find that overall fighting is more frequent in strategic locations close to maritime choke points (e.g., straits or capes), but that booming world trade openness considerably reduces the risks of conflict erupting in such strategic locations. The impact is quantitatively sizable, as moving one SD (1,100 km) closer to a choke point increases the conflict likelihood by 25% of the baseline risk in periods of low globalization, while reducing it during world trade booms. Our results have important policy implications for supranational coordination.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Human Rights Regime ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategic Context

Abstract How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that accounts for the dual effects of technology within the strategic context of preventive repression. Our game-theoretical analysis suggests that technological developments may not be detrimental to authoritarian control and may, in fact, strengthen authoritarian control by facilitating a wide range of human rights abuses. We show that technological innovation leads to greater levels of abuses to prevent opposition groups from mobilizing and increases the likelihood that authoritarians will succeed in preventing such mobilization. These results have broad implications for the human rights regime, democratization efforts, and the interpretation of recent declines in violent human rights abuses.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

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