Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nolan M. McCarty
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Executive Veto

It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims, I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium, stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive.

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 407-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUIBIN YAN
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Uniqueness Results ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Special Case

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? This paper investigates a random-proposer model first studied in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for symmetric and convex characteristic functions, considerably expanding the conditions under which this model is known to exhibit SSPE payoff uniqueness. Our model includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.

Louis Fisher on Congress and the Budget: Institutional Responsibility and Other Taboos

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 510-514
Author(s):  
Jasmine Farrier
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Intellectual ◽  
Power Balance ◽  
Elected Leaders ◽  
Institutional Responsibility

The serial fiscal policy and budgeting woes of the United States over the last three decades have been compounded by a bipartisan evasion of institutional responsibility by elected leaders. Long before “sequestration” and “fiscal cliffs,” Louis Fisher argued that presidents and members of the House and Senate undermined constitutional power balance and the spirit of budgeting law. A variety of ill-conceived process “reforms” further damaged the separation of powers system. As a scholar, Fisher uses an institutional lens to explore budget concepts that are rare in political science, such ascapacity, accountability, andduty. And as a public intellectual, Fisher's relevance has been secured by his repeatedly broaching these scholarly and political taboos.

scholarly journals Executive veto power and credit claiming

Public Choice ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 146 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 375-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indridi H. Indridason
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Credit Claiming ◽  
Executive Veto

Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-774 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Lowry ◽  
James E. Alt ◽  
Karen E. Ferree
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
The State ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
State Budget ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Macroeconomic Conditions ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Fiscal Balance

Clear fiscal policy effects appear in American state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992, independent of the effects of incumbency, coattails, term limits, and macroeconomic conditions. The results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government. Voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations, which differ for each party. Net of these expectations, Republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget; Democrats do not and, indeed, may be rewarded for small increases. Independent of this, the incumbent governor's party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance. Taken together, these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels, partisan control, expectations, and institutions.

Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence

1994 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Lohmann ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Constraint Forces ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
White House ◽  
Policy Theory ◽  
The U.S

If different parties control the U.S. Congress and White House, the United States may maintain higher import protection than otherwise. This proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which Congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the President. When the congressional majority party faces a President of the other party, the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the President by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up-or-down vote. This constraint forces the President to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority. Evidence confirms that (1) the institutional constraints placed on the President's trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and (2) U.S. trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949–90.

scholarly journals Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 1501-1538
Author(s):  
Yasushi Asako ◽  
Tetsuya Matsubayashi ◽  
Michiko Ueda
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
The United States ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Empirical Testing ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.

Sovereign credit and political survival in democracies

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 360-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiGiuseppe ◽  
Patrick E. Shea
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Significant Variation ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Political Survival ◽  
Credit Access ◽  
Sovereign Credit ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Benefits And Costs

AbstractModels of distributive politics often assume that fixed budgets constrain the efforts of incumbents to retain power. Yet, significant variation exists in politicians' abilities to push distributive costs forward by funding current fiscal policy through sovereign borrowing. This article theorizes how and when variation in sovereign credit access influences the central goal of democratic incumbents: political survival. Credit allows incumbents to reward supporters without immediately extracting domestic revenue. Excessive borrowing, however, risks higher interest rates or possible market exclusion. Considering sovereign borrowing's benefits and costs, we argue that the marginal effect of credit access on political survival is greatest for those incumbents that require other parties to implement fiscal policy. An analysis of incumbent party tenure in seventy-one democracies from 1977–2007 demonstrates that affordable sovereign finance is associated with longer tenures under divided government but has no significant effect on survival under unified governments.

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