Court to Court

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 708-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Slaughter

Leave aside the question whether the indication of provisional measures by the International Court of Justice in the Breard case was binding on the United States as a matter of international or domestic law. Scholars will continue to differ on this question; government decision makers will reach their own conclusions. Leave aside that the state of Virginia violated a solemn treaty obligation, a treaty that the Supreme Court is obliged to uphold as the supreme law of the land. Without denigrating the power of these arguments, a less contentious case can be made for the granting of a stay—a case based less on compulsion than on civility.

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz

Although “[tjreaties are the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts,” the president and the courts may sometimes be powerless to achieve compliance with a U.S. treaty. That was the puzzling outcome of Medellin v. Texas. Even though the Supreme Court declared that the United States has an international obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court invalidated the president’s memorandum directing Texas and other errant states to comply.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis O. Wilcox

On August 2, 1946, the United States Senate approved the Morse resolution by the overwhelming vote of 62-2, thereby giving its advice and consent to the acceptance on the part of the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was the same Senate which, just one year and one week earlier, had cast a vote of 89-2 in favor of the United Nations Charter. On August 26 Herschel Johnson, acting United States representative on the Security Council, deposited President Truman’s declaration of adherence with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At long last the United States assumed far-reaching obligations to submit its legal disputes to an international court.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck

The decision of the International Court of Justice in the case between Nicaragua and the United States brims with important procedural and substantive implications for the future of law and adjudication in disputes between states.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Dingle

AbstractThis is a further contribution to the Squire Law Library Eminent Scholars Archive by Lesley Dingle. It is based on interviews with Stephen Schwebel about his distinguished career as an international jurist in the United States and at the International Court of Justice.


1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-174

On September 26, 1991, the International Court of Justice issued an Order recording the discontinuance by Nicaragua of the proceedings in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua and the removal of the case from the Court’s list. Nicaragua had expressed its wish to discontinue the proceedings against the United States in a letter to the Court of September 12, 1991, in which it cited agreements between the two countries “aimed at enhancing Nicaragua’s economic, commercial and technical development to the maximum extent possible.”


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Among the puzzling aspects of the Breard episode was the Clinton administration’s claim that the decision whether or not to comply with the Order of the International Court of Justice requiring the postponement of Breard’s execution lay exclusively in the hands of the Governor of Virginia. The ICJ’s Order provided that “[t]he United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings.” The Clinton administration argued that the Order was not binding, but it also took the position that, even if the order were binding, there would be no authority in the federal Government to require a postponement of the execution. As the administration explained to the Supreme Court:


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-149

While Palestine considers itself a state, the United States does not currently recognize it as such. The relationship between the two has continued to deteriorate following the December 2017 announcement that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move its embassy there. Alleging that the embassy relocation violates international law, Palestine brought a case against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in September of 2018. The United States reacted by announcing its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Also in the fall of 2018, the Trump administration closed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, curtailed its own Palestinian-focused mission in Jerusalem, and sharply cut U.S. funding focused on Palestinian interests.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 880-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Egon Schwelb

The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice did not contain a clause regulating the procedure for its amendment. This was considered to be a “gap,” an “unfortunate lacuna.” This “gap” may or may not have been deliberate. It was certainly not a “genuine” gap. In spite of the absence of a provision on amendments, the law provided a clear though inconvenient answer to the question of how the Statute could be amended, namely, by unanimous consent of all parties to it. In 1928 proceedings for the introduction of some amendments were initiated. They were incorporated in a Protocol of Amendment in 1929. The difficulties which were encountered before the Protocol of Amendment entered into force in 1936 are now history and need not be dealt with here, the less so as they have been described in considerable detail in a recent book. The Protocol of Amendment did not remedy this defect of the original Statute. As Hudson has explained, this was due to the fact that the adhesion of the United States was proposed on condition that the Statute “shall not be amended without the consent of the United States.” Such a position could hardly be accorded to the United States unless it were also maintained for the other states which were parties.


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