Ad Hoc Committees in the House of Representatives & Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior

Polity ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-109
Author(s):  
David J. Vogler
Lentera Hukum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Satya Kumarajati

This paper examines problems as the result of the absence of statement on the establishment of Human Rights Ad hoc Court in the Human Rights Court Act Number 26 Year 2000. By highlingting the kidnapping of activists in the final days of New Order regime in 1997-1998, as Article 43 of Human Rights Court Act, the power to adjudicate is attached to the Human Rights Court. However, the absence of explicit provisions to the establishment of teh Ad hoc Court of Human Rights whether before or after the preliminary investigation to be made by the Indonesian Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), Attorney General argues that no subsequent measures on the results of the investigation made by Komnas HAM into the process of investigation due to the Ad hoc Court of Human Rights was not established.  The aim of this paper is to provide views on the establishment of the Ad hoc Court of Human Rights by using doctrinal research with statute and case approaces. As this paper shows, it concludes that the Ad hoc Court of Human Rights was established after premilinary investigation and full investigation as proposed by the House of Representatives which is assigned throug Presidential Resolution. Keywords: Ad hoc Court of Human Rights, Preliminary Investigation, Investigation


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Limongi ◽  
Argelina Figueiredo

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Lindstädt ◽  
Ryan J. Vander Wielen ◽  
Matthew Green

While there is a substantial literature highlighting the presence of social dynamics in legislatures, we know very little about the precise processes that generate these social dynamics. Yet, whether social dynamics are due to peer pressure, frequency of interaction, or genuine learning, for example, has important implications for questions of political representation and accountability. We demonstrate how a recent innovation can be used to study the diffusion of behavior within legislatures. In particular, we study diffusion within the US House of Representatives by looking at the dynamic process underlying discharge petitions. The discharge procedure shares many characteristics with other forms of legislative behavior, yet it has one important advantage when it comes to studying social dynamics: we can observe when members decide to sign petitions. Based on data from 1995 to 2014, we find that the social dynamics underlying the discharge procedure tend to involve the rational evaluation of information conveyed by the behavior of previous petition signatories.


2000 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-366
Author(s):  
Richard Bensel

The study of the institutional development of the U.S. House of Representatives, long a mainstay of traditional scholarship, has recently undergone a revival with the rise of rational choice approaches of interpretation. In earlier years, most research was highly formal and descriptive; the emphasis was on legislative offices and parliamentary rules. While scholars noted changes in the formal structure of the House of Representatives, their descriptions of these changes consisted mostly of anecdotal accounts in which theoretical explanations played little part. More recently, many scholars have defined institutions primarily or even solely in terms of procedural rules and, from that perspective, have focused on organizational form as an important factor in the empowerment of legislative coalitions and the expression of member preferences. However, because rules are frequently viewed as a rigid structural setting for legislative behavior, institutional change has often been downplayed as outside the scope of most research.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (01) ◽  
pp. 74-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Cohen

AbstractSeveral recent studies noted systematic links between weather conditions and voting turnout amid the mass public. This article extends this logic to the elite level by exploring the relationship between summer heat and abstentions in the US House of Representatives. In controlled multivariate regressions, heat is a significant predictor of abstentions across all votes held between 1991 and 2000. This finding provides new insight into legislative behavior as well as the motivation behind some abstentions, which could inform the understanding of the literature on legislative shirking.


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Sinclair

Because of changes in the issues at the center of controversy, changes in rules and norms and high membership turnover, the current House majority party leaders operate in a much less predictable environment than their predecessors did. In response to the changed environment, Speaker O'Neill has developed the strategy of leadership by inclusion, a central element of which is the Speaker's task force, an ad hoc group appointed by the Speaker and charged with passage of a specific bill. The leaders believe task forces help them perform both of their primary functions—building winning coalitions and “keeping peace in the family.” By increasing the number of people working in an organized way to pass the bill at issue, the task force increases the probability of a bill's success on the floor. Work on a task force satisfies junior members' expectations of participation and fosters cooperative patterns of behavior among party members.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 734-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Bensel

The rise of the modern state has been accompanied by a decline in the importance of statutory law to the operation of Western democratic governments. Two of the strongest critiques of the modern state and of this decline in statutory law have come from Friedrich Hayek and Theodore Lowi. Each has argued that only the restoration of a rule of law can ensure the continued survival of democratic societies. Their indictments of the modern state suggest a standard by which legislative policy alternatives might be evaluated. This article develops such a standard, adapted specifically for use in American politics, and uses it to analyze legislative behavior in the House of Representatives under four different presidential administrations. The development and application of the rule of law standard provides a critique of American government from the Hayek-Lowi perspective and reveals a basic incompatibility between the imposition of a rule of law and the establishment of a responsible-party government system.


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