A Hero of Conscience: Samson Agonistes and Casuistry

PMLA ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille W. Slights

AbstractRenaissance English casuistry, the branch of moral philosophy that applies general principles to particular cases, supplies a significant context for Milton’s Samson Agonistes. In subject matter, structure, and language, Milton’s tragedy resembles the prose cases of conscience in which casuists showed how to overcome doubt and despair and gain peaceful consciences by resolving difficult moral problems. Such casuistical concepts as the supremacy of the individual conscience, the relevance of circumstances to moral law, and the role of reason in resolving doubt illuminate the conflicting moral judgments that form the dramatic texture of Samson Agonistes. Samson learns how to judge his own actions in particular circumstances, and by doing so, learns to repent of his past sin, overcome his sense of powerlessness, and act with a clear conscience. The drama goes beyond conventional casuistry in its uncompromising assertion of the supremacy of the individual conscience and its unflinching recognition of the tragic limits of human power.

Author(s):  
Michael Lambiris

The traditional way of providing feedback to students after tests or assignments is labour-intensive. This paper explains the concepts and techniques used by the author to build computer-based applications that analyse students’ answers and generate individualised, detailed and constructive feedback. The paper explains how the data gathered from a student’s answers can be combined with other knowledge about the subject matter being taught, and the specific test questions, to create computerised routines that evaluate the individual student’s performance. This information can be presented in ways that help students to assess their progress, both in relation to their acquired knowledge in specified areas of study, and with regard to their ability to exercise relevant skills. In this way, appropriate feedback can be provided to large numbers of students quickly and efficiently. The same techniques can be used to provide information to the instructor about the performance of the group as a whole, with a degree of detail and accuracy that exceeds the impressions usually gained through traditional marking. The paper also explains the role of the subject instructor in designing and creating feedback-generating applications. The methodologies described provide insight into the details of the process and are a useful basis for further experimentation and development.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Adrian J. Reimers

The formation of the human conscience is a controverted question in both philosophical ethics and moral philosophy. Conscience refers to one’s conception and understanding of the moral good. An especially significant manifestation of the problem of conscience in the 20th and 21st centuries is the impact of ideology on the individual person’s moral sense. This article considers the impact of two 19th century philosophies―Mill’s utilitarianism and Marxism―on contemporary moral thought insofar as the interaction of these two produce a powerful materialist ideology to determine the modern European and American conscience. We then turn to the thought of Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), who in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor and in his earlier philosophical writings developed an account of moral truth by which the dangers of materialistic ideology can be overcome. It is argued, with John Paul II, that only in the context of truth can a coherent account of freedom of conscience under the moral law be developed.


2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Stark

AbstractInspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart.


The term metatheater is coined by Lionel Abel in 1963 which refers to theater about theater. It draws attention to the distinction between the fiction of the play and the reality of performance. A play refers to itself as a play to encourage the audience to perceive it in two ways; as a pretended reality and as dramatic artifice. Metatheater also appears in both comedy and tragedy, where the audience can laugh and empathize at the same time. The paradoxical perspective of fake and real promoting audience instability and this is the role of metatheater. It is an artistic way to examine the interaction between illusion and reality. There is a need to represent reality through artificiality to provide an insight to see the truth of human mind and to illuminate the individual perspective. Within this study metatheater considered as a tendency rather than a technique. It examines the conflict between illusion and reality in Harold Pinter’s The Lover and focuses on play within the play device. It shows that illusion and reality is the bases of both the subject matter and the dramatic technique of the plays of Harold Pinter who is a revolutionary British playwright. It shows how the play employs the standard Pinter’s technique of mixing illusion and reality, presenting a comedy in modern absurd way. Metatheatrical tendencies in The Lover traces how people lost simplicity and spontaneity of communication and unable express their real beings.


Problemos ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 150-161
Author(s):  
Evaldas Kazlauskas ◽  
Mindaugas Briedis

Straipsnyje analizuojami argumentai, pagrindžiantys paralelizmą tarp kognityvinės ir moralinės raidos. Keliamas klausimas, ar šios dvi universalios raidos formos yra fundamentaliai tarpusavyje susijusios, jei taip, tai kokiu būdu? Straipsnyje keliamiems uždaviniams spręsti visų pirma privalu pateikti universalius šio paralelizmo tipus. Tam geriausiai pasitarnauja Lawrenso Kohlbergo pateikta chrestomatine tapusi kognityvinės ir moralinės raidos komplementarumo hierarchija, savo ruožtu įkvėpta J. Piaget idėjų. Nors Kohlbergo sistema padeda struktūruoti psichologinius ir moralinius procesus, konstruoti praktinę veiklą numatančius argumentus, joje yra daug keblumų, kuriuos ir pasistengsime išryškinti bei aptarti. Visų pirma, straipsnyje kritiškai analizuojami pamatiniai Kohlbergo pateikti asmens raidos viziją apibūdinantys principai. Antra, kvestionuojamas bendrasis šios vizijos principas, tai yra paralelizmas tarp kognityvinės ir moralinės brandos. Pamatinių Kohlbergo sistemos aspektų pristatymas, revizija, kritika ir yra šio straipsnio probleminė ašis. Moralės filosofijos bei kognityviosios psichologijos gretinimas iš naujo pateikia pamatinius šių disciplinų teorinės žiūros objektus – žmogaus pažintinę veiklą ir moralinę brandą. Tai leidžia ne tik praplėsti kognityviosios psichologijos nagrinėjamų problemų lauką, bet ir parodyti, kaip naudojant kognityviosios psichologijos metodologiją, psichologija gali prisidėti prie moralės filosofijos problemų sprendimo. Straipsnio tematika reikalauja tarpdisciplininio požiūrio, todėl leidžia svarbiausiuose probleminiuose kognityvumo ir moralės problematikos laukuose sudurti filosofiją ir psichologiją, kartu numatant platesnes išvadas šių disciplinų savivokos klausimais. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: moralinė raida, kognityvinė raida, raidos stadijos, moralės filosofija, psichologija.Cognitive Psychology and Moral Philosophy: How Strong are Parallels between Cognitive and Moral Development?Evaldas Kazlauskas, Mindaugas Briedis Summary The analysis presented in the article is devoted to the implied parallelism between cognitive and moral development. We discuss whether these universal aspects of human development are fundamentally interrelated, and if the answer is yes, then how this is possible. In order to reach our tasks, we refer to the widely known theory of cognitive and moral development formulated by Lawrence Kohlberg who was directly influenced by the prominent Swiss scientist Jean Piaget. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development emphasizes cognitive processes as the key component in moral judgments. Development of cognitive abilities has a huge impact on moral development. Although Kohlberg’s stages of moral development enable to structure cognitive and in a broader sense the psychological processes and probably help to predict moral actions, there are a number of weak arguments in his theory which we discuss in thes article. Presentation of Kohlberg’s theory, as well as its revision, and critics are the key points of the article. A juxtaposition of moral philosophy and cognitive psychology reveals new trends in the analysis of relevant moral issues, while the main focus of these different fields is still contradictory – human cognitive processes and moral maturity. Utilization of cognitive psychology defining moral issues while using cognitive methods definitely broadens the scope of cognitive psychology, and contributes to moral philosophy. The interdisciplinary approach to psychology and philosophy which we choose in the article enables us to confront the complex issues of cognition and the moral problems using different approaches, and at the same time we conclude that this discussion contributes to a broader understanding of the role and boundaries of both psychology and philosophy. Keywords: moral development, cognitive development, stages of development, moral philosophy, psychology.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar

AbstractIn this paper I argue that Kant's claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill's claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant's writings about conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant's conception of the Fact of Reason.


Author(s):  
Bosko Tripkovic

The chapter analyses the metaethical foundations of the argument from common sentiment. This argument holds that moral emotions of the people in a community indicate the solution to moral problems. Drawing on comparative constitutional practice, the chapter contends that the argument from common sentiment consists of two elements: the emotivist element makes moral judgment dependent on moral feelings, and the relativist element ties these feelings to a specific community. The chapter argues that these elements are incompatible and fail to account for the role of reasoning and reflection in moral judgments. The chapter concludes that the argument from common sentiment is inadequate as an exclusive approach to judicial moral judgment.


Author(s):  
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman ◽  
Nate C. Carnes

In regulating people’s individual behavior in the interests of the group, morality permits group members to reap considerable benefits, but sometimes at the expense of nonmembers. Thus, morality involves an inherent tension between hypo-egoicism at the level of the individual and hyper-egoicism at the group level. This chapter describes and contrasts the hypo-egoic and hyper-egoic aspects of morality, their varied manifestations, and their development. The model of moral motives provides an expanded view of morality by describing the role of proscriptive and prescriptive morality in regulating self-interested behavior at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group level. An examination of the hypo-egoic features of morality argues for a global morality that blurs distinctions between ingroup and outgroup, thereby promoting greater impartiality. Such a global morality requires people to forego their natural egoicism and intuitive moral judgments in favor of increased reliance on rational thought in making moral decisions about outgroup members.


Reflexio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
I. V. Badiev

The article deals with the study of human moral functioning in the framework of neurobiological and psychological research. Presents the views of John. Green and John. Haidt about the nature of moral judgments. Studies of the neurobiological mechanism of moral judgment do not explain their individual variability. This question relates to the subject of psychological research. The psychological concepts of morality of L. Kohlberg and D. Forsythe are compared. It is argued that the concept of ethical positions of Foresight has an advantage, since it considers the individual variability of moral judgments from metaethical positions. The analysis of neurobiological and psychological approaches to morality concluded that they did not represent the behavioral component of moral functioning.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document