scholarly journals ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Reflexio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
I. V. Badiev

The article deals with the study of human moral functioning in the framework of neurobiological and psychological research. Presents the views of John. Green and John. Haidt about the nature of moral judgments. Studies of the neurobiological mechanism of moral judgment do not explain their individual variability. This question relates to the subject of psychological research. The psychological concepts of morality of L. Kohlberg and D. Forsythe are compared. It is argued that the concept of ethical positions of Foresight has an advantage, since it considers the individual variability of moral judgments from metaethical positions. The analysis of neurobiological and psychological approaches to morality concluded that they did not represent the behavioral component of moral functioning.

Adam alemi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (86) ◽  
pp. 129-135
Author(s):  
Almira Omarova

Moral judgements have been a crucial subject-matter of a discussion in the domain of normativity. Many thinkers argue moral judgments are necessarily action-guiding, which prescribe what one ought to do and what ought to be the case. The moral statement “killing is wrong” is prescriptive and locates in the purview of first-order ethical questions. Moral realists widely accept that moral judgments represent propositions, therefore they are subject to truth and false conditions. Thus, moral conclusions can be derived logically from valid premises. How to derive the conclusion “killing is wrong”? How to justify the statement? What does “wrong” mean in this context? This kind of philosophical issue has been labeled as the second-order questions, which is in the purview of metaethics. This article is devoted to the subject of normativity and the nature of moral judgments advocated by metaethicists David Copp and Ralph Wedgwood. The purpose of this article is to outline the current debate on the nature of normative moral judgments. In conclusion, I shall agree with both Copp and Wedgwoodon two points. One, normative moral judgment can be subject to cognition. Two, there are true and false beliefs about particular moral facts which constitute the significant part of the reality we live in.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 949-949

"The safeguards contained in the scientific method are repugnant to some who devote themselves to psychotherapy, and their argument against it always harks back to the uniqueness of the individual." The author points out that this is an obscurantist argument and it does not follow that because an individual is a unique reality, he cannot be compared with anyone else. On this basis there would be no science of zoology as every individual animal is also a unique reality, but this has not been an obstacle to comparison and collective study in this science. The argument is reminiscent of claims prevalent during the controversies about evolution when the opponents asserted that man was an improper subject for comparitive study because of his fundamental distinction from all other creatures. Only insofar as the common denominators between individuals can be ascertained may the subject matter of psychiatry become the object of scientific and rational inquiry and without this it could not be taught. We would be in the position of having to accept the pronouncements of supposedly singularly gifted individuals on faith, and continuity in the field would presumably depend entirely upon apprenticeship.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (16) ◽  
pp. 17-26
Author(s):  
Janusz Trempała

Despite more than a century of history of psychological research on education, we are unable to clearly define the subject and specific tasks and goals of educational psychology as a separate subdiscipline. There is also the lack of one, general and comprehensive psychological theory of education, describing and explaining in a satisfactory way the complexity of educational phenomena. The presented considerations leads to the statement that educational psychology is an area of application rather than a unique category of research subject matter.


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-153
Author(s):  
Marvin Heller

The subject matter of this article is unique or rare editions of early Hebrew books. Due to varying external circumstances, these rare books are extant only in fragments, unique single exemplars, or in a limited number of copies. Although Hebrew texts were subject to the same ravages of time and, perhaps, occasional indifference as were other early books, they also suffered to a much greater extent than their non-Hebrew counterparts from the indignities and deeds, or more accurately misdeeds, of anti-Semites who expended their wrath not only on Jews but also directed their venom towards Jewish books. The article is not about the causes of book rarity per se, but rather describes a variety of Hebrew works, either of the individual title, or, in some instances, of a particular edition of a reprinted work that is extant today in a single or a limited number of copies.


Author(s):  
Michael Lambiris

The traditional way of providing feedback to students after tests or assignments is labour-intensive. This paper explains the concepts and techniques used by the author to build computer-based applications that analyse students’ answers and generate individualised, detailed and constructive feedback. The paper explains how the data gathered from a student’s answers can be combined with other knowledge about the subject matter being taught, and the specific test questions, to create computerised routines that evaluate the individual student’s performance. This information can be presented in ways that help students to assess their progress, both in relation to their acquired knowledge in specified areas of study, and with regard to their ability to exercise relevant skills. In this way, appropriate feedback can be provided to large numbers of students quickly and efficiently. The same techniques can be used to provide information to the instructor about the performance of the group as a whole, with a degree of detail and accuracy that exceeds the impressions usually gained through traditional marking. The paper also explains the role of the subject instructor in designing and creating feedback-generating applications. The methodologies described provide insight into the details of the process and are a useful basis for further experimentation and development.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-52
Author(s):  
Julian Jeliński

Cornel West’s diagnosis of the crisis of the American democracy is the subject matter of this article. Analyzing the condition of the American democracy of the end of XX and the beginning of XXI centuries, C. West focused on the individual, existential character of the crisis. The diagnosed state had according to him much affect not only on political issues, but first and foremost on the spread of nihilism among American citizens. Nihilism – is understood in the C. West as senselessness of life and low self-esteem is the subject matter of this article.


Author(s):  
Emilian Mihailov

AbstractTo capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, (Kahane et al., Psychological Review 125:131, 2018) developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 182-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virgil Zeigler-Hill ◽  
Avi Besser ◽  
Sinead Cronin ◽  
Jennifer K. Vrabel

Recent research has highlighted important individual differences in moral judgment. The present study extends these findings by examining the associations between pathological personality traits and utilitarian moral judgments. This was accomplished by asking 2,121 Israeli community members to complete self-report measures concerning their pathological personality traits and evaluate the acceptability of utilitarian moral judgments in various sacrificial dilemmas (is it acceptable to intentionally kill one person in order to save several other people?). The results showed that the pathological personality traits of antagonism and disinhibition were positively associated with the endorsement of personal utilitarian moral judgments (i.e., those decisions requiring the individual to directly inflict harm on the would-be sacrificed individual), whereas negative affectivity was negatively associated with personal utilitarian moral judgments. Antagonism was the only pathological personality trait associated with impersonal utilitarian moral judgments (i.e., those decisions that did not require the individual to directly inflict harm on the would-be sacrificed individual). Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for understanding the associations between pathological personality traits and moral judgments.


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 237-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

AbstractThis essay offers an interpretation and partial defense of Nietzsche's idea that moralities and moral judgments are “sign-languages” or “symptoms” of our affects, that is, of our emotions or feelings. According to Nietzsche, as I reconstruct his view, moral judgments result from the interaction of two kinds of affective responses: first, a “basic affect” of inclination toward or aversion from certain acts, and then a further affective response (the “meta-affect”) to that basic affect (that is, sometimes we can be either inclined towards or averted from our basic affects). I argue that Nietzsche views basic affects as noncognitive, that is, as identifiable solely by how they feel to the subject who experiences the affect. By contrast, I suggest that meta-affects (I focus on guilt and shame) sometimes incorporate a cognitive component like belief. After showing how this account of moral judgment comports with a reading of Nietzsche's moral philosophy that I have offered in previous work, I conclude by adducing philosophical and empirical psychological reasons for thinking that Nietzsche's account of moral judgment is correct.


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