Determinants of Auditor Going Concern Reporting in the Banking Industry

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 187-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adi Masli ◽  
Christine Porter ◽  
Susan Scholz
Keyword(s):  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Type I ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Loan Quality ◽  
Asset Quality ◽  
Type Ii Errors ◽  
Going Concern Reports ◽  
Shed Light

SUMMARY We develop and test a model of the determinants of going concern reporting for banks. Banks are an essential component of the economy, but most audit market studies exclude them because they have significant differences from other companies. Our model draws on banking literature and industry sources to identify bank-specific risk factors, including measures of capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, and regulatory concern. We find that regulatory sanctions are a significant determinant of going concern opinions along with low capitalization, poor loan quality, and declining customer deposits and that these are incremental to characteristics drawn from studies of other industries. Also, going concern reports anticipate bank failures and provide descriptive evidence regarding Type I and Type II errors. We shed light on the audit market for banks and add to the going concern literature by providing evidence on going concern reporting in this unique industry.

The Effect of Stage of Development and Financial Health on Auditor Decision Behavior in the Going-Concern Task

1999 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Rosman ◽  
Inshik Seol ◽  
Stanley F. Biggs
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Financial Health ◽  
Inference Problem ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Mitigating Factors ◽  
Type Ii Errors ◽  
Problem Representations

The effect of different task settings within an industry on auditor behavior is examined for the going-concern task. Using an interactive computer process-tracing method, experienced auditors from four Big 6 accounting firms examined cases based on real data that differed on two dimensions of task settings: stage of organizational development (start-up and mature) and financial health (bankrupt and nonbankrupt). Auditors made judgments about each entity's ability to continue as a going concern and, if they had substantial doubt about continued existence, they listed evidence they would seek as mitigating factors. There are seven principal results. First, information acquisition and, by inference, problem representations were sensitive to differences in task settings. Second, financial mitigating factors dominated nonfinancial mitigating factors in both start-up and mature settings. Third, auditors' behavior reflected configural processing. Fourth, categorizing information into financial and nonfinancial dimensions was critical to understanding how auditors' information acquisition and, by inference, problem representations differed across settings. Fifth, Type I errors (determining that a healthy company is a going-concern problem) differed from correct judgments in terms of information acquisition, although Type II errors (determining that a problem company is viable) did not. This may indicate that Type II errors are primarily due to deficiencies in other stages of processing, such as evaluation. Sixth, auditors who were more accurate tended to follow flexible strategies for financial information acquisition. Finally, accurate performance in the going-concern task was found to be related to acquiring (1) fewer information cues, (2) proportionately more liquidity information and (3) nonfinancial information earlier in the process.

The Effect of Noisy Fair Value Measures on Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Valencia ◽  
Thomas J. Smith ◽  
James Ang
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Error ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Type I Error ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
Type Ii Errors

SYNOPSIS Fair value accounting has been a hotly debated topic during the recent financial crisis. Supporters argue that fair values are more relevant to investors, while detractors point to the measurement error in the estimation of the reported fair values to attack its reliability. This study examines how noise in reported fair values impacts bank capital adequacy ratios. If measurement error causes reported capital levels to deviate from fundamental levels, then regulators could misidentify a financially healthy bank as troubled (type I error) or a financially troubled bank as safe (type II error), leading to suboptimal resource allocations for banks, regulators, and investors. We use a Monte Carlo simulation to generate our data, and find that while noise leads to both type I and type II errors around key Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) capital adequacy benchmarks, the type I error dominates. Specifically, noise is associated with 2.58 (2.60) [1.092], 5.67 (6.44) [1.94], and 10.60 (26.83) [3.423] times more type I errors than type II errors around the Tier 1 (Total) [Leverage] well-capitalized, adequately capitalized, and significantly undercapitalized benchmarks, respectively. Economically, our results suggest that noise can lead to inefficient allocation of resources on the part of regulators (increased monitoring costs) and banks (increased compliance costs). JEL Classifications: D52; M41; C15; G21.

Rules Rather than Discretion in Audit Standards: Going-Concern Opinions in Belgium

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1395-1428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Ann Vanstraelen ◽  
Michael Willenborg
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Type I Errors ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Major Revision ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Type Ii Errors ◽  
Audit Standards ◽  
Ex Post Analysis

ABSTRACT: We study going-concern (GC) reporting in Belgium to examine the effects associated with a shift toward rules-based audit standards. Beginning in 2000, a major revision in Belgian GC audit standards took effect. Among its changes, auditors must ascertain whether their clients are in compliance with two “financial-juridical criteria” for board of directors' GC disclosures. In a study of a sample of private Belgian companies, we report two major findings. First, there is a decrease in auditor Type II errors, particularly by non-Big 6/5 auditors for their clients that fail both criteria. Second, there is an increase in Type I errors, again particularly for companies that fail both criteria. We also conduct an ex post analysis of the decrease in Type II errors and the increase in Type I errors. Our findings suggest the standard engenders both favorable and unfavorable effects, the net of which depends on the priorities assigned to the affected parties (creditors, auditors, companies, and employees).

scholarly journals Audit Committee Accounting Expertise and Audit Quality – the Case of Going-Concern Opinions

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Gnanakumar Visvanathan
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type I Errors ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
Going Concern Reports

This study examines whether audit committee accounting expertise and other audit committee characteristics promote or deter the likelihood of receiving going-concern reports from the auditors and whether such characteristics shield auditors from dismissals after the issuance of a going-concern report. The study finds no significant association between the likelihood of a going-concern report and audit committee accounting expertise or other audit committee characteristics. No significant association is also found for auditor dismissals following going-concern reports and audit committee accounting expertise. These results contrast with prior literature that examined data preceding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) or the period immediately thereafter. Additional analysis shows that audit committee accounting expertise is found to improve the information in going-concern audit opinions by reducing Type I errors, however. Overall, these findings shed light on the evolving role of audit committees in overseeing the auditors and have implications for regulators interested in improving audit quality and investors interested in improving the effectiveness of audit committees. 

Auditor Going Concern Opinions and Bank Systemic Risk: Evidence from the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Anne Albrecht ◽  
Matthew Glendening ◽  
Kyonghee Kim ◽  
Raynolde Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Type I ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Type I Errors ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Type Ii Errors

SUMMARY Following the 2007–2009 financial crisis, regulators and investor groups alleged that auditors were reluctant to issue going concern opinions (GCOs) to distressed banks during the crisis, raising questions about the quality of auditors' GCO decisions. This paper investigates whether systemic risk influences auditors' GCO decisions during the crisis due to potential adverse spillover effects. Using 496 bank-year observations, we find that auditors are less likely to issue a GCO to systemically risky banks, and this auditor behavior reduces Type I errors without increasing Type II errors. The effects are more pronounced during the crisis period, especially for banks that are large and connected, have lower litigation risk, or are audited by Big 4 auditors or industry specialists. Overall, our findings suggest that during the crisis period, auditors were less likely to over-issue GCOs to systemically risky banks, resulting in more accurate GCOs. JEL Classifications: M42; G20.

Managerial Ability and the Accuracy of the Going Concern Opinion

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan R. Berglund ◽  
Donald R. Herrmann ◽  
Bradley P. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Type I Errors ◽  
Bankruptcy Risk ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Information Signal ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Type Ii Errors

ABSTRACT Current audit guidance directs the auditor to modify their opinion in the presence of significant doubt about their client's ability to continue as a going concern. This paper examines whether managerial ability influences the accuracy of auditors' going concern information signal. Following prior literature, we assess accuracy based on the subsequent viability of the client. We find that, while managerial ability decreases the risk of Type I errors (the auditor issues a going concern opinion for a firm that subsequently remains viable), managerial ability increases the risk of Type II errors (the auditor issues a standard unqualified report for a firm that subsequently files for bankruptcy). Considering prior research indicates that the auditor's opinion provides important information to the market, this finding has important public interest implications regarding the signaling of bankruptcy risk to investors and creditors by auditors' going concern opinion.

An old friend is better than two new ones? Approaches to market research in the context of digital transformation for the antitrust laws enforcement

2020 ◽  
pp. 37-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. E. Shastitko ◽  
O. A. Markova
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Type Ii Errors

Digital transformation has led to changes in business models of traditional players in the existing markets. What is more, new entrants and new markets appeared, in particular platforms and multisided markets. The emergence and rapid development of platforms are caused primarily by the existence of so called indirect network externalities. Regarding to this, a question arises of whether the existing instruments of competition law enforcement and market analysis are still relevant when analyzing markets with digital platforms? This paper aims at discussing advantages and disadvantages of using various tools to define markets with platforms. In particular, we define the features of the SSNIP test when being applyed to markets with platforms. Furthermore, we analyze adjustment in tests for platform market definition in terms of possible type I and type II errors. All in all, it turns out that to reduce the likelihood of type I and type II errors while applying market definition technique to markets with platforms one should consider the type of platform analyzed: transaction platforms without pass-through and non-transaction matching platforms should be tackled as players in a multisided market, whereas non-transaction platforms should be analyzed as players in several interrelated markets. However, if the platform is allowed to adjust prices, there emerges additional challenge that the regulator and companies may manipulate the results of SSNIP test by applying different models of competition.

STUDY OF CAMEL RATING SYSTEM IN BANKING SUPERVISION- A CASE STUDY OF NEPAL BANGLADESH BANK LTD

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 74-96
Author(s):  
Dr. S.U. Gawde ◽  
Prof.. Alekha Chandra Panda ◽  
Prof. Devyani Ingale
Keyword(s):  
Banking Sector ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Rating System ◽  
Financial Risks ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Effective Measure ◽  
Critical Elements ◽  
Financial Soundness ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Asset Quality

The banking sector  plays in important role in the country’s economy, acting as an intermediary to all industries. As the banking sector has a major impact on the economy as a whole. Performance evaluation of the banking sector is an effective measure and indicator to check the soundness of economic activities of an economy. Many methods are employed to analyse banking performance. One of the popular methods is the CAMELS framework, developed in the early 1970’s by federal regulators in the USA. The CAMELS rating system is based upon an evaluation of six critical elements of a financial institution’s operations: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management soundness, Earnings and profitability, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. Under this bank is required to enhance capital adequacy, strengthen asset quality, improve management, increase earnings, maintain liquidity, and reduce sensitivity to various financial risks. In the present study an attempt was made to evaluate the performance & financial soundness of NEPAL BANGLADESH BANK LTD using CAMEL approach. Quantitative parameters are computed and updated on a quarterly basis while in respect of the qualitative parameters the ratings / marks given at the time of previous on-site examination

The Potential of Tax Surprises to Affect Measures of Tax Avoidance and Researchers' Inferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chelsea Rae Austin
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Effective Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Savings ◽  
Type Ii Errors

ABSTRACT While not explicitly stated, many tax avoidance studies seek to investigate tax avoidance that is the result of firms' deliberate actions. However, measures of firms' tax avoidance can also be affected by factors outside the firms' control—tax surprises. This study examines potential complications caused by tax surprises when measuring tax avoidance by focusing on one specific type of surprise tax savings—the unanticipated tax benefit from employees' exercise of stock options. Because the cash effective tax rate (ETR) includes the benefits of this tax surprise, the cash ETR mismeasures firms' deliberate tax avoidance. The analyses conducted show this mismeasurement is material and can lead to both Type I and Type II errors in studies of deliberate tax avoidance. Suggestions to aid researchers in mitigating these concerns are also provided.

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