Audit Committee Accounting Expertise and Audit Quality – the Case of Going-Concern Opinions

This study examines whether audit committee accounting expertise and other audit committee characteristics promote or deter the likelihood of receiving going-concern reports from the auditors and whether such characteristics shield auditors from dismissals after the issuance of a going-concern report. The study finds no significant association between the likelihood of a going-concern report and audit committee accounting expertise or other audit committee characteristics. No significant association is also found for auditor dismissals following going-concern reports and audit committee accounting expertise. These results contrast with prior literature that examined data preceding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) or the period immediately thereafter. Additional analysis shows that audit committee accounting expertise is found to improve the information in going-concern audit opinions by reducing Type I errors, however. Overall, these findings shed light on the evolving role of audit committees in overseeing the auditors and have implications for regulators interested in improving audit quality and investors interested in improving the effectiveness of audit committees.

Determinants of Auditor Going Concern Reporting in the Banking Industry

SUMMARY We develop and test a model of the determinants of going concern reporting for banks. Banks are an essential component of the economy, but most audit market studies exclude them because they have significant differences from other companies. Our model draws on banking literature and industry sources to identify bank-specific risk factors, including measures of capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, and regulatory concern. We find that regulatory sanctions are a significant determinant of going concern opinions along with low capitalization, poor loan quality, and declining customer deposits and that these are incremental to characteristics drawn from studies of other industries. Also, going concern reports anticipate bank failures and provide descriptive evidence regarding Type I and Type II errors. We shed light on the audit market for banks and add to the going concern literature by providing evidence on going concern reporting in this unique industry.

Bank officers’ perceptions and uses of qualified audit reports

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to provide insights into the perceptions and uses of qualified audit reports in financial statements of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As there is a long-standing debate on the usefulness of auditor’s going-concern reports, this study aims to provide insights into the factors that affect how banks perceive and use going-concern reports. Design/methodology/approach – Semi-structured interviews with bank officers were conducted. Findings – The study findings demonstrated that bank officers considered that the going-concern report provided information, although they did not regard the information as being particularly useful. The main factors affecting the usefulness of information are use of other information sources and bank officers’ perceptions of auditing. Other factors are also presented and discussed in the current research paper. Practical implications – Regulators have taken the action to improve the auditor’s reporting model, and the findings provided by this study are important because they provide a deeper understanding of the perceptions and uses of audit reports from smaller companies. The study also contributes knowledge about the role of audit reports in the context of SMEs finance. Originality/value – This is one of the first studies to use a qualitative approach to examine factors that affect the use of going-concern reports.

Do Going Concern Audit Reports Protect Auditors from Litigation? A Simultaneous Equations Approach

ABSTRACT: Audit researchers have a long-standing interest in understanding whether issuing a going concern report to financially stressed clients protects auditors from litigation. An endogeneity issue arises, in that litigation risk affects the going concern decision and the going concern decision impacts auditor litigation risk. Using a simultaneous equations approach, we find a significant positive association between auditors' ex ante litigation risk and going concern reporting. By applying simultaneous equations, we also find a significant negative association between going concern reporting and auditor litigation, suggesting that auditors deter lawsuits by issuing going concern reports to their financially stressed clients. Our research further provides a more rigorous analysis of the relation between going concern reporting and lawsuit outcomes in the form of auditor litigation dismissals, small settlement amounts, and large settlement amounts. Our results indicate that when auditors are named in lawsuits, having issued a going concern report reduces the likelihood of large financial settlements. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available through sources identified in the study.

Audit Fees and Auditor Dismissals in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era

The accounting scandals and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 resulted in large increases in required audit work, and corresponding increases in audit fees for public companies. This study provides early evidence regarding the relationship between higher audit fees, both levels and changes, and auditor dismissals in the period immediately subsequent to the passage of SOX. We find that clients paying higher fees are more likely to dismiss their auditors. We also find that dismissals are associated with smaller companies, companies with going-concern reports, and companies that later reported material weaknesses in their internal controls. Among dismissing clients, smaller Big 4 clients, paying higher fees, tend to hire non-Big 4 successor auditors. This result holds when auditors are divided into Big 4, national, and local tiers. We also find evidence that dismissing clients, in particular clients hiring new non-Big 4 auditors, experience smaller fee increases than nonswitching clients in the following year. These results are consistent with the notion that in the immediate post-SOX period, some companies dismissed their auditors in expectation of lower fees from the succeeding auditor.

Going-Concern Opinions, Auditor Switching, and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Effect Examined in the Regulatory Context of Belgium

Previous studies have demonstrated that auditors are reluctant to issue going-concern opinions. Some suggest this reluctance is strategic and stems from the auditor's desire to avoid loss of clients or reputation. This paper investigates the threat of loss resulting from auditor switching and client bankruptcy in the regulatory context of Belgium. Belgium requires companies to engage an audit firm for a three-year period. Consequently, the client's threat of switching auditors is potentially more credible in the third year than in the first two years. The empirical results support the hypothesis that going-concern opinions significantly increase the probability of bankruptcy. Thus, going-concern reports remain relevant even in a country where debt financing is dominant. In addition, clients are four times more likely to switch auditors at the end of the mandatory term if they receive a going-concern opinion in the final year of the term relative to the previous two years. This strongly suggests that mandatory terms influence the association between going-concern opinions and auditor switching.

Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals following “New” Going-Concern Reports

One important role of audit committees is to protect external auditors from dismissal following the issuance of an unfavorable report. We examine auditor dismissals following new going-concern reports that Big 6 firms issued between 1988 and 1999. Our findings suggest that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance expertise, and lower stockholdings are more effective in shielding auditors from dismissal after the issuance of new going-concern reports. In addition, we find that the relation between audit committee independence and auditor protection from dismissal has grown stronger over time. Finally, independent audit committee members experience a significant increase in turnover rate after auditor dismissals. These findings, coupled with those from Carcello and Neal (2000), suggest that when affiliated directors dominate the audit committee, management often can (1) pressure its auditor to issue an unmodified report despite going-concern issues, and (2) dismiss its auditor if the auditor refuses to issue an unmodified report.

Further Evidence on the Auditor's Going-Concern Report: The Influence of Management Plans

The purpose of this paper is to report the results of a study examining whether auditors' going-concern reports are associated with management plans as directed in SAS No. 59. Proxies for management plan information are taken from management's discussion and analysis (MD&A), the 10-K, or the annual report. The paper extends work by Mutchler (1985) and Chen and Church (1992) by modeling and testing the association between the auditors' going-concern report and three types of management plan disclosures. After controlling for financial condition, size, default status, and the propensity to voluntarily disclose information, the results of the study indicate that auditors' going-concern reporting decisions are strongly linked to publicly available mitigating information relating to certain management plans. In particular, plans to issue equity and to borrow additional funds exerted the strongest association with the issuance of an unqualified opinion.

Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting

This study examines the relation between the composition of financially distressed firms' audit committees and the likelihood of receiving going-concern reports. For firms experiencing financial distress during 1994, we find that the greater the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee, the lower the probability the auditor will issue a going-concern report. These results support regulators' concern about financial-reporting quality and the recent calls for more independent audit committees.