Original and Revised Auditor Fee Data

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. A54-A69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca L. Rosner ◽  
Ariel Markelevich
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Reporting Requirements ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Auditor Fees

SUMMARY: A significant number of companies report revised auditor fees (audit, nonaudit services, and total) in subsequent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. We find that, on average, revised audit fees and total fees are significantly higher, and nonaudit services (NAS) fees are significantly lower than the originally reported fees. The occurrence of fee revisions decreases significantly after 2006 and does not appear to be concentrated in specific industries. In addition, we find that larger clients are more likely to report fee revisions, while clients of Big 4 auditors and clients that file late are less likely to report fee revisions. We also examine the magnitude of upward and downward fee revisions. The fee revisions likely result from the changes in the SEC's fee disclosure reporting requirements from 2001 to 2003, as well as ambiguity related to the new requirements. In addition, they also may stem from estimated billing by accounting firms prior to filing with the SEC, followed by more precise billing after the filing. Our objective is to alert managers and practitioners to the subtleties of the fee disclosure requirements relative to fees billed/paid, the disparity in fee reporting, and the necessity for reporting revised fees if appropriate. We advise audit committee members, analysts, researchers, and other users of audit fee data to use revised fee numbers and exercise caution when using originally reported fees, as they often are revised.

Factors Associated with the Early Adoption of the SEC's Revised Auditor Fee Disclosure Rules

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharad Asthana ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Factors Associated ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Early Adoption ◽  
Disclosure Rules ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Auditor Fees ◽  
Considerable Concern

Corporate disclosures of auditor fees (beginning in February 2001) caused considerable concern among regulators and investors about auditor independence because they revealed that nonaudit fees were a substantial proportion of total auditor fees. However, in 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced revised disclosure requirements, specifying a broader definition of audit fees, and additional fee categories (SEC 2003). About 31 percent of our sample firms adopted the new rules in advance of the required date. We investigate the pattern of early adoption of the new fee disclosure rules by companies. Our results indicate that companies with greater nonaudit fee ratios during the prior year, companies that could show a greater decline in nonaudit fee ratios due to reclassification under SEC (2003), and companies that had greater audit-related fees after the reclassification were likely to adopt the new rules early. We conjecture that companies that had the most to gain from reclassifying fees—possibly by reducing negative investor perceptions about nonaudit services—adopted the new rules earlier than required.

Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

Long-Term Trends in Audit Fees

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishnagopal Menon ◽  
David D. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Expectation Gap ◽  
Long Term Effect ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Model Coefficient ◽  
Long Term Trends ◽  
Wage Increases

The audit fees literature contains little by way of systematic evidence on long-term trends in audit fees. This study analyzes trends in audit fees from 1980 through 1997, adjusting for changes in client size, complexity, and risk. The sample is restricted to clients of Big 6 firms that voluntarily disclosed audit fees in the period 1980–1997. Evidence is found that audit fees increased in the 1980s but stayed flat in the 1990s. Most important, a significant increase is noted in 1988, the year in which the Auditing Standards Board issued the “expectation gap” standards. These results hold even after controlling for wage increases in accounting firms, suggesting an expansion of auditing effort. There is no evidence that auditors obtain any price premium from industry specialization. The 1989 Big 8 mergers appear to have had a short-term, but not long-term, effect on fees. Finally, the magnitude of the audit fee model coefficient for accounts receivable and inventory has declined over the period, presumably due to productivity improvements.

scholarly journals Kualitas Audit: Ditinjau dari Fee Audit, Risiko Audit dan Skeptisme Profesional Auditor sebagai Variabel Moderating

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Muslim Muslim ◽  
Syamsuri Rahim ◽  
Muhammad Faisal AR Pelu ◽  
Alma Pratiwi
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Positive Effect

The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of audit fees and audit risk on audit quality with auditor professional skepticism as a moderating variable. This research was conducted at 8 public accounting firms in Makassar city with 40 respondents. The analytical method used is multiple regression analysis (Moderated Regression Analysis) which is used to measure the strength of the relationship between two or more variables. The results of this study found that the audit fee variable had a negative and not significant effect on audit quality. These results illustrate that the higher the audit fee received by the auditor, the audit quality will decrease. While audit risk is not a significant positive effect on audit quality. The results of this study illustrate that the higher the audit risk, the audit quality will decrease. The auditor's professional skepticism as a moderating variable is not able to strengthen the effect of audit fees on audit quality. Furthermore, auditor professional skepticism as a moderating variable is also unable to strengthen the effect of audit risk on audit quality

Did the 2007 PCAOB Disciplinary Order against Deloitte Impose Actual Costs on the Firm or Improve Its Audit Quality?

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rates ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Archival Studies ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee

ABSTRACT We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

U.S. Big 4 and Local Auditors in the China Initial Public Offering Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950024 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi-Yuan Feng ◽  
Hua-Wei Huang ◽  
Mai Dao
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Corporate Fraud ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Investment Distortions ◽  
Ipo Pricing ◽  
Public Offering

This paper examines (1) whether auditor type affects initial public offering (IPO) pricing; (2) whether the effect of IPO pricing is different for clients with different ownership structures. We find that (1) firms being audited by Big 4 accounting firms receive IPO premium while others being audited by local accounting firms do not; (2) Big 4 auditors receive higher audit fees than China’s Top 10 or small local auditors. This paper extends the prior research (e.g., Kumar, P and N Langberg (2009). Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 40, 144–172) that reduces agency conflicts between shareholders and manager (by means of better audit quality) and also reconciles corporate misreporting and investment distortions.

Going-Concern Audit Opinions and the Provision of Nonaudit Services: Implications for Auditor Independence of Bankrupt Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Callaghan ◽  
Mohinder Parkash ◽  
Rajeev Singhal
Keyword(s):  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Auditor Fees ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

SUMMARY: Researchers in the area of auditor independence have examined the relationship between auditors' opinions and auditor-provided services. While DeFond et al. (2002) and Geiger and Rama (2003) fail to find auditor impairment for distressed U.S. companies, Sharma (2001) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) find a negative relationship between the likelihood of a going-concern (GC) opinion and nonaudit fees paid to auditors for bankrupt Australian companies. These conflicting results may arise from jurisdictional differences between Australia and the U.S. or differential managerial incentives and firm costs between distressed and bankrupt firms. In light of these differences, an empirical question exists as to whether the results of the Australian studies will obtain in the U.S. We examine the relationship between the propensity of auditors to render GC opinions and nonaudit fees (and other auditor fees) for a sample of bankrupt U.S. firms. We do not observe any association between GC opinions and nonaudit fees, audit fees, total fees, or the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees.

Estimating Audit Fees Post-SOX

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. A9-A18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise E. Dickins ◽  
Julia L. Higgs ◽  
Terrance R. Skantz
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Pricing Models ◽  
Estimation Process ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Pricing Process ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Risk Areas

SYNOPSIS: This article discusses the findings of structured interviews with audit practitioners with a goal of increasing our understanding of the audit fee estimation process and how that process has changed following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The data provide practicing auditors with information that may be helpful in the development or revision of their own audit fee pricing practices. The data are also relevant to audit committee members as they seek to better understand the audit fee pricing process and how potential risk areas or other matters may impact audit fees. Researchers may also find the results of the interviews useful for the enhancement of audit fee pricing models, whether to more-closely align estimation models with the reported fee estimation process, or to revise models to reflect post-SOX economic and regulatory changes.

An Analysis of SEC and PCAOB Enforcement Actions against Engagement Quality Reviewers

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
William F. Messier ◽  
Thomas M. Kozloski ◽  
Natalia Kochetova-Kozloski
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Audit Process ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Quality Review ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Quality Control Mechanism

SUMMARY: Engagement quality review is an integral part of the audit process. It is designed to be a quality control mechanism for assessing the quality of an audit engagement. Since the 1990s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased sanctions against partners serving as engagement quality reviewers. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued an auditing standard on engagement quality review as required by Section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This practice note reports on an analysis of SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions against engagement quality reviewers (EQRs). Our results show the following: We identified 28 cases since 1993 that involve some type of sanction against an EQR. Only eight cases involved the Big 4/5 public accounting firms. All of the 28 cases involved sanctions due to violations of GAAS and 75 percent contained GAAP violations. Twenty-three cases identified GAAS violations related to a lack of due professional care. Further analysis of those cases showed that the EQR demonstrated a lack of professional skepticism in 22 cases, over-relied on management representations in 20 cases, and ignored materiality concerns in five cases. About half of the 28 cases resulted in the EQR being denied the privilege of practicing before the SEC or PCAOB for three or more years. Our findings provide important implications for practitioners and regulators, and areas for future research for those interested in engagement quality review.

Audit prices and Big 4 fee premiums: further evidence from Thailand

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanyawee Pratoomsuwan
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Using Data

Purpose Because there is mixed evidence regarding Big N fee premiums across countries, the purpose of this paper is to re-examine the phenomenon of audit price differentiations in the market for auditing services in Thailand. Although Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) reviewed over 80 audit fee papers from 20 countries over 25 years, 13 of which were based in emerging economies, the understanding of the market for auditing services in Thailand remains limited. Because the Thai auditing market is also classified as a segmented market – i.e., a market that is less competitive for large-client firms and more competitive for small-client firms – this study tests audit price competition in an emerging audit market using Thailand as an example. Design/methodology/approach The traditional audit fee model is used to estimate audit fee premiums for a sample of over 300 non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2011. Findings Although the market for auditing services in Thailand is consistent with that described in Ferguson et al. (2013) – in which Big N audit firms dominate only the large-client segment – the results show that Big N auditors charge higher audit fees and earn higher fee premiums compared with non-Big N auditors in both the small- and large-client segments of the audit market. Research limitations/implications The evidence from this study reveals the existence of Big N fee premiums across market segmentations. Audit price differentials between Big N and non-Big N firms in both small- and large-client market segments might concern regulators regarding competition in the audit market with respect to whether the Big N firms are charging uncompetitive audit fees. These findings also imply that audit pricing varies across countries and the Big N price deferential is typically larger in emerging markets than in more developed audit markets and that it might be inadequate to study single-country audit pricing. However, the question whether the Big N fee premium results from Big N product differentiation is not directly investigated in this study. Originality/value Because earlier studies focusing on audit fee premiums have been conducted using data from the USA and Australia, the findings add to the limited evidence regarding audit fee premiums in an emerging country such as Thailand.

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