On the Threshold of Compliance Public Charities and the Public Support Test

Author(s):  
Ashley Newton

This study investigates how public charities respond to the public support test – an IRS requirement that at least one-third of a public charity’s financial support is derived from public sources.  Using a large sample of 836,920 charity-year observations during 2009-2018, I find that a disproportionately large number of charities exceed the 33⅓% public support threshold by a small margin.  This result holds only for public charities actually subject to the test (six years of age or older) and not young charities that automatically retain public charity status.  Further, I find that charities that unexpectedly just meet public support test are more likely to understate fundraising expenses.  This evidence implies that the public support levels of charities that just surpass the 33⅓% threshold are likely misrepresented.  Overall, my findings provide new insights into a vitally important regulatory threshold that has been largely neglected in existing research.

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
C Jones

The author examines the interactions between the process of grant aid to property developers for urban regeneration projects and the operation of land markets. He begins with a brief overview of this financial support, in which the basic principles of this assistance are set out. The author's principal purpose is to assess the fundamental input assumptions behind the public support of these projects. As a prerequisite he outlines the nature of the property-development decisionmaking process. In the subsequent analysis of the funding-appraisal process of urban regeneration projects he considers a number of issues about the level of the developer's profit, land values, and the value of completed projects. In conclusion the author makes an overall assessment of the approach to grant aid for urban regeneration.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Beyeler ◽  
Hanspeter Kriesi

This article explores the impact of protests against economic globalization in the public sphere. The focus is on two periodical events targeted by transnational protests: the ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum (WEF). Based on a selection of seven quality newspapers published in different parts of the world, we trace media attention, support of the activists, as well as the broader public debate on economic globalization. We find that starting with Seattle, protest events received extensive media coverage. Media support of the street activists, especially in the case of the anti-WEF protests, is however rather low. Nevertheless, despite the low levels of support that street protesters received, many of their issues obtain wide public support.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002242782095320
Author(s):  
Alexander L. Burton ◽  
Justin T. Pickett ◽  
Cheryl Lero Jonson ◽  
Francis T. Cullen ◽  
Velmer S. Burton

Objectives: The recurring mass murder of students in schools has sparked an intense debate about how best to increase school safety. Because public opinion weighs heavily in this debate, we examine public views on how best to prevent school shootings. We theorize that three moral-altruistic factors are likely to be broadly relevant to public opinion on school safety policies: moral intuitions about harm, anger about school crime, and altruistic fear. Methods: We commissioned YouGov to survey 1,100 Americans to explore support for a range of gun control and school programming policies and willingness to pay for school target hardening. We test the ability of a moral-altruistic model to explain public opinion, while controlling for the major predictors of gun control attitudes found in the social sciences. Results: The public strongly supports policies that restrict who can access guns, expand school anti-bullying and counseling programs, and target-harden schools. While many factors influence attitudes toward gun-related policies specifically, moral-altruistic factors significantly increase support for all three types of school safety policies. Conclusions: The public favors a comprehensive policy response and is willing to pay for it. Support for prevention efforts reflects moral intuitions about harm, anger about school crime, and altruistic fear.


2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Williams

New Labour's conceptualisation of public participation in local government creates a tension in public participation practice. Government legislation and guidance require local authorities to develop and provide citizen-centred services, engage the public in policy-making and respond to the public's views. Seen in this light, New Labour policy draws from radical democratic discourse. However, local authority staff are also expected to act in accordance with the direction set by their line managers, the Council and the government and to inform, engage and persuade the public of the benefit of their authority's policies. In this respect, New Labour policy draws from the discursive model of civil society, conceptualising public participation as a method for engendering civil ownership of the formal structures of representative democracy. Tension is likely to arise when the ideas, opinions and values of the local authority differ from those expressed by the participating public. This paper uses a local ‘public participation’ initiative to investigate how the tension is managed in practice. The study shows how decision-makers dealt with the tension by using participatory initiatives to supply information, understand the views of the public and encourage public support around pre-existing organisational agendas. Problems occurred when citizens introduced new agendas by breaking or manipulating the rules of participation. Decision-makers responded by using a number of distinctive methods for managing citizens’ agendas, some of which were accompanied by strategies for minimising the injury done to citizens’ motivations for further participation. The paper concludes that New Labour policy fails to deal with the tensions between the radical and discursive models of participation and in the final analysis draws mainly from the discursive model of participation. Furthermore, whilst New Labour policy promotes dialogue between the public and local authority, it does not empower local authority staff to achieve the goal of citizen-centred policy-making.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Baker ◽  
Mohd Masood ◽  
Muhammad Aziz Rahman ◽  
Stephen Begg

Abstract Assessing public opinion towards tobacco policies is important, particularly when determining the possible direction of future public health policies. The aim of this study was to describe the implementation of tobacco retailer licensing systems by state and territory governments in Australia, and to use the National Drug Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS) to assess levels of public support for a retailer licensing system in each jurisdiction over time and by a range of socio-demographic and behavioural attributes. National and state/territory estimates of public support for a tobacco retailer licensing system were derived as proportions using NDSHS data from 2004 to 2016. The effect of one’s jurisdiction of residence on the likelihood of supporting such an initiative in 2016 was assessed using logistic regression while controlling for various socio-demographic and behavioural characteristics. Public support for a tobacco retailer licensing system ranged from a high of 67.2% (95% CI 66.5% – 67.9%) nationally in 2007 and declined to 59.5% (95% CI 58.9% – 60.2%) in 2016. In 2016, support was greatest amongst those from Tasmania, those aged 50 years and older, females, those from the least disadvantaged areas, those living in major cities, never-smokers and never-drinkers. After adjusting for the socio-demographic and behavioural attributes of respondents, those from Queensland were significantly less likely to support a licensing system (adjusted OR = 0.85, 95% CI 0.77 – 0.94) compared to those from other jurisdictions, while those from Tasmania were significantly more likely to support a licensing system compared to those from other jurisdictions (adjusted OR = 1.29 , 95% CI 1.09 – 1.52). A clear majority of the public support a tobacco retailer licensing system, regardless of whether or not such a system is already in place in their jurisdiction of residence. Tobacco control initiatives other than a retailer licensing system may explain some of the residual variations in support observed between jurisdictions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanchayan Banerjee ◽  
Manu Savani ◽  
Ganga Shreedhar

This article reviews the literature on public support for ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ policy instruments for behaviour change, and the factors that drive such preferences. Soft policies typically include ‘moral suasion’ and educational campaigns, and more recently behavioural public policy approaches like nudges. Hard policy instruments, such as laws and taxes, restrict choices and alter financial incentives. In contrast to the public support evidenced for hard policy instruments during COVID-19, prior academic literature pointed to support for softer policy instruments. We investigate and synthesise the evidence on when people prefer one type of policy instrument over another. Drawing on multi-disciplinary evidence, we identify perceived effectiveness, trust, personal experience and self-interest as important determinants of policy instrument preferences, along with broader factors including the choice and country context. We further identify various gaps in our understanding that informs and organise a future research agenda around three themes. Specifically, we propose new directions for research on what drives public support for hard versus soft behavioural public policies, highlighting the value of investigating the role of individual versus contextual factors (especially the role of behavioural biases); how preferences evolve over time; and whether and how preferences spillovers across different policy domains.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nate Breznau ◽  
Carola Hommerich

Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections. However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980-2006) we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English-speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societies – especially with higher historical inequality – reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies – especially with lower historical inequality – opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.


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