Why does the public support or oppose agricultural nutrient runoff regulations? The effects of political orientation, environmental worldview, and policy specific beliefs

2021 ◽  
Vol 279 ◽  
pp. 111708
Author(s):  
Tian Guo ◽  
Victoria Campbell-Arvai ◽  
Bradley J. Cardinale
Envigogika ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Krajhanzl ◽  
Tomáš Chabada

In this study we provide a detailed analysis and comparison of the public support for climate protection and wildlife protection using nationally representative data from the Czech Republic. The results of regression analyses have shown that support for both protections is significantly increasing with growing pro-environmental beliefs of people, leisure time they spent in nature and their altruism. Support for climate protection also rises with higher election participation, left-wing political orientation and younger age. Support for wildlife protection increases with growing trust in non-profit organizations while decreases with growing trust in science & research institutions. The comparison of groups defined according to their consent with climate protection and wildlife protection showed that support for wildlife protection can be characterized as a more inclusive environmental attitude than support for climate protection. The paper discusses the implications of these findings for protagonists of environmental politics and ways how they approach the public.


2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. STEPHEN WEATHERFORD

The concept of critical realignment has shaped much of the thinking of political scientists and historians about the processes and patterns of change in American politics. Research on re-alignment has, however, tended to focus on successful cases and to concentrate on the electoral breakpoints rather than the process of regime formation, with the result that little systematic thinking has been devoted to the question of why some electoral upheavals lead to party realignment while other large vote shifts do not. This article begins from the proposition that the election does not so much constitute the realignment as offer the opportunity and the momentum for the new party to build a lasting national coalition. Whether the party capitalizes on this potential depends on processes and events that follow the critical election, during what could be called the ‘consolidation phase’ of the realignment. The question is ultimately one about public opinion, but the concept of consolidation needs to take in the interaction between the public and political elites, since mass opinion is formed in the context of elite initiatives and interpretations. The model of consolidation depicts two interrelated processes. The first involves strategic competition among elites, including elected officials and organized societal interests, who frame the conflict, by prioritizing issues and cleavages, and by relating policy proposals to group identities and widely-shared values. The second focuses on the public. Their standing loyalties disrupted by the crisis and the incumbents' inability to deal with it successfully, citizens engage in a process of experiential search as they seek to re-establish the stable political orientation given by attachment to a political party. The article draws on qualitative and quantitative information from the New Deal to illustrate the model of consolidation.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


Author(s):  
Ashley Newton

This study investigates how public charities respond to the public support test – an IRS requirement that at least one-third of a public charity’s financial support is derived from public sources.  Using a large sample of 836,920 charity-year observations during 2009-2018, I find that a disproportionately large number of charities exceed the 33⅓% public support threshold by a small margin.  This result holds only for public charities actually subject to the test (six years of age or older) and not young charities that automatically retain public charity status.  Further, I find that charities that unexpectedly just meet public support test are more likely to understate fundraising expenses.  This evidence implies that the public support levels of charities that just surpass the 33⅓% threshold are likely misrepresented.  Overall, my findings provide new insights into a vitally important regulatory threshold that has been largely neglected in existing research.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Beyeler ◽  
Hanspeter Kriesi

This article explores the impact of protests against economic globalization in the public sphere. The focus is on two periodical events targeted by transnational protests: the ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum (WEF). Based on a selection of seven quality newspapers published in different parts of the world, we trace media attention, support of the activists, as well as the broader public debate on economic globalization. We find that starting with Seattle, protest events received extensive media coverage. Media support of the street activists, especially in the case of the anti-WEF protests, is however rather low. Nevertheless, despite the low levels of support that street protesters received, many of their issues obtain wide public support.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002242782095320
Author(s):  
Alexander L. Burton ◽  
Justin T. Pickett ◽  
Cheryl Lero Jonson ◽  
Francis T. Cullen ◽  
Velmer S. Burton

Objectives: The recurring mass murder of students in schools has sparked an intense debate about how best to increase school safety. Because public opinion weighs heavily in this debate, we examine public views on how best to prevent school shootings. We theorize that three moral-altruistic factors are likely to be broadly relevant to public opinion on school safety policies: moral intuitions about harm, anger about school crime, and altruistic fear. Methods: We commissioned YouGov to survey 1,100 Americans to explore support for a range of gun control and school programming policies and willingness to pay for school target hardening. We test the ability of a moral-altruistic model to explain public opinion, while controlling for the major predictors of gun control attitudes found in the social sciences. Results: The public strongly supports policies that restrict who can access guns, expand school anti-bullying and counseling programs, and target-harden schools. While many factors influence attitudes toward gun-related policies specifically, moral-altruistic factors significantly increase support for all three types of school safety policies. Conclusions: The public favors a comprehensive policy response and is willing to pay for it. Support for prevention efforts reflects moral intuitions about harm, anger about school crime, and altruistic fear.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Matthew Ward

Advances in social movement research conceptualise micromobilisation as – at least – a two-step sequential process in which willingness to participate must first be generated and then translated into actual participation. However, such research often ignores a more fundamental first step in this process: the generation of movement support. I address this gap by drawing on a nationally representative sample of adults in the United States – who either sympathised with or opposed anti-immigration activism – to identify individual attributes differentiating anti-immigration movement supporters and non-supporters. Perceptions of economic threat, waning confidence in political leadership, and prejudicial cultural beliefs about Latinos represent attributes differentiated movement supporters from non-supporters. Power devaluation theory is used as an overarching framework to meaningfully interpret these results. More generally, I argue that grievances play an important, yet under theorised role in jumpstarting conservative micromobilisation and that principles from power devaluation theory can help us understand the differentiation of movement support, irrespective of a social movement's political orientation.


2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Williams

New Labour's conceptualisation of public participation in local government creates a tension in public participation practice. Government legislation and guidance require local authorities to develop and provide citizen-centred services, engage the public in policy-making and respond to the public's views. Seen in this light, New Labour policy draws from radical democratic discourse. However, local authority staff are also expected to act in accordance with the direction set by their line managers, the Council and the government and to inform, engage and persuade the public of the benefit of their authority's policies. In this respect, New Labour policy draws from the discursive model of civil society, conceptualising public participation as a method for engendering civil ownership of the formal structures of representative democracy. Tension is likely to arise when the ideas, opinions and values of the local authority differ from those expressed by the participating public. This paper uses a local ‘public participation’ initiative to investigate how the tension is managed in practice. The study shows how decision-makers dealt with the tension by using participatory initiatives to supply information, understand the views of the public and encourage public support around pre-existing organisational agendas. Problems occurred when citizens introduced new agendas by breaking or manipulating the rules of participation. Decision-makers responded by using a number of distinctive methods for managing citizens’ agendas, some of which were accompanied by strategies for minimising the injury done to citizens’ motivations for further participation. The paper concludes that New Labour policy fails to deal with the tensions between the radical and discursive models of participation and in the final analysis draws mainly from the discursive model of participation. Furthermore, whilst New Labour policy promotes dialogue between the public and local authority, it does not empower local authority staff to achieve the goal of citizen-centred policy-making.


2018 ◽  
pp. 8-15
Author(s):  
Іvan Pobochiy

The level of social harmony in society and the development of democracy depends to a large extent on the level of development of parties, their ideological and political orientation, methods and means of action. The purpose of the article is to study the party system of Ukraine and directions of its development, which is extremely complex and controversial. The methods. The research has led to the use of such scientific search methods as a system that allowed the party system of Ukraine to be considered as a holistic organism, and the historical and political method proved to be very effective in analyzing the historical preconditions and peculiarities of the formation of the party system. The results. The incompetent, colonial past and the associated cruel national oppression, terror, famine, and violent Russification caused the contradictory and dramatic nature of modernization, the actual absence of social groups and their leaders interested in it, and the relatively passive reaction of society to the challenges of history. Officials have been nominated by mafia clans, who were supposed to protect their interests and pursue their policies. Political struggle in the state took place not between influential political parties, but between territorial-regional clans. The party system of Ukraine after the Maidan and the beginning of the war on the Donbass were undergoing significant changes. On the political scene, new parties emerged in the course of the protests and after their completion — «Petro Poroshenko Bloc», «People’s Front», «Self-help»), which to some extent became spokespeople for not regional, but national interests. Pro-European direction is the main feature of the leading political parties that have formed a coalition in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Conclusion. The party system of Ukraine as a result of social processes is at the beginning of a new stage in its development, an important feature of which is the increase in the influence of society (direct and indirect) on the political life of the state. Obviously, there is a demand from the public for the emergence of new politicians, new leaders and new political forces that citizens would like to see first and foremost speakers and defenders of their interests.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Baker ◽  
Mohd Masood ◽  
Muhammad Aziz Rahman ◽  
Stephen Begg

Abstract Assessing public opinion towards tobacco policies is important, particularly when determining the possible direction of future public health policies. The aim of this study was to describe the implementation of tobacco retailer licensing systems by state and territory governments in Australia, and to use the National Drug Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS) to assess levels of public support for a retailer licensing system in each jurisdiction over time and by a range of socio-demographic and behavioural attributes. National and state/territory estimates of public support for a tobacco retailer licensing system were derived as proportions using NDSHS data from 2004 to 2016. The effect of one’s jurisdiction of residence on the likelihood of supporting such an initiative in 2016 was assessed using logistic regression while controlling for various socio-demographic and behavioural characteristics. Public support for a tobacco retailer licensing system ranged from a high of 67.2% (95% CI 66.5% – 67.9%) nationally in 2007 and declined to 59.5% (95% CI 58.9% – 60.2%) in 2016. In 2016, support was greatest amongst those from Tasmania, those aged 50 years and older, females, those from the least disadvantaged areas, those living in major cities, never-smokers and never-drinkers. After adjusting for the socio-demographic and behavioural attributes of respondents, those from Queensland were significantly less likely to support a licensing system (adjusted OR = 0.85, 95% CI 0.77 – 0.94) compared to those from other jurisdictions, while those from Tasmania were significantly more likely to support a licensing system compared to those from other jurisdictions (adjusted OR = 1.29 , 95% CI 1.09 – 1.52). A clear majority of the public support a tobacco retailer licensing system, regardless of whether or not such a system is already in place in their jurisdiction of residence. Tobacco control initiatives other than a retailer licensing system may explain some of the residual variations in support observed between jurisdictions.


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