The Association between IT Material Weaknesses and Earnings Management

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Heninger ◽  
Eric N. Johnson ◽  
John R. Kuhn
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Significant Positive Association ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Financial Condition ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the relationship between (1) information technology-related internal control material weaknesses (ITMWs) as reported by public companies between 2004 and 2012, and (2) earnings management. Prior research suggests that companies with internal control deficiencies are more likely to manage earnings; however, no study has specifically examined the incremental effect of ITMWs on earnings management tendencies. Based on a sample of 268 firm-years of ITMWs disclosed by U.S. public companies in their annual SEC filings (pursuant to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), we find a significant positive association between ITMWs and income-increasing abnormal accruals. In addition, we find a positive relation between poor financial condition and material weaknesses in these companies. These results are robust with respect to two control samples of firms with non-IT-related-only material weaknesses (non-ITMWs) and firms with no material weakness disclosures. Implications of these findings for investors, regulators, and future research are discussed.

SOX 404(b) exemption effects on auditor changes

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (4/5) ◽  
pp. 387-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W. Hoffman ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Positive Association ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Significant Positive Association ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Sensitivity Tests ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Section 404(b) exemption caused an increase in auditor changes due to changes in expectations for both auditors and their clients. Design/methodology/approach This paper predicts that this exemption caused a significant amount of auditor changes post-exemption, due to a change in expected future economic rents (audit scope demands) for auditors (clients). Logistic regression analysis is used to examine whether auditor changes increased for non-accelerated filers (public companies with less than $75 million in public float), who were affected by this exemption, compared to auditor changes for accelerated filers (public companies with greater than $75 million in public float), who were not affected by this exemption. Findings The results show a significant positive association between the exemption and auditor dismissals for non-accelerated filers compared to that of accelerated filers. This finding is robust when sensitivity tests are used. Practical implications Prior literature finds that an increase in auditor changes can have various positive and negative effects on the affected companies. Thus, investors will be interested in the results of this paper when making their investment decisions with regard to non-accelerated filers. Social implications The results of this paper will aid policymakers as they consider the pros and cons of this exemption, as it pertains to the affected companies. Originality/value This paper is the first to study the effects of this exemption on auditor turnover for the affected companies.

Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Material Internal Control Weaknesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Picheng Lee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Reported Earnings

SUMMARY: The main objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor has to report an assessment of the firm’s internal controls and attest to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls. Material weaknesses in internal controls must be disclosed in the auditor and management reports. The objective of this study is to examine if firms reporting material internal control weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms. The results provide mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for other firms. Since the findings of ineffective internal controls by auditors under Section 404 may cause firms to improve their internal controls, Section 404 has the potential benefits of reducing the opportunity of intentional and unintentional accounting errors and of improving the quality of reported earnings.

Material Weakness in Internal Controls and Stock Price Crash Risk

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Lobo ◽  
Chong Wang ◽  
Xiaoou Yu ◽  
Yuping Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Significant Relation ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

We investigate the association between material weakness in internal controls (MW) disclosed under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and future stock price crash risk. We argue that relative to firms with effective internal controls, firms with MW have lower financial reporting precision. The lower reporting precision (a) increases divergence of investor opinion with regard to firm valuation and (b) facilitates managers’ withholding of negative information, which increases the information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. We hypothesize that both these effects increase the probability of a future stock price crash. We find empirical evidence consistent with our prediction. In additional analyses, we document that the positive association between MW and crash risk is primarily driven by company level rather than by account-specific weaknesses, increases with the number of material weaknesses, and intensifies during the financial crisis. In addition, we find that both the existence and the disclosure of MW incrementally affect crash risk, and that MW facilitates managers’ withholding of bad news. Finally, we fail to find consistent evidence of a significant relation between MW disclosed under Section 404 of SOX and crash risk.

The Persistence in the Association between Section 404 Material Weaknesses and Financial Reporting Quality

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma-Riikka Myllymäki
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
History Of

SUMMARY This study examines whether Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404 material weakness (MW404) disclosures are predictive of future financial reporting quality. I find evidence that for companies with a history of MW404s, the likelihood of misstatements in financial information continues to be significantly higher for two years after the last MW404 report compared to companies without a history of reported MW404s. The magnitude of the effect decreases non-linearly with decreasing speed. The findings further imply that the reason for the misstatement incidences is the unacknowledged pervasiveness of control problems. In particular, it appears that in many cases, the future misstatements are unrelated to the MW types disclosed in the last MW404 report, suggesting that some MW types are unacknowledged and, hence, control problems are even more pervasive than what was identified. Overall, the findings of this study highlight the importance of discovering and disclosing material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.

scholarly journals From Phishing To Advanced Persistent Threats: The Application Of Cybercrime Risk To The Enterprise Risk Management Model

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Enterprise Risk Management ◽  
Management Model ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Advanced Persistent Threats ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Enterprise Risk

This paper examines the issues of cybercrime in the context of risk to organizations.  In particular, it considers the control frameworks most commonly used by U.S. public companies to benchmark their internal controls over financial reporting.  It discusses the market for stolen identities, looking at the sources from which many of those identities are stolen.  It reviews the available internal control frameworks and explains how a firm’s risk of cybercrime might be classified as a material weakness under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404.  It models how the use of COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management model could improve an organization’s chances of avoiding a serious incident.

Executive Accountants and the Reliability of Financial Reporting

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrienne Rhodes ◽  
Dan Russomanno
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Chief Financial Officer ◽  
Accrual Quality ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Executive Officers

Using hand-collected data from mandatory disclosures of executive officers, we examine financial reporting outcomes associated with delegating significant accounting responsibilities to an executive accountant, not concurrently serving as the chief financial officer or chief executive officer. We find executive accountants are associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of restatement. Moreover, we find evidence of a positive association between executive accountants and accrual quality and faster remediation of material weaknesses in internal control when an executive accountant is present. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with more reliable financial reporting at firms with an executive accountant. In contrast, accountants identified in commonly used datasets (i.e., Execucomp or BoardEx) are not consistently associated with the reliability of financial reporting. We highlight the significant differences between datasets, largely attributable to the objectives and sources of the underlying data. We conclude that Execucomp and BoardEx are not substitute datasets for the executive officers disclosed in firms’ 10-K and proxy statement filings. Furthermore, we caution future research to consider which data are most appropriate in the context of each research question. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weili Ge ◽  
Sarah McVay
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Foreign Currency ◽  
Revenue Recognition ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Specific Material ◽  
Business Complexity

This paper focuses on a sample of 261 companies that disclosed at least one material weakness in internal control in their SEC filings after the effective date of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Based on the descriptive material weakness disclosures provided by management, we find that poor internal control is usually related to an insufficient commitment of resources for accounting controls. Material weaknesses in internal control tend to be related to deficient revenue-recognition policies, lack of segregation of duties, deficiencies in the period-end reporting process and accounting policies, and inappropriate account reconciliation. The most common account-specific material weaknesses occur in the current accrual accounts, such as the accounts receivable and inventory accounts. Material weakness disclosures by management also frequently describe internal control problems in complex accounts, such as the derivative and income tax accounts. In our statistical analysis, we find that disclosing a material weakness is positively associated with business complexity (e.g., multiple segments and foreign currency), negatively associated with firm size (e.g., market capitalization), and negatively associated with firm profitability (e.g., return on assets).

Reflections on a Decade of SOX 404(b) Audit Production and Alternatives

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Kinney ◽  
Roger D. Martin ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Quality Disclosure ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Personal Experiences ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Audit Production ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The U.S

SYNOPSIS Since passage of the quickly finalized Sarbanes-Oxley Act during July 2002, audit production in the U.S. has been substantially expanded by mandated internal control audits. The control audit mandate is unique to the U.S. and costly to apply, yet little is known about the conduct of control audits or the efficacy of lower-cost alternatives. This paper reflects our overall knowledge about control audit production and observation of a consistent message across public and limited non-public archival data, analytical studies, and numerous personal experiences of audit practitioners. Our primary observation is that, absent any financial misstatement, auditors find it difficult to identify material weaknesses in control design. Conversely, when auditors know about misstatements they can, and do, detect related material weaknesses and thereby identify most public companies found by mandated control audits to have ineffective controls. Thus, it appears possible to exploit this observation to identify and publicly disclose most companies with weak controls without incurring the cost of full internal control audits. We believe that U.S. markets could benefit from more transparency about the current U.S. audit production process and from informed debate about the best mechanism design for balancing the needs of all parties interested in internal control quality disclosure.

Does Audit Quality Influence the Relation between Earnings Management and Internal Control Weakness in the Post –SOX Period

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-100
Author(s):  
Judith van Ravenstein ◽  
Georgios Georgakopoulos ◽  
Petros Kalantonis ◽  
Panagiotis Kaldis
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Internal Control System ◽  
A Company ◽  
Big Four

Material weaknesses in the internal control system of a company create more opportunities for managers to engage in opportunistic earnings management. In this study the authors investigate the relation between earnings management and disclosed material weaknesses in the internal controls, both under SOX 302 and SOX 404, and examine whether audit quality, measured as being audited by a Big Four auditor, has an effect on that relation. The results suggest that material weakness firms have more absolute discretionary accruals and greater income-decreasing discretionary accruals. So evidence is provided that material weakness firms engage in more earnings management, however not in opportunistic income-increasing earnings management. When audit quality is high, measured as being audited by a Big Four auditor, the disclosed material weaknesses are lower just as total and absolute discretionary accruals are. It is also interesting in our findings that when material weakness firms are audited by a Big Four auditor a positive relationship seems to exist with discretionary accruals, suggesting that when a firm is audited by a Big Four auditor, material weaknesses in the internal controls will lead to opportunistic earnings management.

Real Earnings Management before and after Reporting SOX 404 Material Weaknesses

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuukka Järvinen ◽  
Emma-Riikka Myllymäki
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
High Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Internal Control System ◽  
Before And After

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this study is to investigate whether SOX Section 404 material weaknesses manifest in real earnings management behavior. The empirical findings indicate that, compared to companies with effective internal controls, companies with existing material weaknesses in their internal controls engage in more manipulation of real activities (particularly inventory overproduction). This implies that the weak commitment by management to provide effective internal control system and high-quality financial information relates to a tendency to use real earnings management methods. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting that companies employ real earnings management (overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses) after disclosing previous year's material weaknesses. We conjecture that the public disclosure of material weaknesses induces management to strive to mitigate the expected negative reactions of stakeholders to the disclosure by engaging in real earnings management, which is not easily detected or constrained by outsiders. Overall, this study suggests that material weaknesses in internal controls signal an environment where management is more inclined to employ real earnings management.

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