scholarly journals Forecasting economic result of manipulation using game theory modeling

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
O. Kuzmin ◽  
◽  
N. Stanasiuk ◽  
D. Berdnik ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Detection Methods ◽  
General Level ◽  
Economic Result ◽  
Model Based ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Annual Volume ◽  
Manipulation Detection

Manipulations are taking place widely on various capital, commodity, derivative and other markets. They are reported regularly and sometimes causing significant losses. But it doesn’t mean that the efforts intended to limit this sort of activity are insignificant. Surveillance budgets, as well as applied fines, are impressing. The annual volume of manipulative attempts and the efforts, intended to deter these attempts, are growing exponentially year after year. The imperfection and low versatility of detection methods are leaving space for successful attempts, making manipulative behavior still attractive. This paper is representing the model, based on the Game Theory and aimed to fit modern requirements of surveillance. The article defines basic problems in manipulation detection and proves model’s capability to solve them. However, the problem is reviewed on a general level allowing to elaborate the versatile model, but not a specific manipulative scenario. At the same time, the model allows complementing it with precise tools defining aspects related to actual manipulation. Manipulation and the shaping of it's economic results are reviewed in-depth, revealing it's core phenomenology.

Analysing Israel-Hamas Conflict Based on Game Theory Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdullah Hamida ◽  
◽  
Yongsheng Jin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Common ◽  
Resistance Movement ◽  
Israeli Defence Forces

ABSTRACT The Islamic Resistance Movement (AKA: Hamas) has taken control over Gaza Strip, Palestine, in 2007. Since then, the organization was in a continues hit-run conflict against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The conflict is very resistant to any sort of resolution, and Hamas and Israel engage frequently in what it seems an endless cycle of resentment and violence. Despite numerous mediations by global and regional powers, this conflict appears to be further away than ever. This particular conflict can’t be addressed according to the common negotiation theories that based on rationality and hard politics, which seems not that functional. Instead, a model based on the game theory approach is presented in this study to explain this phenomenon. In this work, some facts about Israel - Hamas regional concerns are explained. Moreover, the study analyses the reasons behind Hamas enforcing calm in Gaza, even though Hamas considers Israel as its arch enemy. The presented model shows that whenever Israel and Hamas reach an agreement, both sides can collaborate in maintaining a state of calm. Moreover, results show that the proposed model is applicable to analyse a conflict in terms of actions, duration and terms of settlement. KEYWORDS: Israel; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Hamas; Gaza strip; Game theory

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Final State ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Initial States ◽  
Quantum Strategy ◽  
Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

Grid Cyber-Physical System Risk Management Model Based on Cooperative Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Physical System ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Power Grid ◽  
Management Model ◽  
Cyber Physical System ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Generation Power

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.

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