British Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Nazi Germany’s Intentions

Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter examines the evolution of the views held by Britain’s key decision makers, including Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, about Nazi Germany’s intentions, the indicators they used to make inferences about the nature and scope of Adolf Hitler’s intentions, and the policies they advocated that reflected their assessments. Drawing on documents in the British National Archives, the chapter provides evidence that strongly supports the selective attention thesis along with the vividness and subjective credibility hypotheses, adequately supports the behavior thesis’ current actions hypotheses, and only weakly supports the capabilities and strategic military doctrine theses. While Hitler’s costly actions played a relatively important role in the intentions assessments of some decision makers, indicators associated with the capabilities thesis or strategic military doctrine thesis and Germany’s past actions were less central to the process of inferring Hitler’s political intentions.

Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter outlines the theoretical foundations of the selective attention thesis and three competing ones: the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses. It divides perceived political intentions into five ideal-type categories based on the degree to which the enemy is believed to have the determination required to revise the status quo and the extent of its revisionist intentions: unlimited expansionist, limited expansionist, unlimited opportunistic, limited opportunistic, and status quo powers. The chapter proceeds by offering a set of hypotheses as to how civilian decision makers and intelligence organizations conduct intentions assessment. In particular, it considers the vividness hypothesis, the subjective credibility hypothesis, the organizational expertise hypothesis, and the offense–defense theory. It also explains the methodology used in the three case studies.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter summarizes the book's empirical findings and explains their practical policy implications as well as their significance for international relations theory. The selective attention thesis is pitted against the capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis for each of the three historical episodes of intentions assessment. The selective attention thesis is more successful than the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses in accounting for the empirical patterns observed for the three cases. The evidence shows that when assessing intentions, decision makers rely on their personal impressions and are influenced by indicators that are consistent with their own theories about how the world operates as well as their preexisting stance toward an adversary. In contrast, intelligence organizations pay selective attention to those indicators that match their bureaucratic expertise. The chapter concludes by suggesting important avenues for further research.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (71) ◽  
pp. 43-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filip Ejdus

Abstract Serbia is the only state in the Western Balkans that is not seeking NATO membership. In December 2007, Serbia declared military neutrality and in spite of its EU membership aspirations, developed very close relations with Moscow. The objective of this paper is threefold. First, I argue that in order to understand why Serbia declared military neutrality, one has to look both at the discursive terrain and domestic power struggles. The key narrative that was strategically used by mnemonic entrepreneurs, most importantly by the former Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, to legitimize military neutrality was the trauma of NATO intervention in 1999 and the ensuing secession of Kosovo. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the operational consequences of the military neutrality policy for Serbia's relations with NATO and Russia, as well as for military reform and EU accession. Finally, I spell out the challenges ahead in Serbia's neutrality policy and argue that its decision makers will increasingly be caught between pragmatic foreign policy requirements on the one hand and deeply entrenched traumatic memories on the other.


1997 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 399-400
Author(s):  
Stanley B. Alpern

When I wrote two prominent European historians of western Africa that I was planning a trip to São Tomé and would check out the national archives, one replied: “Are there really local archives? The Cape Verdes seem to have lost theirs.” The other remarked that “[i]t would certainly be worth finding out whether any of the old archives are still on the island.” Even the person who would be my host there, a resident American official, had the impression that the Portuguese had carted off all the colonial records when São Tomé and Príncipe became independent in 1975.I am happy to report that the Arquivo Histórico of the new nation is alive and surprisingly well. On my visit in March of 1996 I met two dedicated and cultivated young women who were doing their utmost against long odds to organize and preserve all that is left of their country's written records. They are Maria Nazaré Ceita, a trained historian who is Director General of Culture of São Tomé e Principe, and, under her, Anabela Barroso, Director of the Arquivo Histórico.Since December of 1995 they and a tiny staff have been moving the archives into spacious, if spartan, new quarters in the heart of São Tomé city. The modernistic one-story building used to be the offices of the Prime Minister. When I visited the place, much had already been done. Long neat rows of boxed and dated dossiers were up on shelves, though jumbles of papers remained to be sorted. The archives also contains a small library for researchers and space for a large, as yet unfurnished, reading room.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter focuses on British assessments of Nazi Germany’s intentions during the interwar period (1934–1939). It outlines the predictions generated by each of the four explanations about perceived intentions and examines changes in German military capabilities, doctrine, and actions during this period. The chapter first considers the hypothetical arguments of the selective attention thesis and highlights its predictions for this case, focusing on the vividness hypothesis, the subjective credibility hypothesis, and the organizational expertise hypothesis. It then derives predictions for each of the competing theses, namely: capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. The findings suggest that Britain’s perceptions of Germany from 1934 to 1939 were shaped by costly actions that had been undertaken by the latter well before Adolf Hitler rose to power in January 1933.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.


Author(s):  
Karol Żakowski

The article analyzes the process of modification of Japan’s foreign policy after Donald Trump’s election as US president. As short- and middle-range aims of Japan’s diplomatic strategy were outlined with expectation of victory of Hillary Clinton, Tokyo was forced to abruptly change its policy. Relying on the neoclassical realist theory, the article examines the complex interaction between the external factors, such as security threats from North Korea or China, and domestic factors both in Japan and the US, that is personal, institutional, societal and economic determinants. It is argued that while it was strategic convergence between Tokyo and Washington that enabled relatively smooth cooperation between Prime Minister Abe and President Trump, internal factors, such as right-wing credentials of both decision makers, distorted and to some extent facilitated this process.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. intelligence organizations to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union. Drawing on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced on the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1980, the chapter considers the degree to which history confirms the predictions of the selective attention thesis's organizational expertise hypothesis. It also tests the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses. After providing a brief overview of the U.S. intelligence community's estimates of Soviet intentions earlier in the 1970s, the chapter discusses the intelligence organizations' views about Soviet intentions during Jimmy Carter's presidency. It shows that an effort to understand the adversary's political intentions did not play a significant role in the U.S. intelligence community's intentions assessments, and particularly in the NIEs' judgments of the threat posed by the USSR. Instead, most of the NIEs were dedicated to estimating current and projected Soviet strategic forces as well as military intentions.


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