The US Intelligence Community’s Assessments of Soviet Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Military Doctrine ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. intelligence organizations to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union. Drawing on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced on the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1980, the chapter considers the degree to which history confirms the predictions of the selective attention thesis's organizational expertise hypothesis. It also tests the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses. After providing a brief overview of the U.S. intelligence community's estimates of Soviet intentions earlier in the 1970s, the chapter discusses the intelligence organizations' views about Soviet intentions during Jimmy Carter's presidency. It shows that an effort to understand the adversary's political intentions did not play a significant role in the U.S. intelligence community's intentions assessments, and particularly in the NIEs' judgments of the threat posed by the USSR. Instead, most of the NIEs were dedicated to estimating current and projected Soviet strategic forces as well as military intentions.

The US Intelligence Community’s Assessments of Soviet Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Military Doctrine ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. intelligence organizations to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union. Drawing on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced on the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1980, the chapter considers the degree to which history confirms the predictions of the selective attention thesis’s organizational expertise hypothesis. It also tests the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses. After providing a brief overview of the U.S. intelligence community’s estimates of Soviet intentions earlier in the 1970s, the chapter discusses the intelligence organizations’ views about Soviet intentions during Jimmy Carter’s presidency. It shows that an effort to understand the adversary’s political intentions did not play a significant role in the U.S. intelligence community’s intentions assessments, and particularly in the NIEs’ judgments of the threat posed by the USSR. Instead, most of the NIEs were dedicated to estimating current and projected Soviet strategic forces as well as military intentions.

US Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Soviet Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
National Security ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.

US Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Soviet Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
National Security ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers' stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.

The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977–80

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
The United States ◽  
Carter Administration ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The U.S

This chapter discusses the relevant predictions of the alternative theses about how states should assess intentions by analyzing the case of the Carter administration during the period 1977–1980. Jimmy Carter began his time as president of the United States with great optimism about the USSR and was committed to improving the U.S.–Soviet relations. By the end of his tenure, however, Carter’s perceptions of the Soviet Union had changed and his policies emphasized competition over cooperation. The détente had collapsed. The chapter examines the Carter administration’s assessment of Soviet intentions, and more specifically the dramatic changes in U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union, using the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. It considers whether key decision makers in the Carter administration engaged in intentions assessment attend to different indicators than the U.S. intelligence organizations.

To the discussion about the modern world order

2020 ◽  
pp. 35-41
Author(s):  
A. Mustafabeyli
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Intergovernmental Relations ◽  
World System ◽  
Main Tool ◽  
World Order ◽  
Modern World ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Second World

In many political researches there if a conclusion that the world system which was founded after the Second world war is destroyed of chaos. But the world system couldn`t work while the two opposite systems — socialist and capitalist were in hard confrontation. After collapse of the Soviet Union and the European socialist community the nature of intergovernmental relations and behavior of the international community did not change. The power always was and still is the main tool of international communication.

Soviet Tanks, American Sedans: Traces of India’s Cold War-era Hedging Towards the United States, 1966–1971

2021 ◽  
pp. 097492842098309
Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Food Aid ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Evaluative Study ◽  
Complex Interdependence ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Food Shortages

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.

The Anti-Aryan Moment: Decolonization, Diplomacy, and Race in Late Pahlavi Iran

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Cold War

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”

Will the Rise of China Transform the International System?

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (Fall 2021) ◽  
pp. 231-258
Author(s):  
Kemal İnat ◽  
Melih Yıldız
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political System ◽  
International System ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Global Status ◽  
Chinese Policy ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
The Rise Of China ◽  
The U.S

In this article, the rise of China is discussed in the light of economic and military data, and what the challenge from China means for the global leadership of the U.S. is analyzed. Changes in the indicators of the U.S. and China’s economic and military power over the last 30-40 years are examined and an answer is sought for the following question: What will the consequences of China’s rise be in terms of the international political system? To answer this question, similar ‘rise and challenge’ precedents are discussed to contextualize and analyze and the present challenge China poses. This article concludes that while improving its global status, China has been taking the previous cases’ failed challenges into consideration. China, which does not want to repeat the mistakes made by Germany and the Soviet Union, is hesitant to pursue an aggressive military policy and tries to limit its rivalry with the U.S. in the economic area. While Chinese policy of avoiding direct conflict and focusing on economic development has made it the biggest economic rival of the U.S, the rise of China initiates the discussions about the end of the U.S. and West-led international system.

In Afghanistan: Western and Soviet Methods of Counterinsurgency

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Lasha Tchantouridze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Military Mission ◽  
Lasting Change

The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backed opposition forces subsequently made the situation even worse. On the other hand, the Western mission left the country better off in 2021, and violence subsided when power in the country was captured by the Taliban, which the United States has opposed.

The Emergence of the New Cold War: The Syrian and Ukraine Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World

This article evaluates the emergence of the new Cold War using the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts, among others. Incompatible interests between the United States (US) and Russia, short of open conflict, increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This article argues that the struggle for dominance between the two superpowers, both in speeches and deed, to a greater degree resembles what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. It asserts that despite the US’ unfettered power, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is now being checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion.

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