To the discussion about the modern world order

2020 ◽  
pp. 35-41
Author(s):  
A. Mustafabeyli

In many political researches there if a conclusion that the world system which was founded after the Second world war is destroyed of chaos. But the world system couldn`t work while the two opposite systems — socialist and capitalist were in hard confrontation. After collapse of the Soviet Union and the European socialist community the nature of intergovernmental relations and behavior of the international community did not change. The power always was and still is the main tool of international communication.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 356-360
Author(s):  
Irina V. Minakova ◽  
Tatyana N. Bukreeva ◽  
Оlga I. Solodukhina ◽  
Оlga G. Timofeeva

This paper reveals the consequences of the unipolar system of the world economy provided by the United States leadership in the military-technological, financial-economic, geopolitical and information-ideological spheres. It was established that after the collapse of the socialist camp, the concepts of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘spreading democracy’ were brought to the forefront. In practice, Western European countries have demonstrated their readiness to judge the solutions of domestic political disputes in other countries of the world, especially when it comes to geopolitically important countries. A series of ‘colour revolutions’ have become a demonstration of this policy. Therefore, the globalization of the modern world does not mean the homogenization of development indicators of countries’, but instead leads to further delamination and inequality. The gap between the world leaders and the rest of the world in terms of indicators reflecting the dynamics of the standard of living, the quality of life, scientific and technological progress, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has significantly increased.It is illustrated that attempts of the US to consolidate its hegemony in the form of ‘leadership’ in the world had led to the erosion of international legal principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the United States attempts to solve the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan unilaterally has failed.The objective and subjective signs of a global restructuring of the existing unipolar world system are revealed.


Author(s):  
A. V. Ryabov

The collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist commonwealth contributed to the reconstruction of integrity of the World-System. These changes became a major global transformation of the second half of the XX century. Then there was an opinion that over time the model of liberal capitalism would be established in all countries. However the restoration of the integrity of the global world did not lead to shaping of its homogeneity. New contradictions emerged both between developed and developing countries and within the core countries of the World-System. All of this undermined stability of the system and contributed to the gradual distraction of the unipolar world order. Russia initially tried to be integrated into the new world reality and become the main partner of the USA as a center of the World-System. However the plans of the United States and its allies did not provide that Russia would retain its role as an important and independent actor in world politics. As a result, Russia’s integration into the West did not take place. Nevertheless having made the transition to an independent policy not subordinated to the USA and its allies Russia could not claim to create alternative global social project as the Soviet Union had. To do this Russia had neither resources nor attractive idea for the rest of the world. As China began to turn into economic superpower it seemed that Beijing was not going to offer the world its own social project alternative to liberal capitalism but it claimed only to take place in existing global system corresponding to its economic impact. Situation was changed after the USA in the middle of the 10-th felt in China a serious rival and moved to the policy of deterrence of it. China began to work out its own model of the world order. Now in comparison with the past many experts suppose that Chinese model of the social and political order may be used by other developing countries. Will this lead to emergence of the new global project alternative to the Western liberal capitalism and to distraction of integrity of the World-System? Will there be a new global transformation as a result of current processes? This article is devoted to the analysis of probable prospects of these tendencies of the world development. 


Author(s):  
Judith M. Brown

Recent events in the Arab world have sharpened and widened public interest in the way states can be broken and made. Since the end of the Second World War the world has seen three great waves of state-breaking and state-making: the end of European empires; the collapse of the Soviet Union; and the contemporary ‘Arab Spring’. By revisiting an example from the first of these great waves, perhaps the greatest ‘imperial ending’—the end of British imperial rule in India in 1947, this lecture investigates issues which may prove instructive in probing the dynamics of other phases of turbulence in the structures and nature of states. It addresses four major questions which are relevant across the many different episodes of state breaking and making, with the help of evidence from the case of the South Asian subcontinent. What is the relationship between state and society and the patterns of relationship which help to determine the nature and vulnerability of the state? What makes a viable and destabilising opposition to the imperial state? What is the nature of the breaking or collapse of that state? How are states refashioned out of the inheritance of the previous regime and the breaking process?


Author(s):  
David Abulafia

The Allied victory over Germany in the Second World War, like that in the First, left the Mediterranean unsettled. After Greece emerged from its civil war with a pro-western government, there were ever louder rumbles in Cyprus, where the movement calling for enôsis, union with Greece, was gathering pace again. Precisely because the Greeks sided with the West, and because Turkey had kept out of the war, during the late 1940s the United States began to see the Mediterranean as an advance position in the new struggle against the expanding power of the Soviet Union. The explicit theme was the defence of democracy against Communist tyranny. Stalin’s realism had prevented him from supporting Communist insurgency in Greece, but he was keen to find ways of gaining free access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. In London and Washington, the fear that Soviet allies would establish themselves on the shores of the Mediterranean remained real, since the partisan leader in Yugoslavia, Tito, had played the right cards during the last stages of the war, even winning support from the British. Moreover, the Italians had lost Zadar along with the naval base at Kotor and chunks of Dalmatia they had greedily acquired during the war, while Albania, after an agonizing period of first Italian and then German occupation, had recovered its independence under the Paris-educated Communist leader Enver Hoxha, whose uncompromising stance was to bring his country into ever-greater isolation. When he took power, Hoxha imagined that his country would form part of a brotherly band of socialist nations, alongside Tito’s renascent Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Close ties with the Yugoslavs were sealed by economic pacts which reveal Tito’s hope of drawing Albania into the Yugoslav federation. Hoxha had other aspirations, and in his view Albania’s right to defend every square inch of the national territory extended into the waters off the Albanian coast: the Corfu Channel, long used as a waterway linking Greece to the Adriatic, was mined to prevent foreign incursions. Britain decided to send warships through the channel, asserting its right to police the Mediterranean on behalf of the nations of the world.


Author(s):  
Kal Raustiala

The single most important feature of American history after 1945 was the United States’s assumption of hegemonic leadership. Europeans had noted America’s enormous potential since at least the nineteenth century. After the Civil War the United States had one of the largest economies in the world, but, as noted earlier in this book, in geopolitical terms it remained a surprisingly minor player. By 1900 the United States was playing a more significant political role. But it was only after 1945 that the nation’s potential on the world stage was fully realized. Victory in the Second World War left the United States in an enviable position. Unlike the Soviet Union, which endured devastating fighting on its territory and lost tens of millions of citizens, the United States had experienced only one major attack on its soil. Thanks to its actions in the war America had great influence in Europe. And the national economy emerged surprisingly vibrant from the years of conflagration, easily dominant over any conceivable rival or set of rivals. When the First World War ended the United States ultimately chose to return to its hemispheric perch. It declined to join the new League of Nations, and rather than maintaining engagement with the great powers of the day, America generally turned inward. The years following the Second World War were quite different. In addition to championing—and hosting—the new United Nations, the United States quickly established a panoply of important institutions aimed at maintaining and organizing international cooperation in both economic and security affairs. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union, apparent to many shortly after the war’s end, led the United States to remain militarily active in both Europe and Asia. The intensifying Cold War cemented this unprecedented approach to world politics. The prolonged occupations of Germany and Japan were straightforward examples of this newly active global role. In both cases the United States refashioned a conquered enemy into a democratic, free-market ally—a significant feat. The United States did not, however, seek a formal empire in the wake of its victory.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bargatzky

In these days, we live in a new Cold War. On the side of Western elites, the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as representing the End of History and a permanent triumph of democratic values. American triumphalism, an expression of the idea of Manifest Destiny, believed that America was capable of reshaping the world in its image. According to this concept, the world was entering a New World Order in which international norms and transnational principles of human rights would prevail over the traditional prerogatives of sovereign governments. Promoting regime change was considered a legitimate act of foreign policy. In reality, all of this turned out to be illusionary. Instead of promoting peace, the attempt to usher in a New American Century resulted in international terrorism and endless wars in Afghanistan and the Near East. The eastward enlargement of NATO entails the risk of nuclear war. The New World Order turns out to be a big delusion, endangering the survival of humankind.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
Larissa S. Ruban ◽  
Wong Qu

The author shows how the post-war world order was formed and what role the countries that were allies of the anti-Hitler coalition (the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom) played in this process. The development of the Charter and procedures for the activities of the United Nations, which took place at the meeting Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill at the Yalta conference in February 1945 in the Crimea, is discussed in detail. Describing the current situation in the context of globalization, the author leads the discussion of Russian and foreign scientists about the vision of the modern world.


1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97
Author(s):  
David Robie

Review of Whose Story? Reporting the Developing World After the Cold War, edited by Jill Spelliscy and Gerald B. Sperling, Calgary, Canada: Detselig Enterprises, 1993. 242 pp. 'I get terribly angry', remarks Daniel Nelson, editor of Gemini News Service, 'when journalists take the phrase, which is completly manufactured, "New World Order"—it's absolutely meaningless. Personally I don't think there is a New World Order. I think we have the same world order, but without the Soviet Union which was never a major part of the world economy. And if you live in Katmandu or Kampala, there is no change.'


Menotyra ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalia Vasiliūnienė

The newly identified goldsmiths’ works of East Prussia are presented in the article: a chalice from Kaunas St. Cross Church forged by Otto Schwerdfeger, a master in Königsberg, in 1704 (?), a ciborium from Vilnius St. Apostles Peter and Paul Church made by goldsmith Johann Kownatzky in Tilsit in the 1760–80s, and a monstrance from Valakbūdis Church made by Michael Greiffenhagen II, a master from Tilsit, in 1795 (?). After the World War II, East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union. Destruction of the region and its historical memory and enormous losses of the cultural heritage partly resulted in knowledge gaps in Lithuania about the goldsmithing in this region. For the knowledge of goldsmith history in East Prussia, works by Eugen von Czihak, a German scientist, based on the information collected before the First and Second World Wars are very important. The goldsmithing of Eastern Prussia is pretty seldom mentioned in the Lithuanian historiography. Only sparsely survived works by Königsberg, Tilsit and Klaipėda (Memel) masters from the 17th – 19th century have been published. On the contrary, the context of Lithuanian goldsmith history is described based on data provided by the German writings. According to our knowledge, the goldsmith heritage from Königsberg predominates in Lithuania. Not a few goldsmith works from Tilsit were also identified in Lithuania. The works of Eastern Prussian goldsmiths are of particular value. Because of the dramatic fate of Königsberg region, the survived number of goldsmith works throughout Europe is relatively low.


2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
A. Lukin

The article explores characteristics of the international relations bipolar system, changes occurred after its collapse and the future of post-bipolar world, focusing on the role of non-Western actors in it. On one hand, the bipolar system provided stability of international relations, but on the other – lead to competition between the U.S. and the USSR for the influence on the third countries, which sometimes resulted in armed conflicts in the third states. The collapse of the Soviet Union convinced the West both in the universality of its development model and the necessity to spread it all over the world. Now it is clear that the “democratism” ideology failed politically and culturally. The Western model has neither become a panacea for eliminating disparities between countries on different stages of development, nor the only example of successful and strong governance. New power centers, such as Russia, China, India and Brazil, have been successfully developing after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their influence has been growing along with that of the West, and even though they did not necessarily directly confront it, they never shared all its values, yet never actively imposed their positions on the rest of the world. Regional powers (Nigeria, Venezuela, etc.) are also playing a more significant role in the emerging system, although sometimes they may join the alliances with more powerful countries to achieve their goals (as Vietnam does with the U.S. in its conflict with China). Russia’s reluctance to follow the West in its development created the first serious alternative to the existing unipolar world model and its values, so naturally and widely accepted by the Western actors. Whereas China with its rapid economic development is also posing a challenge to the ideology of "democratism" proving that the economic welfare is achievable outside the Western political model. As for Russia, its role in the modern world is still not defined. The Russian Federation wants to become an independent power unit and a center of the Eurasian integration. However, it is not clear whether it has resources of all kinds to implement this idea, – moreover, its economic dependence on the West is still too strong to insist on further confrontation. Instead, Russia (as well as its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union) could use Eurasian integration platforms to act as an "ambassador" of Asia in Europe and that of Europe in Asia. Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by the grant of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics in 2016.


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