scholarly journals THE PLOT SITUATION OF IMAGINARY DEATH IN V. NABOKOV’S FICTION (DRAMA «DEATH» AND STORY «THE SPY»)

Author(s):  
Иван Иванович Назаренко

Введение. Делается предположение, что повесть В. Набокова «Соглядатай» (1930) вырастает из его драмы «Смерть» (1923), которая остается на периферии набоковедческого интереса. Основания для сопоставления произведений обнаруживаются прежде всего на сюжетном уровне: попытка самоубийства героя и переживание мнимой смерти. Цель – сопоставить сюжетные ситуации мнимой смерти в драме «Смерть» и повести «Соглядатай», чтобы выявить изменение отношения автора к мистификации человеком собственной жизни, более того, к возможности метафизической (послесмертной) реальности. Материал и методы. Исследуются ранняя драма В. Набокова «Смерть», близкая символистской драме, и повесть «Соглядатай», отражающая творческое созревание писателя. Исследование опирается на сравнительно-исторический метод, а также на положения Э. Эриксона (личностная идентичность) и В. И. Тюпы (нарративная идентичность). Результаты и обсуждение. Открывается разная интерпретация автором близкой сюжетной ситуации: намеченная в «Смерти», в «Соглядатае» ситуация мнимой смерти сюжетно развернута, внимание автора сосредоточено на том, как поведет себя современный человек в ситуации свободы от прежних условий существования. В «Смерти» герой в попытке суицида оказывается объектом манипуляций другого, а в «Соглядатае» герой вершит самосуд и сам мистифицирует дальнейшие события. Обоим героям мнимая смерть приносит мнимую свободу, но для человека романтического мироощущения это возможность освобождения от кризиса и обретения идентичности («Смерть»), а для нецельного человека начала ХХ в. – освобождение от этических границ в отстраненном наблюдении за собой как другим, персонажем наррации, и в историях-мистификациях персонажа о себе, в чем проявляется стремление сменить идентичность («Соглядатай»). Но, по Набокову, пересочинение себя, игра с судьбой обречены на поражение. Финал обоих произведений – осознание героями мнимости их смерти и их свободы, но для героя драмы – это духовная смерть, а герой повести отказывается от самоидентичности и принимает положение «соглядатая» – самонаблюдение при отказе от нравственной ответственности. Заключение. Делается вывод о набоковской концепции человеческого существования, которое связывается прежде всего со зрительным восприятием, способностью видеть. Набоков отказывает человеку в возможности постичь сущность посмертного существования, воображенное видение послесмертия разрушается видением реальности. Introduction. It is suggested that V. Nabokov’s story “The Spy” (1930) largely grows out of his drama “Death” (1923), which remains on the periphery of the interest of the researchers of Nabokov’s fiction. The grounds for comparing the works are found, first of all, at the plot level: the hero’s attempt at suicide and the experience of imaginary death. The aim is to compare the plot situations of imaginary death in the drama “Death” and the story “The Spy” in order to reveal the change in the author’s attitude to the mystification of his own life by a person, moreover, to the possibility of metaphysical (post-death) reality. Material and methods. The article examines the early V. Nabokov’s drama “Death”, which is close to the symbolist drama, and the story “The Spy”, which reflects the creative maturation of the writer. The research is based on the comparative historical method, as well as on the provisions of E. Erickson (personal identity) and V. I. Tyupa (narrative identity). Results and discussion. The author reveals a different interpretation of a similar plot situation: the situation of imaginary death outlined in “Death”, in “The Spy” is plotted, the author’s attention is focused on how a modern person will behave in a situation of freedom from previous conditions of existence. In Death, the hero in an attempt at suicide turns out to be an object of manipulation by another, and in The Spy, the hero performs lynching and himself mystifies further events. For both heroes, imaginary death brings imaginary freedom: but for a person with a romantic outlook it is an opportunity to free themselves from the crisis and acquire an identity (“Death”), and for an intact person of modern civilization – liberation from ethical boundaries in the ability to change identities in observing himself as another narration, and in the stories-hoaxes of the character about himself (“The Spy”). But according to Nabokov, rewriting oneself, playing with fate are doomed to failure. The finale of both works is the heroes’ awareness of their imaginary death and their freedom, but for the hero of the drama this is spiritual death, and the hero of the story renounces self-identity and assumes the position of a “spy” – self-observation while refusing moral responsibility. Conclusion. The conclusion is made about Nabokov’s concept of human existence, which is associated, first of all, with visual perception, the ability to see. Nabokov denies a person the opportunity to comprehend the essence of posthumous existence, the modality of vision is negative: imagination-composition is destroyed by the vision of reality.

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Marya Schechtman

Everyone loves a good story. But does everyone live a good story? It has frequently been asserted by philosophers, psychologists and others interested in understanding the distinctive nature of human existence that our lives do, or should, take a narrative form. Over the last few decades there has been a steady and growing focus on this narrative approach within philosophical discussions of personal identity, resulting in a wide range of narrative identity theories. While the narrative approach has shown great promise as a tool for addressing longstanding and intractable problems of personal identity, it has also given rise to much suspicion. Opponents of this approach charge it with overstating or distorting the structure of actual lives.


Author(s):  
I.A. Apollonov ◽  
◽  
I.A. Chistilina ◽  

The article discusses the dialogical foundations of a person’s personal self-identity in the space of culture on the example of N. M. Bakhtin. The relevance of the work is associated with the increased relevance of the experience of live dialogue, which in modern information reality, on the one hand, appears as an opportunity for unprecedented self-expression and a space for communication and exchange of meanings, on the other hand, as a real danger of drowning in the cacaphony of discord and loss of oneself. The purpose of the work is through a hermeneutic reading of the works of N.M. Bakhtin, to show that through dialogue a person’s personal identity is formed, through existential questioning: «Who am I?». The authors use a hermeneutic approach to reading the philosophical works of N. M. Bakhtin, as well as a comparative analysis of his ideas and those of the leading philosophers of our time. However, the authors of the article not only analyze the similarity of N.M. Bakhtin with the main philosophies of postmodernism, but also insist on the pragmatic value of his works in themselves. The authors come to the conclusion that the dialogues of Nikolai Mikhailovich Bakhtin are a wonderful example of the experience of dialogue, which takes on an existential dimension, addressing the very essence of human existence. Nikolai Bakhtin appears as a thinker striving for a living experience of philosophy, trying to find a way to a genuine person who collects and shapes himself into a simple and integral unity in the space of the true culture of a hierarchically ordered cosmos. Thanks to this, the tension of the dialogue keeps the vivid sounding of the word, ready to turn into a deed, and does not allow the voices of the interlocutors to fall into monologue one-sidedness, degenerate into artificial schemes that disidentify and enslave a person’s personal integrity.


2007 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 155-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marya Schechtman

Everyone loves a good story. But does everyone live a good story? It has frequently been asserted by philosophers, psychologists and others interested in understanding the distinctive nature of human existence that our lives do, or should, take a narrative form. Over the last few decades there has been a steady and growing focus on this narrative approach within philosophical discussions of personal identity, resulting in a wide range of narrative identity theories. While the narrative approach has shown great promise as a tool for addressing longstanding and intractable problems of personal identity, it has also given rise to much suspicion. Opponents of this approach charge it with overstating or distorting the structure of actual lives.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Polkinghorne

Abstract When the self is thought of as a narrative or story, rather than a substance or thing, the temporal and dramatic dimension of human existence is emphasized. The operation of narrative "emplotment" (Ricoeur, 1983/1984) can configure the diverse events and actions of one's life into a meaningful whole. One's self-concept or self-identity is fashioned by adaptation of plots from one's cul-tural stock of stories and myths. Stories of personal identity differ from literary productions in that they are constructed within an unfolding autobiography and incorporate the accidental events and unintended consequences of actions. Under stressful conditions, a self-narrative may decompose, producing the anxiety and depression of meaninglessness. One function of psychotherapy is to assist in the reconstruction of a meaning-giving narrative of self-identity. (Psychology)


Author(s):  
Christian Sternad

AbstractAging is an integral part of human existence. The problem of aging addresses the most fundamental coordinates of our lives but also the ones of the phenomenological method: time, embodiment, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and even the social norms that grow into the very notion of aging as such. In my article, I delineate a phenomenological analysis of aging and show how such an analysis connects with the debate concerning personal identity: I claim that aging is not merely a physical process, but is far more significantly also a spiritual one as the process of aging consists in our awareness of and conscious relation to our aging. This spiritual process takes place on an individual and on a social level, whereas the latter is the more primordial layer of this experience. This complicates the question of personal identity since it will raise the question in two ways, namely who I am for myself and who I am for the others, and in a further step how the latter experience shapes the former. However, we can state that aging is neither only physical nor only spiritual. It concerns my bodily processes as it concerns the complex reflexive structure that relates my former self with my present and even future self.


but at the same time the self-identity of evangelicals contrasted sharply with the secular individualist self which has often been taken as the normative development of the Enlightenment. It remains to make a few observations linking this distinctive evangelical self-understanding to the appearance within evangelicalism of an active and vocal laity. The narrative identity of evangelicals expressed through stories of conversion was embraced by a wide spectrum of society, including women as well as men, laity as well as clergy, and all orders from the lowest to the highest in social rank. If we take into view contexts such as Sierra Leone at the end of the century, we can add that this narrative identity included people of different races as well. Conversion was a central emphasis within evangelicalism and the genre of conversion narrative is correspondingly and surprisingly broad in its sociological reach. One of the implications is that the concept of the laity within evangelicalism, under the impetus of conver-sionism, became something more like the apostle Paul’s use of the term laos to refer to the whole people of God, comprehending both clergy and non-clergy. In the eighteenth century this came into focus in certain debates about call to the ministry, ordination and what constituted a legitimate min-istry. As Jerald Brauer writes, ‘The moment one argues for the illegitimacy of a minister because he has not had a genuine conversion experience, one opens the possibility of ministry to any who have had such a conversion experience.’ Thus, the narrative identity of evangelicals, expressed through


2020 ◽  
pp. 151-181
Author(s):  
Karen E. Shackleford ◽  
Cynthia Vinney

This chapter explores the way fictional stories impact personal identity. It discusses how identity develops with a particular focus on adolescence. Then, it sheds light on how fiction contributes to identity construction as teens gain insight into things like careers, relationships, values, and beliefs through stories and how these insights can impact their choices for their futures. The chapter also looks at the way people’s emotional investments in their favorite stories can cause them to become extensions of themselves and how this may lead them to use these stories as symbols of who they are. Finally, it explores the topic of narrative identity—the internalized, constantly evolving life story each person tells of himself or herself—and how fiction influences and becomes incorporated into people’s life stories.


Author(s):  
Pamela Anderson

A reading of Luce Irigaray suggests the possibility of tracing sexual difference in philosophical accounts of personal identity. In particular, I argue that Irigaray raises the possibility of moving beyond the aporia of the other which lies at the heart of Paul Ricoeur's account of self-identity. My contention is that the self conceived in Ricoeur's Oneself as Another is male insofar as it is dependent upon the patriarchal monotheism which has shaped Western culture both socially and economically. Nevertheless there remains the possibility of developing Ricoeur's reference to 'the trace of the Other' in order to give a non-essential meaning to sexual difference. Such meaning will emerge when (i) both men and women have identities as subjects, and (ii) the difference between them can be expressed. I aim to elucidate both conditions by appropriating Irigaray's 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love.'


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