Personal Identity versus Self-Identity

Author(s):  
Pamela Anderson

A reading of Luce Irigaray suggests the possibility of tracing sexual difference in philosophical accounts of personal identity. In particular, I argue that Irigaray raises the possibility of moving beyond the aporia of the other which lies at the heart of Paul Ricoeur's account of self-identity. My contention is that the self conceived in Ricoeur's Oneself as Another is male insofar as it is dependent upon the patriarchal monotheism which has shaped Western culture both socially and economically. Nevertheless there remains the possibility of developing Ricoeur's reference to 'the trace of the Other' in order to give a non-essential meaning to sexual difference. Such meaning will emerge when (i) both men and women have identities as subjects, and (ii) the difference between them can be expressed. I aim to elucidate both conditions by appropriating Irigaray's 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love.'


2020 ◽  
pp. 62-67
Author(s):  
Nadezda Yurevna Mochalova

The author outlines that the essence of the problem of personal identity is formulated in the form of a dilemma: the personality must be identical to itself, because it retains the inconsistency of all experiences, actions, plans throughout the life of the individual; the personality must not be identical to itself on the basis of its inclusion in the context of changing being, which inevitably implies its internal self-change. It is noted that this dilemma involves the use of the term “identity” in two contexts: in the context of comparison (the opposite meaning of “identical” is expressed in the following terms: “other”, “another”, “alien”, “unequal”, “reverse”) and in the context of development, temporality (the term “identity” becomes the opposite meaning of “changed”, “impermanent”, “developing”). Research methods: analysis of literature on the topic studied; comparison, descriptive method. The artist's creative identity as a dialectical process of changing the dominant forms, styles, and images is reviewed in the article. The artistic and ontological problem of self-identity of artistic personality is presented through the dialogue between “One” and “Other”. The artistic reality of a work of art allows the artist to know the essence of his identity in the context of intersubjectivity. It is concluded that the paradigm that allows us to detect intersubjective conditionality of identity is the relational ontology, which represents relationships as a fundamental form of being. It is emphasized that personal identity is discursively mediated by a person's self-understanding, so hermeneutics primarily becomes the methodological space in which this research is carried out. Hermeneutics proves that self-knowledge and self-understanding of a person is an interpretive process that forms an important part of the subject's ontology. According to this methodology, personal identity is mediated by its own interpretive activity as a narrative philosophy, as a person's story about himself, and as the formation of a life story. The author is impressed by the productive idea of E.G. Trubina's research on the reflection of the individual as a creative process of self-construction in relation to the modified personal identity of the artist.


Author(s):  
Michael Allen Fox

‘People, objects, and identity’ considers how the home is a major focus in the construction of self-identity and how people carve out home space even within institutions. It suggests that a home is always a house plus many other ingredients, but a house is a home minus many elements. These elements include the people who matter to us and the objects we choose to keep in our homes. The links between home, objects, and personal identity are dramatically illustrated by two stories focusing on the Holocaust. They demonstrate that destroying homes and their occupants’ ties to place also amount to erasing things that mould identities and create networks of memories.


Think ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (47) ◽  
pp. 25-32
Author(s):  
Sally Latham

This piece considers the role of memory in personal identity, but specifically how we can choose and manipulate individual memories in order to take control of self-identity. The ideas of Locke and Ricoeur are briefly included, along with some questions about the implications of memory on identity in the age of social media.


Author(s):  
Иван Иванович Назаренко

Введение. Делается предположение, что повесть В. Набокова «Соглядатай» (1930) вырастает из его драмы «Смерть» (1923), которая остается на периферии набоковедческого интереса. Основания для сопоставления произведений обнаруживаются прежде всего на сюжетном уровне: попытка самоубийства героя и переживание мнимой смерти. Цель – сопоставить сюжетные ситуации мнимой смерти в драме «Смерть» и повести «Соглядатай», чтобы выявить изменение отношения автора к мистификации человеком собственной жизни, более того, к возможности метафизической (послесмертной) реальности. Материал и методы. Исследуются ранняя драма В. Набокова «Смерть», близкая символистской драме, и повесть «Соглядатай», отражающая творческое созревание писателя. Исследование опирается на сравнительно-исторический метод, а также на положения Э. Эриксона (личностная идентичность) и В. И. Тюпы (нарративная идентичность). Результаты и обсуждение. Открывается разная интерпретация автором близкой сюжетной ситуации: намеченная в «Смерти», в «Соглядатае» ситуация мнимой смерти сюжетно развернута, внимание автора сосредоточено на том, как поведет себя современный человек в ситуации свободы от прежних условий существования. В «Смерти» герой в попытке суицида оказывается объектом манипуляций другого, а в «Соглядатае» герой вершит самосуд и сам мистифицирует дальнейшие события. Обоим героям мнимая смерть приносит мнимую свободу, но для человека романтического мироощущения это возможность освобождения от кризиса и обретения идентичности («Смерть»), а для нецельного человека начала ХХ в. – освобождение от этических границ в отстраненном наблюдении за собой как другим, персонажем наррации, и в историях-мистификациях персонажа о себе, в чем проявляется стремление сменить идентичность («Соглядатай»). Но, по Набокову, пересочинение себя, игра с судьбой обречены на поражение. Финал обоих произведений – осознание героями мнимости их смерти и их свободы, но для героя драмы – это духовная смерть, а герой повести отказывается от самоидентичности и принимает положение «соглядатая» – самонаблюдение при отказе от нравственной ответственности. Заключение. Делается вывод о набоковской концепции человеческого существования, которое связывается прежде всего со зрительным восприятием, способностью видеть. Набоков отказывает человеку в возможности постичь сущность посмертного существования, воображенное видение послесмертия разрушается видением реальности. Introduction. It is suggested that V. Nabokov’s story “The Spy” (1930) largely grows out of his drama “Death” (1923), which remains on the periphery of the interest of the researchers of Nabokov’s fiction. The grounds for comparing the works are found, first of all, at the plot level: the hero’s attempt at suicide and the experience of imaginary death. The aim is to compare the plot situations of imaginary death in the drama “Death” and the story “The Spy” in order to reveal the change in the author’s attitude to the mystification of his own life by a person, moreover, to the possibility of metaphysical (post-death) reality. Material and methods. The article examines the early V. Nabokov’s drama “Death”, which is close to the symbolist drama, and the story “The Spy”, which reflects the creative maturation of the writer. The research is based on the comparative historical method, as well as on the provisions of E. Erickson (personal identity) and V. I. Tyupa (narrative identity). Results and discussion. The author reveals a different interpretation of a similar plot situation: the situation of imaginary death outlined in “Death”, in “The Spy” is plotted, the author’s attention is focused on how a modern person will behave in a situation of freedom from previous conditions of existence. In Death, the hero in an attempt at suicide turns out to be an object of manipulation by another, and in The Spy, the hero performs lynching and himself mystifies further events. For both heroes, imaginary death brings imaginary freedom: but for a person with a romantic outlook it is an opportunity to free themselves from the crisis and acquire an identity (“Death”), and for an intact person of modern civilization – liberation from ethical boundaries in the ability to change identities in observing himself as another narration, and in the stories-hoaxes of the character about himself (“The Spy”). But according to Nabokov, rewriting oneself, playing with fate are doomed to failure. The finale of both works is the heroes’ awareness of their imaginary death and their freedom, but for the hero of the drama this is spiritual death, and the hero of the story renounces self-identity and assumes the position of a “spy” – self-observation while refusing moral responsibility. Conclusion. The conclusion is made about Nabokov’s concept of human existence, which is associated, first of all, with visual perception, the ability to see. Nabokov denies a person the opportunity to comprehend the essence of posthumous existence, the modality of vision is negative: imagination-composition is destroyed by the vision of reality.


Disentangling ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Robbie Fordyce ◽  
Bjørn Nansen ◽  
Michael Arnold ◽  
Tamara Kohn ◽  
Martin Gibbs

The question of how the dead “live on” by maintaining a presence and connecting to the living within social networks has garnered the attention of users, entrepreneurs, platforms, and researchers alike. In this chapter we investigate the increasingly ambiguous terrain of posthumous connection and disconnection by focusing on a diverse set of practices implemented by users and offered by commercial services to plan for and manage social media communication, connection, and presence after life. Drawing on theories of self-presentation (Goffman) and technological forms of life (Lash), we argue that moderated and automated performances of posthumous digital presence cannot be understood as a continuation of personal identity or self-presentation. Rather, as forms of mediated human (after)life, posthumous social media presence materializes ambiguities of connection/disconnection and self/identity.


Classical and modern theories of identity, such as E. Giddens concept of self-identity, social identity of I. Hoffmann, non-reflective identity of M. Foucault, the theory of recognition and social imaginary of C. Taylor, the concept of imaginary communities of B. Anderson, the theory of «using the Other» and the exclusive identity of I. Neumann are analyzed. As a result of the analysis, methodological benchmark principles for the conceptualization of identity phenomenonare defined. It is suggested to consider the phenomenon of identity as a multi-level construct, also, the principles of identity typology are developed. According to this typology, ontological (personal identity) and social (collective identity) dimensions of the phenomenon are distinguished. It is admitted that personal identity, in addition to being directly connected with emotions, is the result of an individual’s personal experience. Meanwhile collective identity is a phenomenon of a social level, mental awareness of the existence of a community that shares common for an individual interests/values. As types of personal identity, the reflective, when the individual asks himself «whom I relate to/ want to relate myselfto?», and non-reflective – the individual unconsciously reproduces certain practices, patterns of behavior –forms of the phenomenon are analyzed. Within the framework of collective identity, it is suggested to distinguish between identities according to the institutional level (regional/local or national/state), as well as according to the attributes of a social group (ethnic, racial, linguistic, gender, etc.). The attention is drawn to the further perspective of the social identity study precisely through the prism of the institutional level. In particular, the following research question is identified as an important aspect of the further research: how the features of the reproduction of certain formal and informal practices affect the formation and «renewal»/reconstitution of regional and national identities.


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jūratė Baranova

Straipsnyje svarstomas teorinis judesys, kuriuo Emmanuelis Levinas grindė savąją asmens tapatumo sampratą, priešingą Vakarų filosofijos klasikiniame racionalizme ir fenomenologijoje susiklosčiusios savimonės kaip sąmonės tapatumo sau prielaidai. Kanto asmens tapatumo koncepcija taip pat lieka šioje „antileviniškoje“ paradigmoje, tačiau Levinas pasitelkia ketvirtąją Kanto antinomiją kaip išlaisvinančią subjektyvumą iš laiko spąstų. Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kaip Levinas peršoka nuo dinamiško laiko sekmens problemos prie subjekto tapatumo kaip jo socialumo klausimo. Kokį vaidmenį šioje naujoje asmens tapatumo sampratoje vaidina Fiodoro Dostojevskio romanų kai kurių veikėjų vertybinėms prielaidoms labai artima Levino subjekto pasyvumo, pažeidžiamumo ir apsėstumo samprata? Kaip ji išplaukia iš ketvirtosios Kanto antinomijos pamokų? Vienišas filosofinis subjektas negali kito momento kitybės aptikti pats savyje. Levino filosofinis subjektas kito momento kitybę randa kitame asmenyje. Taip laikas sukuriamas. Levinas, susiedamas asmens tapatumą su nauja laiko samprata, suteikia jam socialumo matmenį. Autorė straipsnyje įrodinėja tezę, kad Levino subjekto tapatumo steigčiai didžiausią įtaką turėjo Dostojevskio romanuose suformuluota žmogiškosios brolybės samprata. Jos paveiktas Levinas formuluoja naują asmens tapatumo savimonę, todėl jo filosofijoje pasyvus apsėstasis kitu subjektas yra amžinas Odisėjas, niekada nebegrįžtantis pats į save ir nebesutampantis su savimi. Toks teorinis judesys, autorės manymu, tampa galimas, kai Levinas, sekdamas Kanto ketvirtąja antinomija, savo subjektą išlaisvina iš dinaminės laiko tėkmės pančių. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: ketvirtoji Kanto antinomija, Levinas, Dostojevskis, subjekto tapatumas.The Fourth Kant’s Antinomy and the Odyssey of Levinas’ Subject Jūratė Baranova SummaryThis article is focused on the problem of self-identity suggested by Emamnuel Levinas. Author starts from the presupposition that Levinas created a new concept of identity, not reducible to any one elaborated by Western thought. Nevertheless Levinas takes the starting point from the fourth antinomy elaborated by Kant. Kant, like Edmund Husserl, was concerned in the transcendental subject. Georg Hegel and Jean-Paul Sartre considered the problem of personal identity as self-counsciousness, namely as the posibility of consciousness to return to itself (pour soi). Levinas, on the other side, opposes such a possibility of return. He encourages his philosophical subject to leave his own self for a permanent journey never to return back. The article deals with the question how this new identity as a substitution of the other person (autrui) by oneself, as being a hostage instead of him could be theoreticaly related with the fourth antino my of Kant. The author comes to a conclusion that by this antinomy Levinas helped his own philosophical subject to free oneself from the bondage of the sequence of time. This new subject, released from the dinamic sequence of time, needs the otherness of the other person, because the otherness of the second moment could not be included into a lonely subject. So Levinas included sociality into the question of time. Time is socially created. In this movement of thought Levinas returns back to the prephilosophical sources one can find in the novels of Dostoyevsky. Such crucial dimensions of new Levinas’ subjects as vulnerability, passivity, letting oneself being obsessed and persecuted by the other could not be derived from the tradition of Western reflection dealing with the topic of personal identity.Keywords: Levinas, Dostoyevsky, the fourth Kant’s antinomy, the identity of subject.> 


Author(s):  
I.A. Apollonov ◽  
◽  
I.A. Chistilina ◽  

The article discusses the dialogical foundations of a person’s personal self-identity in the space of culture on the example of N. M. Bakhtin. The relevance of the work is associated with the increased relevance of the experience of live dialogue, which in modern information reality, on the one hand, appears as an opportunity for unprecedented self-expression and a space for communication and exchange of meanings, on the other hand, as a real danger of drowning in the cacaphony of discord and loss of oneself. The purpose of the work is through a hermeneutic reading of the works of N.M. Bakhtin, to show that through dialogue a person’s personal identity is formed, through existential questioning: «Who am I?». The authors use a hermeneutic approach to reading the philosophical works of N. M. Bakhtin, as well as a comparative analysis of his ideas and those of the leading philosophers of our time. However, the authors of the article not only analyze the similarity of N.M. Bakhtin with the main philosophies of postmodernism, but also insist on the pragmatic value of his works in themselves. The authors come to the conclusion that the dialogues of Nikolai Mikhailovich Bakhtin are a wonderful example of the experience of dialogue, which takes on an existential dimension, addressing the very essence of human existence. Nikolai Bakhtin appears as a thinker striving for a living experience of philosophy, trying to find a way to a genuine person who collects and shapes himself into a simple and integral unity in the space of the true culture of a hierarchically ordered cosmos. Thanks to this, the tension of the dialogue keeps the vivid sounding of the word, ready to turn into a deed, and does not allow the voices of the interlocutors to fall into monologue one-sidedness, degenerate into artificial schemes that disidentify and enslave a person’s personal integrity.


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