scholarly journals Schelling y la metafísca de la voluntad

Author(s):  
Fernando Pérez-Borbujo Álvarez

ResumenEn el presente artículo haremos un breve recorrido por la historia de la metafísica del siglo XIX, partiendo del giro que se produce en la concepción del ser en el pensamiento de Schelling, más concretamente, en su ensayo sobre la libertad (1809). Schelling aparece como el fundador de la nueva metafísica, una metafísica que entiende el ser como voluntad, concepción que subyace al pensamiento de Schopenhauer y Nietzsche. Redescubrir la filosofía de Schelling como la fuente inspiradora de cierto pensamiento filosófico más allá de la figura imponente de Hegel nos permitirá enriquecer nuestra visión de la historia del pensamiento filosófico del XIX.Palabras claveIdealismo alemán, Historia de la Filosofía, Metafísica, Voluntad, siglo XIXAbstractIn the present article we’ll go on a very short walk through the history of metaphysics during 19th century, setting off at the «turn» in the concept of being that took place in Schelling’s thought, more concretely in his essays on liberty (1809). Schelling appears to us as the founder of a new metaphysics, one in which being is understood as will, concept which underlies Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s thought. Rediscovering Schelling’s philosophy as the source of inspiration for these thinkers, beyond the impressive figure of Hegel, will allow us to enrich our vision of history of philosophical thought during 19th century.Key wordsGerman Idealism, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Will, 19th century

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Saverio Ricci

Abstract The relation between Garin and Cassirer is still an insufficiently investigated topic, here proposed also in light of their personal connections and documents. This relation represents an important episode in the Nachwirkung of Cassirer in Italy. Garin was deeply influenced by Cassirer’s historical research and philosophical thought, in the shaping of his own research fields and in the methodological debates about the history of philosophy.


Author(s):  
Klaus Jacobi

Gilbert’s most important work is his commentary on the theological treatises of Boethius. His contemporaries valued him not only as a theologian but also as a philosopher, especially as a logician. Their estimation was well-founded. Although today we possess only theological writings from his own hand, these allow us to reconstruct a body of rich and independent philosophical thought. The most salient characteristic of Gilbert’s thought is the precise, analytical reflection that he brought to bear on the linguistic and conceptual means by which we think about whatever exists. In Gilbert’s thought, two things go hand in hand: a philosophy of the concrete and the particular and an intellectual viewpoint whose conceptual resources are manifestly Platonist. In the history of philosophy, these two things are not usually found together.


1981 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-50
Author(s):  
David Farrell Krell

AbstractThe following paper, delivered as a lecture to the philosophy departments of a number of American universities in 1979, traces a parallel between Hegelian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis. It stems from a project I have been working on for several years now entitled Erinnerungsversuch or "Essay in Remembrance. " In my studies of Freud and Hegel for that project I was struck by the importance of memory for their work, not only as a field of investigation but also as a method of the investigation itself. Remembering and forgetting are the crucial events for both psychoanalysis and phenomenology, crucial yet maddeningly intertwined, so that while memory seems eminently subject to malfunction and even illness it remains the sole source of insight and cure. I therefore determined to extend the parallel as far as it would go-perhaps even farther-and the present paper is the result. I am of course aware that Hegel was not a psychotherapist, Freud not a systematic philosopher, and realize that if essays like this one may be excused at all it is only because they eventually grow silent and allow irreconcilable differences to reassert themselves. Yet there is a sense in which Hegel's creative recapitulation of the history of philosophy, seeking as it does to liberate philosophical thought from a crippling self-ignorance, amounts to therapy of spirit; and there is a sense in which Freudian therapy must shatter traditional prejudices in our thoughts about what the psyche or spirit is, by letting psychological phenomena show themselves as they are. I have tried to make the parallel as concrete as possible, shunning Freud's metapsychology and turning instead to one of his earliest accounts of psychoanalytic praxis, eschewing sweeping remarks about Hegel's "system" and concentrating on just a few pages from the Phenomenology. Readers trained in philosophy will know that a few pages of Hegel are bound to contain labyrinths. I hope that my psychologist-readers will overlook the oversimplified presentation of Freud-which results partly from the lecture form-and will forgive my unwillingness to make Hegel's thought seem less demanding than it is. Finally, if I am right, the Freud-Hegel parallel with respect to memory tells us a good deal not only about this fascinating faculty but also about that singular creature who is so ardent to remember and so prone to forget.


Classics ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Bonazzi

The term “Middle Platonism” was created in the 19th century ce to distinguish this movement from the later tradition known as “Neoplatonism.” Both terms, however, are misleading and would have been rejected by the ancients; neither “Middle Platonists” would have accepted that they were an intermediate step in the history of Platonism nor would “Neoplatonists” have agreed that they were introducing anything new in the Platonic tradition. However, it is true that Early Imperial Platonism differs in basic ways from Late Antique Platonism, and both labels continue to be used for the sake of clarity. In short, Middle Platonism conventionally refers to a group of philosophers from the 1st century bce to the 3rd century ce who may be described as Platonists by virtue of their allegiance to a nucleus of Platonic doctrines. More precisely, this allegiance can be presented as the attempt to develop a systematic and theological interpretation of Plato’s philosophy. This suffices to prove its importance, philosophically and historically, for two reasons: (1) because the commitment to the view that Plato’s philosophy can be reduced to a system proved very influential in the history of philosophy, and (2) because in this period monotheistic religions such as Judaism and Christianity first encountered Greek philosophy, and this confrontation was greatly influenced by the theological speculations of these authors. Unfortunately, most of the works of Middle Platonists are now lost, but the material that remains enable us to reconstruct the basic features of their thought.


DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Ariel González Porta

A filosofia alemã do século XIX posterior a Hegel está bastante estudada em três direções. A primeira, que surge da luta entre hegelianos de esquerda e direita, acaba por conduzir ao materialismo e ao marxismo; a segunda, que se expressa na vertente irracionalista e anti-sistemática, passa por Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard e Nietzsche; a terceira é constituída pelo neo-kantismo e suas derivações, cuja versão oficial teria suas raízes fincadas pelo famoso discurso inaugural de Zeller e pelo livro de Otto Liebmann, que deram o impulso ao movimento “Zurück zu Kant”. Em tal visão de conjunto, o grande ausente é um movimento contínuo, ainda quando irregular e multifacetado, que terminará conduzindo à filosofia contemporânea. Este movimento tem em Trendelenburg uma figura chave. É com suas “Investigações Lógicas” que se inicia a reformulação das relações entre filosofia e ciência e, neste sentido, o verdadeiro retorno a Kant. O fato de sua obra principal ter exatamente o mesmo nome que a coleção de ensaios temáticos de Frege, a obra de ruptura de Husserl e as dissertações de doutorado de Cohen, Dilthey e Brentano significa algo mais que curiosas coincidências. “Zurück zu Kant” (Adolf Trendelenburg the overcoming of idealism and the roots of contemporary philosophy) Abstract Considering history of philosophy as a whole, the two main traditions of thought from the 20th century (analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic) can be regarded as being variants of one same fundamental turn. This systematic relation is connected to a common historical root. To highlight it implies to review the ideas that are deeply in the basis of the historiography of the German thought in the 19th century. Beyond names, problems and theses that may appear to have at first sight no relationship whatsoever, we can notice a continuous unitary development that has not yet received all the attention it deserves. In this movement, Adolf Trendelenburg stands out, once the beginners of both the abovementioned traditions and of neokantianism (Frege, Brentano, Dilthey and Cohen) received a decisive impulse from his reflections.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Catana

Abstract This article critically explores the history and nature of a hermeneutic assumption which frequently guided interpretations of Plotinus from the 18th century onwards, namely that Plotinus advanced a system of philosophy. It is argued that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the 18th and 19th centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy, dating from the 1740s, to which the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ was essential. It is observed that the concept is absent from Ficino’s commentary from the 15th century, and that it remained absent in interpretations produced between the 15th and 18th centuries. It is also argued that the assumption of a ‘system of philosophy’ in Plotinus is historically incorrect—we do not find this concept in Plotinus’ writings, and his own statements about method point in other directions. Eduard Zeller (active in the second half of the 19th century) is typically regarded as the first to give a satisfying account of Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole. In this article, on the other hand, Zeller is seen as having finalised a tradition initiated in the 18th century. Very few Plotinus scholars have examined the interpretative development prior to Zeller. Schiavone (1952) and Bonetti (1971), for instance, have given little attention to Brucker’s introduction of the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’. The present analysis, then, has value for an understanding of Plotinus’ Enneads. It also explains why “pre-Bruckerian” interpretations of Plotinus appear alien to the modern reader; the analysis may even serve to make some sense of the hermeneutics employed by Renaissance Platonists and commentators, who are often eclipsed from the tradition of Platonism.


2006 ◽  
pp. 38-42
Author(s):  
Georgii D. Pankov

An important place in the creative work of thinkers of the Orthodox tradition in the broad occupied the philosophical understanding of religion. However, the national religious and philosophical heritage of Orthodoxy of the past is mainly studied in the history of philosophy, but not in religious studies. Therefore, according to the author, for modern academic religious studies one of the urgent tasks is to study the philosophy of religion in its theological paradigm, which is expressed in its various confessional variants. While there are still no fundamental works in this field, but to create them it is necessary to take into account the experience of theological-philosophical thought and to critically revise it


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Mirella Romero Recio

Resumen: La figura de Augusto no tuvo gran atractivo para los historiadores españoles del siglo XIX. Más interesados en destacar la labor de los emperadores de origen hispano, las Historias de España no dedicaron demasiada atención a la labor de quien cerró las conquistas militares romanas en la Península Ibérica. Las contradicciones fueron constantes en una historiografía que abordó la etapa augústea casi siempre de manera colateral y que no profundizó de manera exhaustiva en el conocimiento de este periodo histórico. Sin embargo, como muestra este artículo, Augusto no pasó desapercibido en la historiografía española decimonónica.Palabras clave: Emperador Augusto, Historiografía española, Historia de Roma, siglo XIX.Abstract: The figure of Augustus did little to attract the attention of 19th century Spanish historians. They were more interested in highlighting the work of emperors of Hispanic descent, thus the Histories of Spain dedicated little space to the Roman military leader who conquered the Iberian Peninsula. There are constant contradictions in the historiography, which approached the Augustan period almost exclusively side on, never plunging into the knowledge with exhaustive depth. However, as this article shows, Augustus did not go completely unnoticed in the 19th century Spanish historiography.Key words: Emperor Augustus, Spanish historiography, history of Rome, 19th century.


1992 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 243-266
Author(s):  
Eugeniusz Górski

Abstract/ short description The article presents an overview of philosophical developments in Latin America. Its aim is to relate the Latin American philosophical thought to its Polish equivalents. For example: the emergence of the so-called Liberation Theology in the beginning was greatly contested by Polish Catholic philosophers. Later they became less critical as they started to compare Liberation theology to the ideas of 19th Century Catholic clergy that opposed the partition of Poland. Despite this and many other influences Górski concludes that relations between eastern European and Latin American philosophical thoughts were limited. Short description written by Michal Gilewski


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document