Food-Deprivation Induced Arousal: Evidence against “Behavioral Inhibition” in Electrocortical Hypersynchrony

1977 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 527-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin D. Bigler ◽  
Donovan E. Fleming

Hypersynchronous activity was recorded from the visual cortex of the rat in the form of photically evoked after-discharges following 0, 24, 48, and 72 hr. of food deprivation. After-discharge activity was affected at only the 48-hr. level of deprivation and only in terms of a decrease in the frequency of occurrence. All other measures—after-discharge burst duration, after-discharge spindle amplitudes, and spindle waves per after-discharge burst—were unaffected by conditions of food deprivation. These results are discussed in terms of evidence against the uniform role of behavioral inhibition in hypersynchronous brain activity.

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (12) ◽  
pp. 4094-4105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-Te Wu ◽  
Melissa E. Libertus ◽  
Karen L. Meyerhoff ◽  
Marty G. Woldorff

Several major cognitive neuroscience models have posited that focal spatial attention is required to integrate different features of an object to form a coherent perception of it within a complex visual scene. Although many behavioral studies have supported this view, some have suggested that complex perceptual discrimination can be performed even with substantially reduced focal spatial attention, calling into question the complexity of object representation that can be achieved without focused spatial attention. In the present study, we took a cognitive neuroscience approach to this problem by recording cognition-related brain activity both to help resolve the questions about the role of focal spatial attention in object categorization processes and to investigate the underlying neural mechanisms, focusing particularly on the temporal cascade of these attentional and perceptual processes in visual cortex. More specifically, we recorded electrical brain activity in humans engaged in a specially designed cued visual search paradigm to probe the object-related visual processing before and during the transition from distributed to focal spatial attention. The onset times of the color popout cueing information, indicating where within an object array the subject was to shift attention, was parametrically varied relative to the presentation of the array (i.e., either occurring simultaneously or being delayed by 50 or 100 msec). The electrophysiological results demonstrate that some levels of object-specific representation can be formed in parallel for multiple items across the visual field under spatially distributed attention, before focal spatial attention is allocated to any of them. The object discrimination process appears to be subsequently amplified as soon as focal spatial attention is directed to a specific location and object. This set of novel neurophysiological findings thus provides important new insights on fundamental issues that have been long-debated in cognitive neuroscience concerning both object-related processing and the role of attention.


Brain ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avital Hahamy ◽  
Meytal Wilf ◽  
Boris Rosin ◽  
Marlene Behrmann ◽  
Rafael Malach

Abstract Spontaneous activity of the human brain has been well documented, but little is known about the functional role of this ubiquitous neural phenomenon. It has previously been hypothesized that spontaneous brain activity underlies unprompted (internally generated) behaviour. We tested whether spontaneous brain activity might underlie internally-generated vision by studying the cortical visual system of five blind/visually-impaired individuals who experience vivid visual hallucinations (Charles Bonnet syndrome). Neural populations in the visual system of these individuals are deprived of external input, which may lead to their hyper-sensitization to spontaneous activity fluctuations. To test whether these spontaneous fluctuations can subserve visual hallucinations, the functional MRI brain activity of participants with Charles Bonnet syndrome obtained while they reported their hallucinations (spontaneous internally-generated vision) was compared to the: (i) brain activity evoked by veridical vision (externally-triggered vision) in sighted controls who were presented with a visual simulation of the hallucinatory streams; and (ii) brain activity of non-hallucinating blind controls during visual imagery (cued internally-generated vision). All conditions showed activity spanning large portions of the visual system. However, only the hallucination condition in the Charles Bonnet syndrome participants demonstrated unique temporal dynamics, characterized by a slow build-up of neural activity prior to the reported onset of hallucinations. This build-up was most pronounced in early visual cortex and then decayed along the visual hierarchy. These results suggest that, in the absence of external visual input, a build-up of spontaneous fluctuations in early visual cortex may activate the visual hierarchy, thereby triggering the experience of vision.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Ja. O. Petik

The connection of the modern psychology and formal systems remains an important direction of research. This paper is centered on philosophical problems surrounding relations between mental and logic. Main attention is given to philosophy of logic but certain ideas are introduced that can be incorporated into the practical philosophical logic. The definition and properties of basic modal logic and descending ones which are used in study of mental activity are in view. The defining role of philosophical interpretation of modality for the particular formal system used for research in the field of psychological states of agents is postulated. Different semantics of modal logic are studied. The hypothesis about the connection of research in cognitive psychology (semantics of brain activity) and formal systems connected to research of psychological states is stated.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Rivera-Lillo ◽  
Emmanuel A. Stamatakis ◽  
Tristan A. Bekinschtein ◽  
David K. Menon ◽  
Srivas Chennu

AbstractThe overt or covert ability to follow commands in patients with disorders of consciousness is considered a sign of awareness and has recently been defined as cortically mediated behaviour. Despite its clinical relevance, the brain signatures of the perceptual processing supporting command following have been elusive. This multimodal study investigates the temporal spectral pattern of electrical brain activity to identify features that differentiated healthy controls from patients both able and unable to follow commands. We combined evidence from behavioural assessment, functional neuroimaging during mental imagery and high-density electroencephalography collected during auditory prediction, from 21 patients and 10 controls. We used a penalised regression model to identify command following using features from electroencephalography. We identified seven well-defined spatiotemporal signatures in the delta, theta and alpha bands that together contribute to identify DoC subjects with and without the ability to follow command, and further distinguished these groups of patients from controls. A fine-grained analysis of these seven signatures enabled us to determine that increased delta modulation at the frontal sensors was the main feature in command following patients. In contrast, higher frequency theta and alpha modulations differentiated controls from both groups of patients. Our findings highlight a key role of spatiotemporally specific delta modulation in supporting cortically mediated behaviour including the ability to follow command. However, patients able to follow commands nevertheless have marked differences in brain activity in comparison with healthy volunteers.


Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. e0218977
Author(s):  
Brunella Donno ◽  
Daniele Migliorati ◽  
Filippo Zappasodi ◽  
Mauro Gianni Perrucci ◽  
Marcello Costantini

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