Russia and the North Korea nuclear crisis

North Korea’s hydrogen bomb test and ICBM tests in 2017 incurred a new crisis. Given that North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons and a military option against it may be unworkable, deterrence becomes a realistic recourse to cope with the crisis. The most challenging issues are the North’s pursuit of more missile technologies and unknown aspects of nuclear command and control in Pyongyang.

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Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

International Security ◽

10.1162/isec_a_00385 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 45 (1) ◽

pp. 9-50

Author(s):

Christopher Lawrence

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

North Korea ◽

The United States ◽

Political Commitment ◽

Technological Infrastructure ◽

The North ◽

Agreed Framework ◽

Water Reactors ◽

Plutonium Production ◽

Nuclear Crisis

The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. The accord succeeded at rolling back North Korea's nuclear program, but the regime secretly began enriching uranium when the LWR project fell behind schedule. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. A combiniation of political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework. Under this interpretation, the LWR project created a platform for important breakthroughs in U.S.-North Korean engagement by signaling a U.S. commitment to normalization, but its signaling function was undercut when the United States displaced the costs of LWR construction to its allies. The real challenge of proliferation crisis diplomacy is not to bribe or coerce target states into giving up nuclear weapons, but to credibly signal a U.S. commitment to the long-term political changes needed to make denuclearization possible.

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The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Avoiding the Road to Perdition

Current History ◽

10.1525/curh.2003.102.663.152 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 102 (663) ◽

pp. 152-169

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Korean Peninsula ◽

North Korea ◽

Northeast Asia ◽

The United States ◽

The Road ◽

The North ◽

Constructive Engagement ◽

Nuclear Crisis

Confrontational United States policies toward North Korea, adopted unilaterally, would not only exacerbate the nuclear crisis but also undermine United States relations with Northeast Asia as a whole. … The United States would end up with the worst of both worlds: a nuclear-capable North Korea and severely strained relations with key powers important to United States interests globally as well as regionally. Conversely, by pursuing constructive engagement in concert with its friends and allies in the region, the United States would maximize the pressure on North Korea for an acceptable nuclear settlement and promote the long-term United States objective of liberalizing the North Korean system.

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Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem

Journal of Asian and African Studies ◽

10.1177/0021909607076708 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 42 (3-4) ◽

pp. 297-320 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Tsuneo Akaha

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

South Korea ◽

Korean Peninsula ◽

North Korea ◽

The United States ◽

Urgent Problem ◽

Security Issues ◽

The North ◽

Nuclear Issue ◽

Nuclear Crisis

North Korea became an urgent problem for Japan as a result of the 1994 nuclear crisis in North Korea, the 1998 missile launch over Japan and the 2003—4 nuclear crisis. At the historic Tokyo—Pyongyang summit in September 2002, both sides acknowledged the need to solve the security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula through peaceful, multilateral efforts. However, the issue of North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens in earlier decades intensified Japanese sentiment against the North and this issue halted bilateral normalization talks. Japan has participated in six-party talks on the nuclear issue since 2004, but its distinct bilateral interests vis-à-vis North Korea, South Korea and the United States limit its influence in the multiparty engagement.

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Why Has There Been No People’s Power Rebellion in North Korea?

European Journal of Korean Studies ◽

10.33526/ejks.2018181.1 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 1-34

Author(s):

Andrew Jackson

Keyword(s):

Rural Areas ◽

North Korea ◽

Large Scale ◽

Political Elite ◽

Information Control ◽

Al Jazeera ◽

The North ◽

New Information ◽

Effective System ◽

The Right

One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.

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Unseen Laws- A Quantitative Approach to Developments in North Korea’s Legal System

European Journal of Korean Studies ◽

10.33526/ejks.20181702.22 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 22-62

Author(s):

Martin Weiser

Keyword(s):

North Korea ◽

Legal Rules ◽

The North ◽

Legal Texts ◽

Policy Fields ◽

Policy Agendas ◽

Broad Policy ◽

Sophisticated Analysis ◽

Detailed Picture ◽

Law Making

The position of law in North Korean politics and society has been a long concern of scholars as well as politicians and activists. Some argue it would be more important to understand the extra-legal rules that run North Korea like the Ten Principles on the leadership cult as they supersede any formal laws or the constitution.1 But the actual legal developments in North Korea, which eventually also mediate those leading principles and might even limit their reach, has so far been insufficiently explored. It is easy to point to North Korean secrecy as a main reason for this lacuna. But the numerous available materials and references on North Korean legislation available today have, however, not been fully explored yet, which has severely impeded progress in the field. Even publications officially released by North Korea to foreigners offer surprisingly detailed information on legal changes and the evolution of the law-making institutions. This larger picture of legal developments already draws a more detailed picture of the institutional developments in North Korean law and the broad policy fields that had been regulated from early on in contrast to the often-assumed absence of legislation in important fields like copyright, civil law or investment. It also shows that different to a monolithic system, various law-making institutions exist and fulfil discernably different legal responsibilities. Next to this limitation in content, scholars in the field currently also have not used all approaches legal developments in the North Korea could be analysed and interpreted with. Going beyond the reading of legal texts or speculating about known titles of still unavailable legislation, quantitative approaches can be applied ranging from the simple counting of laws to more sophisticated analysis of legislative numbering often provided with legislation. Understanding the various institutions as flexible in their roles and hence adoptable to shifts in leadership and policy agendas can also provide a more realistic picture of legal practices in North Korea.

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