The audit reform in the United Kingdom: Challenges and the future

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (8) ◽  
pp. 907-921
Author(s):  
Irina N. DERNOVSKAYA

Subject. Intended to counter fraud and unreasonably high bonuses for top executives, the U.K. corporate governance and audit reform implies some changes so as to improve the financial transparency of companies, primarily, large and public interest entities. The reform is called to maintain the lucrativeness and competitiveness of the U.K. financial markets, creating a sustainable and manageable environment, which major long-term investors seek. Objectives. I review and summarize proposals set out in the reform as best-in-class practices, which may work in auditing and assurance in Russia and underlie respective changes. The reform may contribute to the auditing profession, help avoid accounting scandals and corporate failure. Methods. Studying the audit reform, I applied methods of analysis, generalization, and analogy. Results. Having analyzed the reform plan, I found valuable ideas concerning directors’ responsibilities, corporate reporting and auditing. The reform suggests that the Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority should be established. The definition of public interest entities became broader. Audit boards are now to meet additional requirements. The audit market will be overhauled by segregating auditing and consultancy units of the Big Four companies and introducing statutory audit, which should be jointly performed by major and smaller entities, and tightening audit transparency rules. Hence, top executives will be more responsible and liable for financial reporting and increased transparency of internal control and trade account settlement principles. Such proposals should be adapted to the audit regulation practice in Russia and be applied with reference to the recent legislative novels. Conclusions. The quality of audit is critical for the economy and the public, since it ensures the national credibility as a capital market. Any sustainable economy needs a comprehensive approach, which combines the audit reform and corporate governance and accounting standards reform.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Sutana Narkchai ◽  
Faudziah Hanim Binti Fadzil ◽  
Sompon Thungwha

<em>The issue of performance of internal auditors is important since Thailand was also affected by the accounting scandals. The expanded scope in the definition of internal auditing and new regulatory requirements such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 has increased the demands on internal auditing. This study was conducted to examine the relationship between the corporate governance on the performance of internal auditors in Thailand public limited companies. In this study, corporate governance relates to the board of directors size and audit committee size to the performance of the internal auditor. To achieve this objective, two hypotheses were developed based on previous studies and the agency theory. Survey questionnaires were sent to the Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) to determine the effectiveness on their performance based on the professional standards issued by the IPPF (2017) indicators. A total of 520 questionnaires were distributed, but only 146 were usable. Multiple regressions were used to test the relationship between the variables. The result showed that there is insignificant relationship between board of director’s size and internal auditors’ performance. This study however found that audit committee size has a positive relationship on the performance of internal auditors. Therefore, audit committee need to increase higher responsibility with regard to corporate governance by overseeing financial reporting and internal control matters.</em>


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Sorensen ◽  
Scott E. Miller

Purpose In the 1990s and beginning of the next decade, a series of financial accounting scandals occurred in the United States (USA or US) and in several other countries of the world. The USA and Italy (among others) responded with legislation to reform financial reporting and corporate governance in these jurisdictions. This paper aims to compare the regulatory response of Italy to that of the USA. Design/methodology/approach This paper includes a review of relevant literature and evaluation of the actions of the regulatory authorities. Findings In the case of the financial reporting crises, the rapid response put the USA into the role of the “first mover” with the European Union (EU) reacting to US initiatives and eventually converging to a large degree with the provisions of the US legislation. Italy has adopted many of the same regulatory reforms as the USA and has added some reforms that are directed to the specific needs to Italy. Research limitations/implications In conjunction with legislative initiatives like Sarbanes-Oxley, private enforcement mechanisms, such as shareholder class action suits in the USA, play an important role in discouraging and punishing financial accounting fraud. Practical implications In the absence of significant reforms of the Italian private enforcement system, corporate governance abuses and the potential for accounting scandals may still be persistent. As a whole, cooperative efforts continue between the USA and the EU. Such efforts are needed more and more, as companies become increasingly globalized. Originality/value This paper provides comparison and evaluation of corporate governance reform efforts in the USA and Italy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1167-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Guo ◽  
Pinghsun Huang ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Nan Zhou

ABSTRACT This study investigates the role of employment policies in reducing internal control ineffectiveness and financial restatements. We provide new evidence that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of ineffective internal control. We also find that employee-friendly policies significantly reduce the propensity for employee-related material weaknesses. These results suggest that greater employee benefits facilitate the acquisition, development, and motivation of the workforce and ameliorate the loss of valuable human capital, thereby mitigating employee failures to implement internal control tasks properly. Moreover, we document novel results that financial restatements, especially those caused by unintentional errors, are less likely to arise in firms that invest more in employee benefits. Collectively, our emphasis on the effect of employee treatment policies on the integrity of internal control and financial reporting distinguishes our paper from previous studies that focus on the role of top executives in accounting practices. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Yu Lu ◽  
Diandian Ma

The purpose of this essay is to review empirical literature on internal control weakness over the past seven years. I use an analysis framework consisting of determinants (corporate governance and other affecting factors) and economic consequences (accounting information quality, market reaction, cost of equity, debt contracting) of weakness disclosure and its remediation. Basic findings of prior studies agree that corporate governance and firm characteristics influence the presence of control problems and their remediation. In turn, the effectiveness of internal control impacts the quality of financing reporting, auditor reaction (auditing fees and audit delays), insider trading and leads to capital market consequences (the weakness disclosures affect debt contracting). More internal control studies combine with capital market and provide evidence that SOX are not always effective. Overall, these findings contribute to profession by suggesting that the disclosures of internal control deficiencies generally convey incremental information on the quality of financial reporting to investors. This review integrates and assesses current internal control weakness research and offers some suggestions for future study.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-191
Author(s):  
Myoung Gi Lee ◽  
Jin San Kim

The purpose of this study is to find the effects of corporate governance on executive compensation using the sample of Korean manufacturing firms listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2005 to 2012. In order to do that, this study extends empirical models of Core et al. (1999), Fahlenbrach (2009), Giroud and Mueller (2011), and finds the following results. First, internal corporate governance negatively affects executive compensation, implying that a good corporate governance can prevent outrageous compensation to top executives with poor performance. On the other hand, the interactions between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms have mixed results. While the first interaction has little impact on executive compensation, the second interaction among three different mechanisms has a positive and statistically significant impact. These results imply that while internal corporate governance and product market competition works against executive compensation, labor union may be in the same boat with managers in terms of compensation. Unlike most previous studies based on one-dimensional approach, this study investigates interactions among various corporate governance mechanisms. Overall results have a few important economic and social implications. Because internal corporate governance works as an effective mechanism, policymakers should find ways to make internal control mechanisms as independent as possible.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard

ABSTRACT: This study examines the association between corporate governance and disclosures of material weaknesses (MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We study this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404, deriving data on audit committee financial expertise from automated parsing of member qualifications from their biographies. We find that a lower likelihood of disclosing Section 404 MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as board strength. Further, the nature of MW varies with the type of experience. However, these associations are not detectable using Section 302 reports. We also find that MW disclosure is associated with designating a financial expert without accounting experience, or designating multiple financial experts. We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associated with internal control quality. However, this association is only observable under the more stringent requirements of Section 404.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 2990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ionela Munteanu ◽  
Adriana Grigorescu ◽  
Elena Condrea ◽  
Elena Pelinescu

The global financial crisis was decisive in reanalyzing the role of corporate governance based on the accountability and ethics of governance practices and its impact on sustainable development. The study aims to analyze the relevance of and the interdependencies between financial governance assessment indicators and income efficiency with synergetic effects on sustainable development and social cohesion, offering a distinct contemplation on errors in governance and financial reporting. Deviations concerning the accuracy of financial statements, flaws in the process of budget creation and budgetary execution, poor implementation of internal control systems, non-compliance with procedures of public procurement contracts, and ineffectiveness in sound financial management represent barometers for assessing managerial accountability in the public sector. This study is based on data reported by the Romanian Court of Accounts processed with the principal component analysis and proposes a global efficiency index as a benchmark indicator barometer in order to analyze the influence of managerial accountability and sustainable reporting compliance on revenue reported by public institutions in Romania. The results of the study are of empirical importance and explore the constant need to evaluate managerial accountability and ethics, with an emphasis on error, in order to improve public governance and enhance corporate accountability.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Botti ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Amal Hamrouni ◽  
Bernardin Solonandrasana

Purpose – This paper aims to shed some light on the role of boards of directors in improving internet financial reporting (IFR) quality. Design/methodology/approach – The empirical study uses a data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach on a sample of 32 French firms belonging to the CAC40 index as of December 2007. Findings – The empirical results show that 28 percent of the sample firms are located on the efficiency frontier for all IFR components. These firms' boards of directors and their committees seem to act as effective monitors of top executives, which improves the quality of the firm's disclosure policy through, inter alia, an increase in the level of IFR. Under efficient board control, firms develop user-friendly and readily accessible web sites disclosing the information required by various stakeholders. Additional empirical results show that 46.9 percent of the sample firms lie outside the efficiency frontier for all IFR measures, suggesting inefficiencies in the composition, structure, and/or functioning of their boards of directors. The inefficient monitoring and oversight of top executives by the board allowed for lower levels of IFR quality for nearly half of the CAC40 firms in 2007. Research limitations/implications – The study uses only CAC40 companies, which are relatively large and financially healthier than the average French firms, exhibiting diffuse ownership structures, with heavy foreign shareholding, and investing more in communications. This may limit the generalizability of the results to other French listed firms. Originality/value – The paper extends the literature on corporate governance and voluntary corporate disclosure by investigating the association between board characteristics and IFR quality. It examines the relative performance of the board directors in improving IFR policy.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 254-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Grove ◽  
Tom Cook

The recent fraudulent financial reporting by Enron, Qwest, and other companies was facilitated by poor corporate governance. As shown in this paper, ten timeless factors of corporate governance helped detect such reporting. Weak corporate governance facilitated both classic and recent financial reporting frauds, particularly the following factors: all-powerful CEO, weak system of internal control, focus on short-term performance goals, weak or non-existent code of ethics, and questionable business strategies with opaque disclosures. These factors implied ineffective boards of directors and audit committees. New corporate governance guidelines for boards and audit committees by the U.S. stock exchanges and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act appear to have good potential for strengthening corporate governance to help prevent earnings manipulations and fraudulent financial reporting. These new regulations should continue to strengthen strong corporate governance and control systems, especially in relation to the ten timeless factors for fraudulent financial reporting. If corporate governance guidelines are not followed, then, these stock exchanges can delist the offending companies


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