6.  Mental State Decoding in Dysphoric Individuals: The Role of Motivation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Social Activity ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Depression Symptoms ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Decoding Ability

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits.  Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005).  My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.

scholarly journals Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

scholarly journals Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Dysphoria: An Event‐Related Potential Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelita Wong
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Clinical Importance ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Depression Symptoms ◽  
Social Deficits ◽  
The Right

Depression is often associated with profound social and interpersonal functioning impairments. Negative interpersonal experiences may lead depressed individuals to withdraw from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate the depression state (Rippere, 1980). As a result, it is of theoretical and clinical importance to understand the mechanisms underlying these social deficits. Researchers have applied the theory‐of‐mind framework to better understand the impaired social functioning in depressed individuals. Theory of mind refers to the everyday ability to attribute mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, emotions) to others to both understand and predict their behaviour (Wellman, 1990). Research has found that individuindividuals with dysphoria (i.e. elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression) demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). This study will determine neural mechanisms that may underlie this phenomenon by examining whether differences in brain activity exist between dysphoric and nondysphoric groups during mental states decoding. I will record electrophysiological data while participants are judging the mental states from pictures of eyes. Based on previous research (Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004), I anticipate that mental state decoding will be associated with the right inferior frontal and right anterior temporal regions of the brain. Furthermore, I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will have greater activations in these brain regions and make significantly more accurate judgments than nondysphoric individuals when making mental state judgments.

scholarly journals An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment

2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 1396-1405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liane Young ◽  
Rebecca Saxe
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Medial Pfc ◽  
The Right ◽  
State Inference ◽  
Moral Facts

Human moral judgment depends critically on “theory of mind,” the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent's beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent's action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other's mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist's action and then either (i) “moral” facts about the action's effect on another person or (ii) “nonmoral” facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.

Mind, child’s theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan M. Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Neurodevelopmental Disorder ◽  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Preschool Period

Knowledge of other minds poses a variety of unusual problems due to the peculiarly private nature of mental states. Some current views, impressed by the contrast between the apparently direct access we have to our own mental states and the inaccessibility of others’ mental states, argue that we understand the mental states of others by imagining that they are our own by ‘simulation’. Other current views propose that we infer both our own mental states and the mental states of others by employing a set of conjectures arrived at through general inductive reasoning over experience: a ‘folk psychology’ or ‘theory of mind’. Experimental studies, by contrast, suggest that we possess an ‘instinct’ for comprehending the informational mental states of other minds. Children develop mental state concepts uniformly and rapidly in the preschool period when general reasoning powers are limited. For example, children can reason effectively about other people’s beliefs before they can reliably calculate that 2 plus 2 equals 4. In the empirical study of the ‘theory of mind’ instinct there have been three major discoveries so far: first, that normally developing 2-year-olds are able to recognize the informational state of pretending; second, that normally developing children can, by the age of 4 years, solve a variety of false belief problems; and lastly, that this instinct is specifically impaired in children with the neurodevelopmental disorder known as ‘autism’.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Human Adults: An Event-related Potential Study

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Sabbagh ◽  
Margaret C. Moulson ◽  
Kate L. Harkness
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Human Adults ◽  
The Right

Successful negotiation of human social interactions rests on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how others' behaviors can be understood in terms of internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions. A core theory-of-mind skill is the ability to decode others' mental states on the basis of observable information, such as facial expressions. Although several recent studies have focused on the neural correlates of reasoning about mental states, no research has addressed the question of what neural systems underlie mental state decoding. We used dense-array eventrelated potentials (ERP) to show that decoding mental states from pictures of eyes is associated with an N270–400 component over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right hemisphere. Source estimation procedures suggest that orbitofrontal and medial temporal regions may underlie this ERP effect. These findings suggest that different components of everyday theory-of-mind skills may rely on dissociable neural mechanisms.

Armstrong's Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
George S. Pappas
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central State ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
David Armstrong

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.

scholarly journals Play as a Factor of Harmonious and Disharmonious Development in Childhood

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-41
Author(s):  
S.A. Voskresenskaya ◽  
G.V. Kozlovskaya ◽  
M.V. Ivanov
Keyword(s):  
Autism Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Proximal Development ◽  
Play Activity ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Long Term Observation ◽  
Clinical Conditions

The article discusses the problems of the development of play activity, as a reflection of harmonious and disharmonious mental development, starting from an early age. 4030 preschool children (2720 boys and 1310 girls) were examined. For the long-term observation, 150 people (92 boys and 58 girls) were selected. Methods: clinical-psychopathological, neurological, psychological, using the concept of leading activity, focused on the “zone of proximal development”. The article analyzes the role of toys as material objects used by children of different ages and clinical conditions, in the structure of which disorders of the mental state and play activity were found. The clinical picture of mental disorders was determined by disorders of the neurosis-like, affective level in combination with individual schizotypal stigmas, and behavioral disorders within the autism spectrum disorders. Conclusions are made about the possibility of an adverse effect of certain forms of play and play objects on the mental state and development of schizo- typal disorders and autism spectrum disorders.

Theory of Mind and Conversation in Deaf and Hearing Children

2020 ◽  
pp. 212-231
Author(s):  
Candida C. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Peer Group ◽  
Social Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Deaf Children ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Fundamental Building Block ◽  
School Based ◽  
Shared Language ◽  
Hearing Children

Conversation in a shared language (spoken or signed) is not only a pleasurable social activity but also a fundamental building block for the growth of social cognition, including theory of mind (ToM). Participating in informal conversations at home and at school fosters cognitive development of ToM, which, in turn, fosters reciprocated friendship, peer-group popularity, leadership, and social skills, while protecting against loneliness and social isolation. These interconnections between ToM and conversation are explored with a special focus on deaf children, a population of key theoretical significance for the understanding of ToM development generally. Timely ToM growth is linked with (a) having access from birth to a language (spoken or signed) that all family members can fluently share, (b) frequent family discussions of cognitive mental states, (c) school-based access to varied peer and adult conversational partners, and (d) children’s own eagerness to participate in conversations exposing them to different mental viewpoints.

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