scholarly journals Nierozróżniający wgląd w medytacji buddyzmu chan i jego wczesnobuddyjskie analogie

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-110
Author(s):  
Kamil Nowak

Undifferentiating insight in the Chan Buddhist meditation and its early Buddhist analogies: In the paper a comparative analysis of Chan Buddhist meditation and the early Buddhist meditation has been conducted. In the first part the meditational instructions present in Zuochan yi and the corresponding texts of Chinese Buddhism have been demonstrated. Subsequently, based on those texts, the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation is created. The second part consists of the analysis of Aṭṭhaka‑vagga with the corresponding motifs from the other Pali Canon Suttas. The last part consists of a comparative analysis of the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation and meditation as shown in Aṭṭhaka‑vagga. The whole of the analysis aims at demonstrating the topos common for the early Buddhist tradition and Chan Buddhism.

Author(s):  
Justin S. Whitaker ◽  
Douglass Smith

The Pāli Canon presents a number of summaries of the Buddha’s teaching, one of the most concise being that of the Three Trainings (or Three Disciplines): ethics, meditation, and wisdom. The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the various formulations of these Three Trainings as well as to discuss their relationship to one another and other Pāli Buddhist teachings. Its focus is on the Pāli material of early Buddhism and Theravāda in particular. It discusses the Three Disciplines and their interrelations, along with analyses of what comes before the discipline, namely the ordinary worldling or person, and what comes after, namely the awakened person. The Three Trainings can be analytically divided, but the development of each reciprocates the development of the others. An illustration from the Pāli Canon, leaving out meditation, suggests that ethics and wisdom act ‘like one hand washing the other’.


Author(s):  
Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho

O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao sofrimento. Com isso em mente, este artigo irá analisar algumas ações inábeis do eu e do não-eu em suttasselecionados do Cânone Pali, mostrando como se encaixam na estratégia do Buddha de se utilizar de elementos como ferramentas para o abandono desses próprios elementos. Nessa perspectiva, o eu não é negado em absoluto desde o início do caminho, mas aprende-se a usa-lo de forma hábil como um meio de abandoná-lo.THE RAFT OF THE SELF: SOTERIOLOGICAL USES OF SELF AND NOT-SELF IN ANCIENT BUDDHISM ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to suggest that the Buddhist teachings on anattā (not-self) should not be understood as a categorical denial of the self, but constitute a soteriological strategy commonly employed by the Buddha, of using something as tool for its own demise.Taking kamma (action) as the main framework that structure all the other teachings, we can think of self-identification as a kind of action. Some instances of this action will be skillful and will lead to liberation, while others will be unskillful and will lead to suffering.With this in mind, the present article will analyze some skillful actions of self and not-self in selected suttas of the Pali canon, showing how they fit into the Buddha’s overall strategy of using elements as tools for their own demise. In this perspective, the self is not denied from the beginning of the path, but one learns how to use it skillfully in order to let go of it.


2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (133) ◽  
pp. 153-176
Author(s):  
Krishna Del Toso

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch on the way Nāgārjuna deals with the idea of 'relation'. The concept of 'relation' as expressed in the Pāli sources is here theoretically systematized according to three patterns: 1. (onto)logical, 2. strictly subordinative existential, 3. non-strictly subordinative existential. After having discussed Nāgārjuna's acceptance and treatment of these three patterns, particular attention is paid to the non-strictly subordinative existential relation. This kind of relation is meant to describe the way the factors of the conditioned co-origination are linked to each other and is exemplified by Nāgārjuna by means of the father-son bond. A possible way to explain the conditioned co-origination doctrine in the light of the father-son example is here suggested by having resource to the 'Cambridge change' theory. Even if in the Pāli Canon the non-strictly subordinative existential pattern is said to apply to all the other factors of the conditioned co-origination, there is no direct evidence that it concerns also the avidyā-saṃskāras link. It will be shown how Nāgārjuna, by applying it to the avidyā-saṃskāras link, seems to introduce a new perspective in the conditioned co-origination theory.


Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Cervi

Exclusionary populism is well known for twisting real grievances of the citizens, by problematizing the gap between “us” and “them”, capitalizing on identity lines, calling out as “others” those who do not share “pure people’s” identity and culture. Especially after 9/11, Muslims have become the ideal-type of “other”, making Islamophobia the primary populist anti-paradigm. This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on Islamophobic populism analyzing the presence of Islamophobia in the electoral discourse of Vox party in Spain and Lega in Italy. In addition, it makes a novel contribution by discussing and testing the existence of different models of Islamophobia, distinguishing between “banal Islamophobia” and “ontological Islamophobia”. Applying clause-based semantic text analysis—including qualitative and quantitative variables—to thirty speeches by the two party leaders, Santiago Abascal and Matteo Salvini, during the last three elections (General, Regional and European), the paper concludes that, despite the similarities, the two politician display two different models of Islamophobia. Whereas Abascal displays a clear “ontological Islamophobia”, depicting Muslims ontologically incompatible with Spanish civilization (defined precisely by its anti-Muslim history), the latter presents a mix of arguments that oscillate between “ontological” and “banal” Islamophobia.


1970 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Waldschmidt
Keyword(s):  
The Sun ◽  
The Moon ◽  

The Candimā-sutta or ‘discourse on the moon’ in the Samyuttanikāya of the Pali canon based on the Indian myth according to which eclipses of the moon as well as of the sun are caused by a demon named Rāhu ‘the Seizer’, who is supposed to try to lay hold of one or the other of the two planets at certain times. The Sutta reports that on such an occasion the god dwelling in the moon takes his refuge in the Buddha who successfully shows his power and pity by directing Rāhu emphatically to set the moon at once at liberty.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-127
Author(s):  
Attila Badó ◽  
Péter Mezei

SummaryComparative law plays a role both at the time of the creation and interpretation of constitutions. Hungary is not an exception in this respect. The comparative analysis of Hungarian constitutional law is an ordinary one both in terms of quantity and quality. The new Fundamental Law of 2011 as well as the “two-third majority statutes”, however, led to an international scandal. Several studies have suggested that the method of acceptance of the new Fundamental Law and its content are unique in several aspects. The reviews of the Fundamental Law by scholars and international organizations show, however, contradictory opinions. We argue that such opposition is mainly due to differing conceptions of the ideal democratic society. Proponents of the Fundamental Law asserting national sovereignty and the supremacy of legislation accept any constitutional regulation that is backed by the necessary amount of votes. On the other hand, opponents have disliked everything that has happened in Hungarian constitutional law since 2010 on the premises of global constitutional values, the lack of consensus, self-restraint or elegance. The present paper aims to evaluate the Fundamental Law of Hungary through the lens of Joseph Raz’s seven constitutional criteria that might serve as a structured approach to analysis that is acceptable to those who express supportive as well as critical opinions on the Fundamental Law. Indeed, based upon Raz’s criteria we have come to the conclusion that the new constitutional regime does not meet one single criterion that is connected to its acceptance. As the Fundamental Law was accepted rapidly, without any endorsement by the opposing parties or any referendum, it cannot be demonstrated that it mediates general values accepted by the whole society.


Gṛhastha ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 58-74
Author(s):  
Oliver Freiberger
Keyword(s):  

Stephanie Jamison suggests in her chapter of this volume that the Brahmanical authors of the Dharmasūtras borrowed the term gṛhastha from the śramaṇic discourse of the time. Aside from Aśoka’s inscriptions, this śramaṇic discourse may also be reflected in the earliest layer of the Buddhist Pāli canon. This chapter takes a closer look at these texts and its vocabulary for householders. A lexical survey shows that of the three most commonly used terms, gahaṭṭha (Sanskrit gṛhastha) is the least popular one. The other two, gahapati (Sanskrit gṛhapati) and gihin (Sanskrit. gṛhin) are much more common and also more clearly distinguished in their usage, with positive and negative connotations, respectively. The chapter suggests that precisely the fact that it was the least specific and most flexible term may have made gahaṭṭha/gṛhastha attractive for Brahmanical appropriation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 61-75
Author(s):  
Hans Henrik Bruun

Hans Henrik Bruun: A Classic – Dead or Alive? What Use is Max Weber today? This article, based on the author’s Inaugural Lecture, discusses two related questions. The first question is how to deal with the great classics of sociology. And the second is to what extent Max Weber – arguably the greatest sociological classic of them all – is still relevant today. As for the study of sociological classics, it is important to keep the original context of their ideas firmly in mind, in order to avoid the dangers of misunderstanding, misattribution and banalization. The analysis of the place in contemporary sociology of Weber’s core methodological concepts of value freedom, objectivity and the ideal type, as well as his Protestantism thesis, concludes that, to a significant extent, they have now fallen prey to one or more of these dangers. On the other hand, Weber’s ideas continue to fascinate because of the exceptional lack of closure of his thought, and, more generally, because his approach reflects, with paradigmatic clarity, the tension between intentionality and necessity inherent in social action. Moreover, Weber’s insistence that scholars be passionate in their pursuit of and respect for truth, however uncomfortable the results of their endeavours, remains a durable ethical legacy to the discipline of sociology.


1932 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Th. Stcherbatsky

We must be thankful to Professor Berriedale Keith for once more calling attention to the problem of the doctrine preached bythe Buddha. The problem is indeed important for the history of Indian civilization, as well as for the comparative history of philosophy. Was there or was there not a real philosophy, or, to use an expression of the late M. Émile Senart, “ une pensée maàtresse d'ellemêeme,” in the sixth century B.C. in India ? Professor Keith thinks it “ really impracticable to discover with any precision the doctrine which Buddha in fact expounded ”. The reasons for this despair are several. First of all, an extraordinary diversity of doctrine has developed from the teaching of the Buddha in the sixth century B.C.1 Professor Keith apparently thinks that if a doctrine has much developed, it becomes “ undiscoverable ”. I rather feel inclined to disbelieve such an axiom. A rotten seed will have no growth; but a seed strong and healthy may produce luxuriant vegetation. The other reason is more plausible. “ What assurance have we that the Pali Canon really represents the views of the Buddha with any approach to accuracy ? ” But, even if it contained the records of contemporary eyewitnesses, the scepticism of Professor Keith would not be shaken, for “we need”, he says, “ only remember the difficulties presented by the Aristotelian view of the doctrine of Plato ”—in order to disbelieve an eyewitness of the highest authority.


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