scholarly journals Foreign policy strategy of the Romania. Evolution, principles, goals

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-148
Author(s):  
D. G. Dragan

In this article, the author attempts to determine the strategic directions of Romania’s foreign policy. Significant geopolitical events in Europe expose the need to clarify the priorities of the policy pursued by the country. Historically in foreign relations Romania has employed diplomatic strategies that allowed it, according to historians, to «anoeuvre» between the centres of power on the international arena. However, in the early 2000’s a departure from this tradition has become apparent, especially during the administration of Traian Basescu (2004–2014), which also coincided with the country’s joining NATO in 2004 and EU in 2007. After the collapse of the socialist bloc Romania set its priorities, firstly, in the direction of joining both NATO and EU and later bringing the country in accordance with their norms and standards was put high on the agenda. Having become a member of the Alliance and an EU-state, Romania has been determining its foreign policy from the point of view of synchronizing its strategic goals with those of NATO and EU. Along with this, the strategic partnership with the US and the attached to it significant importance for Romania dictate the one-sided political approach deprived of the traditional manoeuvre capability in foreign affairs. This is also proven by the fact that despite the declared and established privileged relations with a number of countries, the level of their “strategic” execution is very low in reality. That being said, the direction of the relations between Romania and the Russian Federation, whose views on many regional and international issues differ, are likely to be greatly influenced by the state of the Russia-West affairs. Having analyzed the historic and current aspects of Romania’s foreign policy, the author determines the preservation of the euroatlanticism course as the main direction of the development of the foreign policy of Romania.

Author(s):  
Юрий Говоров ◽  
Yuri Govorov

The article deals with the role and place of China in the major swing of the Russian Policy towards the East in response to the Western pressure upon the RF after the Crimea accession. The cornerstone of this policy is in the strengthening of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. China is the chief trade partner both of the US and the RF. It feels comfortable enough within the existing global economic system but is dissatisfied with the US global political domination. The impact of the growing power of China and the RF upon the one-polar system leads to increasing geopolitical rift between these two countries and the US. The US consider China as its most principal competitor, but deal a first blow at Russia as a weaker link in the China's rear. The rise of the Western enmity towards Russia diverts the attention of the US from China. But for China Russia is not a strong and important enough country yet: the value of our trade is not so big, we lack qualified staff, the level of confidence and reliability is low, but misinterpretation of Asiatic specificity is very great. Our countries have the common point of view on strategic global issues, but our local interests, ambitions and geography are rather different, from inconsistency to incompatibility. In conclusion, the author summarizes the results and prospects of the further development of the Russian-Chinese cooperation: it will be founded on the level of «strategic partnership» arrangement in the spheres of mutual interest in the East and in the West. The author believes that this level of cooperation would be much more profitable for Russia, than the allied relations because of the great difference in economic weight between our countries.


2021 ◽  
pp. 205789112110211
Author(s):  
Zafar Khan

This article primarily focuses on how the increasing US–China competing strategies in Asia-Pacific affect the policies of South Asian rivals India and Pakistan when, on the one hand, the US as part of its offshore balancing grand strategy has been increasing its strategic partnership with India through the transfer of emerging technologies in terms of military modernization process, and on the other hand, China and Pakistan have improved their geo-economic and geostrategic partnership as part of the Chinese grand strategy via the Belt and Road Initiative while enabling Pakistan to produce effective countermeasures against its potential adversary. The article presumes that, in doing so, such competing strategies frame a quadrangle setting comprising of US and India to deter and contain China on the one hand and China and Pakistan to produce countermeasures and try to create a balance to potentially prevent the risk of conflict in South Asia out of such competing strategies at the quadrangle order conceived here. However, in fact, neither the US nor rising China would desire such a possibility of conflict otherwise unintendedly occurring from the intense US–China competing strategies while affecting the policies of the South Asian rivals. The article concludes that the shaping of this quadrangle framework may bring both opportunities and challenges for the South Asian rivals. It also concludes that the more intense the competition between the US and China becomes, the more intense its implications could be on the South Asian rivals, while the reduced tension between China and the US, although unlikely, would have reduced pressure on India and Pakistan relations as well.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 271-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE CUMINGS

At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?


2022 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-161
Author(s):  
G. G. Kosach

The paper examines the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the context of wider changes in the Middle East and in the Arab world triggered by the Arab Spring. The author argues that during this decade the Kingdom’s foreign policy has witnessed a fundamental transformation: the very essence of the Saudi foreign policy course has changed signifi cantly as the political es-tablishment has substantially revised its approaches to the country’s role in the region and in the world. Before 2011, Saudi Arabia — the land of the ‘Two Holy Mosques’ — positioned itself as a representative of the international Muslim community and in pursuing its foreign policy relied primarily on the religious authority and fi nancial capabilities. However, according to Saudi Arabia’s leaders, the Arab Spring has plunged the region into chaos and has bolstered the infl uence of various extremist groups and movements, which required a signifi cant adjustment of traditional political approaches. Saudi Arabia, more explicit than ever before, has declared itself as a nation state, as a regional leader possessing its own interests beyond the abstract ‘Muslim Ummah’. However, the author stresses that these new political ambitions do not imply a complete break with the previous practice. For example, the containment of Iran not only remains the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, but has become even more severe. The paper shows that it is this opposition to Iran, which is now justifi ed on the basis of protecting the national interests, that predetermines the nature and the specifi c content of contemporary Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy including interaction with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), approaches towards the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, combating terrorism, and relations with the United States. In that regard, the transformation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has, on the one hand, opened up new opportunities for strengthening the Kingdom’s interaction with Israel, but, at the same time, has increased tensions within the framework of strategic partnership with the United States. The author concludes that currently Saudi Arabia is facing a challenge of diversifying its foreign policy in order to increase its international profi le and political subjectivity.


1964 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary D. Condon

The Whig ministries of 1830-34 were faced with problems in regard to foreign affairs and parliamentary reform that were almost certain to reveal differences of philosophy within the Cabinets, yet it was on the Irish issues, more particularly that of the Episcopal Reformed Church of Ireland, that the ministries divided and broke. It is generally known that questions concerning the revenues of the Irish Church drove Stanley, the future Conservative Prime Minister, out of the Whig Party, enabled the House of Lords to rally after the Reform Bill and block measures passed by the Commons, and gave William IV an opportunity to dismiss a ministry which still retained the confidence of the lower house and replace it by a Government of his own choice. There is less knowledge, however, of the specific issues behind these events, and of the peculiarities of the Irish Church which hampered an easy solution of its problems. A study of both will serve to illuminate the conflict of parties and of personalities in the first five years of the reform age.From the utilitarian point of view, the temporalities of the Church were absurdly large. Containing only 852,064 members — less than there were in the see of Durham alone — it had a total of twenty-two bishops, including four archbishops. Many holders of benefices had no religious duties, nor, indeed, even a church in which to perform the one service required by their appointment; where parish duties were necessary, they were frequently discharged by a curate who received only a small fraction of the income of the incumbent.


1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 399-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya

India's strategic environment has undergone significant changes in recent years, especially in the seventies. From the point of view of Indian foreign policy, the strategic environment and its dynamics can be studied in three different spheres: (1) the global strategic environment, particularly consisting of the strategic confrontation between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other; (2) the immediate strategic environment, consisting mainly of Pakistan and China; and (3) the intermediate strategic environment, consisting of the non-aligned movement and the Third World. Needless to say, there is considerable and inevitable overlap and feedback among these three spheres of the strategic environment. They are, nevertheless, conceptually and operationally different spheres. The purpose of this article is to analyse the recent changes in these three different spheres of our strategic environment and the implications of these changes for our foreign policy in the foreseeable future.


Author(s):  
Clay Silver Katsky

While presidents have historically been the driving force behind foreign policy decision-making, Congress has used its constitutional authority to influence the process. The nation’s founders designed a system of checks and balances aimed at establishing a degree of equilibrium in foreign affairs powers. Though the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the country’s chief diplomat, Congress holds responsibility for declaring war and can also exert influence over foreign relations through its powers over taxation and appropriation, while the Senate possesses authority to approve or reject international agreements. This separation of powers compels the executive branch to work with Congress to achieve foreign policy goals, but it also sets up conflict over what policies best serve national interests and the appropriate balance between executive and legislative authority. Since the founding of the Republic, presidential power over foreign relations has accreted in fits and starts at the legislature’s expense. When core American interests have come under threat, legislators have undermined or surrendered their power by accepting presidents’ claims that defense of national interests required strong executive action. This trend peaked during the Cold War, when invocations of national security enabled the executive to amass unprecedented control over America’s foreign affairs.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sutter

This assessment first briefly examines recent features of China's approach to foreign affairs, and then examines in greater detail features in China's approach to relations with its neighbours, especially in Southeast Asia. It does so in order to discern prevailing patterns in Chinese foreign relations and to determine in the review of salient recent China–Myanmar developments in the concluding section how China's approach to Myanmar compares with Chinese relations with other regional countries and more broadly. The assessment shows that the strengths and weaknesses of China's recent relations with Myanmar are more or less consistent with the strengths and weaknesses of China's broader approach to Southeast Asia and international affairs more generally. On the one hand, China's approach to Myanmar, like its approach to most of the states around its periphery, has witnessed significant advances and growing interdependence in the post-Cold War period. On the other hand, mutual suspicions stemming from negative historical experiences and salient differences require attentive management by Chinese officials and appear unlikely to fade soon.


Author(s):  
Mann F A

An issue is justiciable if it is capable of being tried according to law. In so far as foreign relations in England are concerned, this means that justiciability is lacking only where issues come within the exclusive province of the Executive and its prerogative. In assessing the English law and practice relating to the problem of justiciability it is important to realise that there are numerous cases which, if there were no practice relating to the executive certificate, would clearly be non-justiciable, that, in other words, they become justiciable by virtue of that practice. Problems of non-justiciability in foreign affairs can arise only in a few connections. These include non-interference with the conduct of foreign policy, enforcing treaty rights by a party against a party, enforcing treaty rights against a Crown servant, and enforcing claims by a third party beneficiary against the Crown.


2018 ◽  
pp. 91-154
Author(s):  
Chaitanya Ravi

This chapter concentrates on the period from July 2005–March 2006 and examines the way in which the nuclear deal and the US-India strategic partnership wrapped around it influenced India’s energy and foreign policy, in particular the Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) natural gas pipeline and Iran–India relations. The chapter follows the shifting relationships between Petroleum Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar; External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh; and Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. An important part of the chapter is the US Ambassador to India David Mulford’s role vis a vis the IPI pipeline and the factors that gave rise to the idea of a nuclear deal with India among a small coterie in the State Department. The chapter concludes with the collision of the rival energy initiatives, the strategic paradigms wrapped around them and the way in which the nuclear deal prevailed over the pipeline with Natwar’s exit and Aiyar’s dismissal being important milestones.


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