Derechos sociales y amparo constitucional

Author(s):  
María DÍAZ CREGO

LABURPENA: Nahiz eta Espainiako Konstituzioak eskubide sozial sorta handia aitortu, bertako 53. artikuluaren jokoak oinarrizko eskubideak bermatzeko mekanismotik kanpo uzten ditu eskubide sozial horiek. Artikulu horrek zalantzan jartzen baitu eskubide sozial gehienen justiziabilitatea. Eta ez hori bakarrik; gainera, oinarrizko eskubideak Auzitegi Konstituzionalean bermatzeko espresuki eraturiko auzibidetik kanpo uzten ditu, hots, babes-errekurtsotik kanpo. Eskubide sozialen degradazio hori, ohikoa Zuzenbide Konparatuan, saihestu izan da, auzitegi nazional eta nazioarteko askotan, eskubideoi zeharkako babesa ematen dieten estrategien bitartez. Ildo horretan, gaurko azterlan honen xedea da babes-errekurtsoetan ezarritako jurisprudentzia konstituzionala analizatzea, ikusteko zer neurritaraino baliatu den Auzitegi Konstituzionala estrategia horietaz Konstituzioak aitortzen dituen eskubide sozial gehienak babes-errekurtsoek eskaintzen duten aterpetik kanpo uzteko joerari aurre egiteko. RESUMEN: A pesar de que la Constitución española reconoce un importante elenco de derechos sociales, el juego de su artículo 53 les excluye de los principales mecanismos de garantía de los derechos fundamentales. Este precepto no sólo pone en duda la justiciabilidad de la mayoría de los derechos sociales, sino que les excluye de la vía procesal específicamente pensada para garantizar los derechos fundamentales ante el Tribunal Constitucional: el recurso de amparo. Esta degradación de los derechos sociales, habitual en Derecho comparado, ha sido salvada por muchos tribunales nacionales e internacionales utilizando estrategias de protección indirecta de estos derechos. En esta línea, el objeto del presente trabajo es analizar la jurisprudencia constitucional sentada en recursos de amparo a fin de identificar en qué medida el Tribunal Constitucional ha hecho uso de esas estrategias para paliar la exclusión de la mayoría de los derechos sociales reconocidos en la Constitución de la protección que otorga el amparo. ABSTRACT: Although the Spanish Constitution recognizes a remarkable cast of social rights, its article 53 excludes these rights from the mechanisms built to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights. Article 53 brings into question the justiciability of most of the social rights recognized in the Spanish Constitution and deprives most of them from the protection granted by the recurso de amparo, the procedural safeguard specifically designed to protect fundamental rights in case of individual violations before the Spanish Constitutional Court. However, this situation is not so atipical as many other national and international courts face this sort of limits by developing a creative case law in order to protect social rights even when the national constitution or the international treaty they interpretate do not expressly recognize these rights. In this sense, the aim of this paper is to analyse the Spanish Constitutional Court’s case law as to determine to what extent it has made use of the indirect strategies to ensure the justiciability of social rights that other courts have already used.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 849
Author(s):  
Miguel Agudo Zamora

Resumen:Este trabajo analiza la situación en el modelo constitucional español del principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales. Se parte del análisis sucinto del modelo social de nuestra Constitución lo que implica el reconocimiento de derechos económicos y sociales. Este reconocimiento es la plasmación constitucional de los principios de solidaridad y de cohesión social. El principio de cohesión social ha sido definido por el Consejo de Europa e incluido explícitamente en los tratados constitutivos de la Unión Europea. La necesidad de lograr la cohesión social fundamenta la inclusión en las Constituciones y en los tratados internacionales del principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales. En la Constitución española de 1978 este principio no se incluye expresamente. La no inclusión en la Constitución de este principio supone un peligro para la cohesión social en tiempos de crisis económica. Por su parte, el Tribunal Constitucional ha sentado una doctrina ambigua sobre este asunto, que ha sido analizada en este trabajo, así como las más significativas aportaciones doctrinales sobre la materia. Para saber cuáles son los limites de la regresividad de los derechos sociales que dotan de contenido este principio se ha realizado una comparativa internacional y de los principios constitucionales. Del estudio del ordenamiento internacional y de los valores y principios constitucionales se ha obtenido una serie de límites a la regresividad del contenido, eficacia y protección de los derechos sociales. Concluye este trabajo sugiriendo una propuesta de reforma constitucional que incluya el principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales en el texto constitucional estableciendo una serie de requisitos de aquellas medidas que puedan suponer una regresión de contenido de los mismos tales como que deberán justificarse plenamente en referencia a la totalidad de los derechos, valores y principios recogidos en la Constitución y en los tratados internacionales suscritos por el Estado español y en el contexto del aprovechamiento pleno del máximo de los recursos de que se disponga; se aplicarán tras el examen más exhaustivo de todas las alternativas posibles; tendrán en todo caso carácter temporal hasta que las circunstancias económicas permitan restablecer el ámbito material de contenido, eficacia, protección y garantía prexistente de los derechos sociales afectados; en todo caso respetarán el contenido mínimo esencial de los derechos sociales como manifestación de la dignidad humana; serán razonables y estarán suficientemente motivadas; no vulnerarán, entre otros, los principios de seguridad jurídica, confianza legítima, no discriminación e irretroactividad de disposiciones restrictivas de derechos individuales, serán proporcionadas y respetarán los principios de solidaridad, cohesión y sostenibilidad social. Summary1. State, solidarity and social cohesion. 2. Doctrinal and jurisprudential notes on the principle of non-regressivity of social rights. 3. Limits to the regressivity of social rights. a) Limits derived from international law. b) Limits derived from dignity as essential content of social rights. c) Limits derived from the prohibition of arbitrariness: the need for sufficient motivation. 4. Conclusion: constitutionalamendment and non-regressivity of social rights.Abstract:This paper analyzes the constitutional recognition of the principle of non-regressivity of social rights in Spain. It starts from the succinct analysis of the social model of our Constitution which implies the recognition of economic and social rights. This recognition is the constitutionalization of the principles of solidarity and social cohesion. The principle of social cohesion has been defined by the Council of Europe and explicitly included in the constitutive treaties of the European Union. The need to achieve social cohesion underpins the inclusion in the Constitutions and international treaties of the principle of non-regression of social rights. In the Spanish Constitution of 1978 this principle is not expressly included. The non-inclusion in the Constitution of this principle poses a danger to social cohesion in times of economic crisis. For its part, the Constitutional Court has established an ambiguous doctrine on this subject, which has been analyzed in this work, as well as the most significant doctrinal contributions on the subject. In order to know which are the limits of the regressivity of the social rights that give content of this principle an international comparison has been made as well as a study of constitutional principles. Limits to the regressivity of content, effectiveness and protection of social rights have been obtained from the study of international order and constitutional values and principles. This paper concludes by suggesting a proposal for constitutional amendment that includes the principle of non-regressivity of social rights in the Spanish Constitution establishing some requirements of those measures that imply a regression of their content such as: they shall be fully justified in relationship with all the rights, values and principles contained in the Constitution and in the international treaties signed by the Spanish State and in the context of full exploitation of the maximum resources available; Shall be applied after a more comprehensive examination of all possible alternatives; Shall in any case be of a temporary nature until the economic circumstances permit the restoration of the content, effectiveness, protection and pre-existing guarantee of the social rights affected; In any case they will respect the essential minimum content of social rights as a manifestation of human dignity; Shall be reasonable and sufficiently motivated; Shall not infringe, inter alia, the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, non-discrimination and non-retroactivity of provisions restricting individual rights; Shall be proportionate and shall respect the principles of solidarity, cohesion and social sustainability.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-19
Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

The author highlights the paradoxical evolution of CJEU’s case-law in the field of social rights and how in the past, it has played a praetorian role in a context of implied powers and modest EU primary legal provisions whereas now, it is showing clear self-restraint under explicit competences and an evolved EU primary law [including the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU)]. From this perspective, the author proposes the opening of the CJEU to the new framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights, as part of the broader Turin process for the European Social Charter, through positive judicial willingness (by taking into account the synergies between the EU and the Council of Europe – including the case-law from the European Committee of Social Rights).


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1&2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

In order to accomplish its objectives of extensively regulating rights and obligations, the 1996 Constitution of South Africa similarly provides for the enforcement of those rights by the courts. In turn, it has, in the said enforcement provisions, invested in the courts enormous discretionary powers to enable them to effectively deal with breaches of the entrenched fundamental rights as well as all constitutional rights violations. That the Constitutional Court has purposefully interpreted and made optimum use of the expressions: ‘appropriate relief’ and ‘just and equitable’ order in developing the constitutional remedies jurisprudence is crystal clear from a wealth of available case law. It is also not in doubt that the contributions of Justice Ngcobo (later Chief Justice) in this regard are intellectually gratifying. This presentation singles out for discussion and analysis the judgment of Ngcobo J in Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) which not only typifies judicial activism at its acme; it has also introduced into the South African public and labour laws, the novel remedy of ‘instatement.’ Apparently drawn from the analogy of the labour law remedy of reinstatement, ‘instatement’ is akin to the remedy of mandamus in public law, and specific performance in the law of contract. This article moves from the premise that this innovation is one of its kind in contemporary common law jurisprudence and one which courts in the common law jurisdictions world would no doubt emulate one fine day.


Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas

This chapter deals with Art. 6 of the Grundgesetz (GG), which guarantees protection for marriage and the family. Art. 6 GG protects marriage and the family from state interference, and also creates a special principle of equality. Paragraphs 4 and 5 create constitutional rights for mothers and children born outside of marriage. The chapter first considers the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court concerning the scope of protection for marriage and the family, including issues concerning discrimination against same-sex relationships, freedom to marry, marital cohabitation, the right to divorce, and the right to spousal maintenance. It then examines the constitutional rights of parents and the social rights of mothers before concluding with an analysis of the social rights of children born outside of marriage.


Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea

Every constitutional system today presents major controversies and encounters significant challenges in the protection and guarantees of fundamental rights, and for that reason they constitute the most lively subject of transnational constitutional dialogue. The Italian Constitutional Court has a highly developed body of jurisprudence on fundamental rights, starting with its very first decision examining the validity of Fascist laws limiting freedom of expression. This chapter provides a broad overview of some of the constitutional principles that ground fundamental rights in Italian constitutional law, such as human dignity and equality, and then presents the Court’s case law in a selected set of problem areas: personal liberty; freedom of religion; protection of the family; reproduction; social rights; immigration. These are areas with which many other constitutional systems are struggling, and the Italian Court’s particular way of conceptualizing and addressing these issues provides a welcome new voice in the global dialogue.


Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ

LABURPENA: Lan eremuan bideozaintzaren erabilerak ondorio garrantzitsuak dakartza funtsezko eskubideei dagokienez, esate baterako intimitateari eta datu pertsonalen babesari dagokienez. Hala eta guztiz ere, oraindik ez daukagu araudi zehatz eta espezifikorik kontrol-teknika hori lan eremuan erabiltzeari buruz. Horrek behartuta, errealitate horri araudi-esparru anitz eta generikoa aplikatzeko modua auzitegiek zehaztu behar dute, kontuan hartuta, gainera, Espainiako Konstituzioaren 18.4 artikulua alde horretatik lausoa dela. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, datuen babeserako funtsezko eskubidea aztertzean, datuen titularraren adostasuna eta titular horri eman beharreko informazioa eskubide horretan berebizikoak zirela ezarri zuen; hortik ondorioztatzen da titularraren adostasuna eta hari emandako informazioa mugatuz gero behar bezala justifikatu beharko dela. Hala ere, Konstituzio Auzitegiak, duela gutxiko jurisprudentzian, bere doktrina aldatu du. Aldaketa horrek, lan eremuan, argi eta garbi langileak informazioa jasotzeko duen eskubidea debaluatzea dakar, bere datuetatik zein lortzen ari diren jakiteari dagokionez. RESUMEN: La utilización de la videovigilancia en el ámbito laboral posee importantes implicaciones en relación con derechos fundamentales como los relativos a la intimidad y a la protección de datos personales. Pese a ello, carecemos aún de una normativa detallada y específica en relación con el uso de dicha técnica de control en el ámbito laboral, lo que obliga a que sean los tribunales los que vayan concretando la aplicación de un marco normativo plural y genérico a esa realidad, dada además la vaguedad del art. 18.4 CE. El TC, al analizar el derecho fundamental a la protección de datos, había establecido el carácter central en él del consentimiento del titular de los datos y de la información que debe dársele a éste, de donde se sigue que cualquier limitación del papel de ambos deberá estar debidamente justificada. Sin embargo, en su más reciente jurisprudencia el TC ha realizado un cambio de doctrina que supone, en el ámbito laboral, una clara devaluación del derecho a la información por parte del trabajador en relación con qué datos suyos se están obteniendo. ABSTRACT : T he use of video surveillance systems within the work sphere has major implications for fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection. Nonetheless, we still lack of a detailed and specific regulation regarding the use of that control technology within the work sphere, which obliges courts to define the application of a plural and generic normative framework to that issue, given the vagueness of art. 18.4 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, when analyzing the fundamental right to data protection, had settled the centralityof the consent of the data rightholder and of the information to be provided to the latter, and from this it followed that any restriction on the role of both rights should be duly justified. However, in its most recent case law the Constitutional Court has changed its doctrine which means, within the work sphere, a clear devaluation of the right of information by the employee regarding the obtained data of him/her.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 1099
Author(s):  
Alberto Oehling de los Reyes

Resumen:El artículo 53 de la Constitución española recoge tres cuestiones básicas: en primer lugar, determina que los derechos y libertades vinculan a todo el poder público; en segundo lugar, determina la protección constitucional y judicial de los derechos y libertades y de los derechos fundamentales; en tercer lugar, reconoce los principios rectores de la política social y económica. En este artículo se analizan estos preceptos y conceptos constitucionales, pero también se estudia su desarrollo legislativo desde 1978 y la realidad práctica hasta el día de hoy. En el artículo también se hace análisis de algunas incoherencias de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional en materias fundamentales del artículo 53 de la Constitución española de 1978. La intención es dar una visión de conjunto del artículo 53 de la Constitución desde 1978 hasta hoy.Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The structure of the practical realization of the article 53. 3. Preconditions of the legislation of the rights and freedoms and fundamental rights: 3.1 The principle of subjection and legally binding of all public authorities. 3.2 The principle of legal reserve. 3.3 The core content of the rights and freedoms. 4. The preferred procedure and ordinary summary of the article 53: 4.1 Outline of evolution and situation of the preferred procedure and summary inthe jurisdictional divisions. 4.2 About the protection of fundamental rights with procedural nature. 5. The remedy of amparo in the context of the article 53.2. 6. Approximation to the practical sense of the principles recognized in Chapter III Title I.Abstract:The article 53 of the Spanish Constitution specifies three basic issues: First, determines that the rights and liberties link all the public authorities; Secondly, determines the judicial and constitutional protection of the rights and freedoms and fundamental rights in Spain; Thirdly, recognizes the guiding principles of the social and economic policy. In this article are analysed these constitutional provisions and concepts, but also is studied their legislative development since 1978 and the practical reality until the present day. In the article are also analysed some inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of the SpanishConstitutional Court on fundamental issues about the article 53 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. The intention is to give an overview of the article 53 of the Constitution from 1978 until today.


2020 ◽  
pp. 124-149
Author(s):  
Alessia Barroso Lima Brito Campos Chevitarese ◽  
Ana Borges Coêlho Santos ◽  
Camila Nascimento de Souza

RESUMOO artigo tem por objetivo analisar a efetividade da jurisdição constitucional como mecanismo de emancipação social de determinados grupos a partir de decisões da Corte Constitucional colombiana. Nesse sentido, busca-se compreender a tutela dos direitos sociais, conforme o disposto na Constituição Colombiana de 1991, e os desafios de implementação dos direitos previstos, bem como o contexto de desenvolvimento de um protagonismo mais acentuado da Corte Constitucional colombiana. O estudo investiga se as progressistas decisões da citada Corte são capazes de modificar positivamente a situação social de grupos socialmente vulneráveis, com a finalidade de ponderar, nesse contexto, o papel da jurisdição constitucional na efetividade dos direitos sociais dos jurisdicionados.PALAVRAS-CHAVECorte Constitucional da Colômbia. Emancipação social. Efetividade dos direitos sociais. ABSTRACTThe article aims to analyze the effectiveness of judicial review as a mechanism of social emancipation of certain groups based on decisions of the Colombian Constitutional Court on social rights. In this sense, we seek to understand the protection of social rights, in accordance with the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and the challenges of implementing the rights envisaged, as well as the context of developing a more prominent role of the Colombian Constitutional Court. The study investigates whether if the progressive decisions of the aforementioned Court are capable of positively changing the social situation of socially vulnerable groups, in order to consider, in this context, the role of constitutional jurisdiction in the effectiveness of the social rights.KEYWORDSColombian Constitutional Court. Social emancipation. Effectiveness of social rights.


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Elaine Dewhurst

In 2008, Ireland faced an economic crisis without parallel in its recent history. To address this crisis, a large programme of financial assistance was obtained from the European Union and the IMF, and the Irish government set about the process of reforming the structure and financing of social security benefits and the healthcare system to ameliorate the effects of the crisis. While much can be said about the legislative reforms, their rationale, necessity, and impact, this chapter addresses the legacy of the crisis on the Irish constitutional system and, particularly, on the Irish constitutional protection of social rights (or lack thereof). Following an analysis of the limited case law surrounding the reforms imposed during the economic crisis, it is contended that the economic crisis had the effect of highlighting the lack of explicit constitutional protection of social rights, a deficiency which in turn created an opportunity for the utilisation of other existing and emerging constitutional rights. While the future of social rights in the Irish Constitution is still unclear, it is evident that the economic crisis has left an indelible mark on the Irish constitutional landscape.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document