TİKA’s Heritage Restoration Projects: Examples of Foreign Aid or Proof of Neo-Ottomanism?

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (Summer 2021) ◽  
pp. 141-156
Author(s):  
Miloš Todorović

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been using the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) to gain soft power and increase its influence in the Balkans, Caucasia, and Central Asia. As Turkey’s focus is on countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, many have characterized this attempt as Neo-Ottomanism. Especially problematic is the fact that, over the years, TİKA has funded the restoration of numerous Ottoman monuments in these regions. Using Serbia as an example, this article explores whether such projects are proof of Turkey having a ‘Neo-Ottoman agenda’ of reviving Ottoman culture and exerting influence over former Ottoman territories, or just a way of Turkey gaining soft power through foreign aid.

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 043-049
Author(s):  
Punit GAUR ◽  
Anurag TRIPATHI ◽  
Shovan Sinha RAY

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s economy was weak since most of the industrial enterprises were located in Russia. To attain economic growth, Kazakhstan crafted a unique foreign policy known as the multi-vector foreign policy, which facilitated an easy inflow of direct foreign investments into the state economy. After economic liberalization in 1991, India took a serious interest in Central Asia, and since then the two nations have come a long way marked by complex interdependence in the international arena. They have demonstrated a successful and sustained upward trend in their bilateral relationship through soft power, trade and long-standing historical connections. Thus, the prospects of mutual cooperation between Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, and India are quite promising in the near future.


2018 ◽  
pp. 550-563
Author(s):  
Daniel Sawert ◽  

The article assesses archival materials on the festival movement in the Soviet Union in 1950s, including its peak, the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students held in 1957 in Moscow. Even now the Moscow festival is seen in the context of international cultural politics of the Cold War and as a unique event for the Soviet Union. The article is to put the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students in the context of other youth festivals held in the Soviet Union. The festivals of 1950s provided a field for political, social, and cultural experiments. They also have been the crucible of a new way of communication and a new language of design. Furthermore, festivals reflected the new (althogh relative) liberalism in the Soviet Union. This liberalism, first of all, was expressed in the fact that festivals were organized by the Komsomol and other Soviet public and cultural organisations. Taking the role of these organisations into consideration, the research draws on the documents of the Ministry of culture, the All-Russian Stage Society, as well as personal documents of the artists. Furthermore, the author has gained access to new archive materials, which have until now been part of no research, such as documents of the N. Krupskaya Central Culture and Art Center and of the central committees of various artistic trade unions. These documents confirm the hypothesis that the festivals provided the Komsomol and the Communist party with a means to solve various social, educational, and cultural problems. For instance, in Central Asia with its partiarchal society, the festivals focuced on female emancipation. In rural Central Asia, as well as in other non-russian parts of the Soviet Union, there co-existed different ways of celebrating. Local traditions intermingled with cultural standards prescribed by Moscow. At the first glance, the modernisation of the Soviet society was succesful. The youth acquired political and cultural level that allowed the Soviet state to compete with the West during the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students. During the festival, however, it became apparent, that the Soviet cultural scheme no longer met the dictates of times. Archival documents show that after the Festival cultural and party officials agreed to ease off dogmatism and to tolerate some of the foreign cultural phenomena.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 179-199
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Entina ◽  
Alexander Pivovarenko

The article reflects on the issue of the foreign policy strategy of modern Russia in the Balkans region. One of the most significant aspects of this problem is the difference in views between Russia and the West. Authors show how different interpretations of the events in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s predetermined the sense of mutual suspicion and mistrust which spread to other regions such as the post-Soviet space. Exploring differences between the Russian and the Western (Euro-Atlantic) views on the current matters, authors draw attention to fundamental differences in terminology: while the Western narrative promotes more narrow geographical and political definitions (such as the Western Balkan Six), traditional Russian experts are more inclined to wider or integral definitions such as “the Balkans” and “Central and Southeast Europe”. Meanwhile none of these terms are applicable for analysis of the current trends such as the growing transit role of the Balkans region and its embedding in the European regional security architecture. Therefore, a new definition is needed to overcome the differences in vision and better understand significant recent developments in the region. Conceptualizing major foreign policy events in Central and Southeast Europe during the last three decades (the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s), authors demonstrate the significance of differences in tools and methods between the Soviet Union and the modern Russia. Permanent need for adaptation to changing political and security context led to inconsistence in Russian Balkan policy in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Russia was able to preserve an integral vision of the region and even to elaborate new transregional constructive projects, which in right political circumstances may promote stability and become beneficial for both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 212-241
Author(s):  
Mathijs Pelkmans

AbstractMissionaries have flocked to the Kyrgyz Republic ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Evangelical-Pentecostal and Tablighi missions have been particularly active on what they conceive of as a fertile post-atheist frontier. But as these missions project their message of truth onto the frontier, the dangers of the frontier may overwhelm them. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork amongst foreign and local Tablighis and evangelical-Pentecostals, this article formulates an analytic of the frontier that highlights the affective and relational characteristics of missionary activities and their effects. This analytic explains why and how missionaries are attracted to the frontier, as well as some of the successes and failures of their expansionist efforts. In doing so, the article reveals the potency of instability, a feature that is particularly evident in missionary work, but also resonates with other frontier situations.


Author(s):  
H. R. Jabbarinasir

The article studies factors of transformation of political Islam and reasons for its “tightening” in the modern context. On the basis of the ideas of social constructivism, the author traces the main milestones in the evolution of political Islam and the formation of its radical branches that orient towards violence and terrorism. The article examines nine mega-events that ultimately determined the specifics of the modern union of Islam and poli tics — the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the September 11 attacks (2001), the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the “Arab Spring”, and the establishment of political Islam with a “Turkish face”. The author demonstrates that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Islam began to gradually transform from the social phenomenon into the world-political factor. Initially, this tendency was observed in the intellectual and ideological spheres, but then penetrated practical politics. The article identifies four models of modern political Islam — Shiite, Salafi-jihadist, Takfirist-jihadist and moderate political Islam. According to the author’s conclusion, the attitude towards violence within these models is largely determined by the peculiarities of the formation, geographic ambitions and goals of the respective branches. The Shiite branch of political Islam that has established in Iran justifies violence for solving defensive tasks and appeals mainly to the categories of justice and protection of the oppressed. Salafijihadist and Takfirist groups, in essence, see violence as a key instrument for implementing the commandments of Allah and rebuilding the world on the principles of Sharia. The moderate political Islam (as shown by analyzing the case of Turkey) completely rejects violence, and religion remains largely a social phenomenon, although it is used for political purposes, in particular, to attract the electorate. On the basis of his analysis, the author comes to the conclusion that the idea of violence as an inherent element of political Islam is erroneous, but at the same time he points out risks of the increasing significance of this factor.


2019 ◽  
pp. 237-248
Author(s):  
Alyssa M. Park

This chapter examines Soviet and Japanese disputes over the Korean population in the Maritime Province from the 1920s to 1945. It shows that heightened geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia resulted in a renewed effort on the part of the Soviet Union to institute citizenship, migration and resettlement, and cultural policies among Koreans. Tensions inside the Maritime also escalated in the late 1920s and 1930s due to collectivization efforts and the Great Terror. Soviet policies culminated in the 1937 forced deportation of Koreans to Central Asia. The chapter argues that the deportation was an extreme attempt by the Soviet state to align its authority over territory and people in a sensitive border region. The chapter ends with a discussion of Korean migration, citizenship, and the border region between Russia, North Korea, and China after 1945.


Author(s):  
Atola Longkumer

Of the two Asian regions, socio-economically, South Asia presents both prosperity and abject poverty, embedded in varying traditions. Central Asian states are well-endowed with natural resources and sustain a diverse cultural heritage against a backdrop of Islam. The indigenous shamanic cultures that have sustained myriad indigenous people (often described by terms such as tribals, Adivasis, minorities) for generations across South Asia need to be recognised along with its globalisation. Healing, use of traditional medicines, the position and role of women, caste hierarchy and the relationship with the other are incorporated into South Asian Christianity. ‘Anonymous Christians’ have also contributed to concepts such as ‘insider movements’ to discuss embedded followers of Jesus. In Central Asia, Charismatic Christianity is finding particular resonance. The relative freedom of religious expression has given opportunities for Christians to witness to the gospel. The potential ecumenical relationship with the existing Orthodox Church presents an opportunity for global Christianity. Christianity has received fresh interest in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the nation-states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Theological creativity along with prophetic proclamation will be needed to balance these challenges of culture and faith in the region.


Author(s):  
James H. Meyer

The history of Muslim populations in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union is long and varied. In a Pew–Templeton poll conducted in Russia in 2010, 10 percent of respondents stated that their religion was Islam, while Muslims also make up a majority of the population in six post-Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Muslims have long lived in regions across Russia, with far-flung communities ranging from distant outposts of Siberia to western cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were more Muslims in the Russian Empire than there were in Iran or the Ottoman Empire, the two largest independent Muslim-majority states in the world at the time. Historically, the Muslim communities of Russia have been concentrated in four main regions: the Volga–Ural region in central Russia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. While Muslim communities across former Soviet space share both differences and similarities with one another with regard to language and religious practices, their respective relations with the various Russian states that have existed over the years have varied. Moreover, Russian and Soviet policymaking toward all of these communities has shifted considerably from one era, and one ruler, to another. Throughout the imperial and Soviet eras, and extending into the post-Soviet era up to the present day, therefore, the existence of variations with regard to both era and region remains one of the most enduring legacies of Muslim–state interactions. Muslims in Russia vary by traditions, language, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and practices, and with respect to their historical interactions with the Russian state. The four historically Muslim-inhabited regions were incorporated into the Russian state at different points during its imperial history, often under quite sharply contrasting sets of conditions. Today most, but not all, Muslims in Russia and the rest of the former USSR are Sunni, although the manner and degree to which religion is practiced varies greatly among both communities and individuals. With respect to language, Muslim communities in Russia have traditionally been dominated demographically by Turkic speakers, although it should be noted that most Turkic languages are not mutually comprehensible in spoken form. In the North Caucasus and Tajikistan, the most widely spoken indigenous languages are not Turkic, although in these areas there are Turkic-speaking minorities. Another important feature of Muslim–state interactions in Russia is their connection to Muslims and Muslim-majority states beyond Russia’s borders. Throughout the imperial era, Russia’s foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Iran was often intimately connected to domestic policymaking toward Muslim communities inside Russia. While this was a less pronounced feature of Moscow’s foreign policymaking during the Soviet era, in the post-Soviet era, policymaking toward Muslims domestically has once again become more closely linked to Russia’s foreign policy goals.


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