scholarly journals Multipolarity and Stability in Asia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nu Hoang Anh Duong

<p>This thesis considers the relationship between multipolarity and stability in Asia. Stability can be perceived as a system’s tendency towards equilibrium and will be examined in terms of war avoidance of the great powers and the stability of the distribution of power in the region. In the next twenty or thirty years, Asia will be increasingly multipolar in the form of either three powers (the United States (US), China, and India) or four (the US, China, India and Japan). I argue that a more multipolar Asia will reduce the likelihood of great power wars because of increasing economic interdependence and the calculations by states of their national interests. However, in terms of the stability of the distribution of power, the new distribution of power will involve a balance between the US, China and India, but it still remains contested due to questions raised about China’s and India’s legitimacy. In general, while Asia is more likely to be stable in Asia if it is multipolar, the likelihood of conflicts between China and India remains an open question. I conclude that the stability in Asia depends not only on the structure of the system but also other factors such as these major states’ uncontrolled actions and behaviors in response to other states in the system.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nu Hoang Anh Duong

<p>This thesis considers the relationship between multipolarity and stability in Asia. Stability can be perceived as a system’s tendency towards equilibrium and will be examined in terms of war avoidance of the great powers and the stability of the distribution of power in the region. In the next twenty or thirty years, Asia will be increasingly multipolar in the form of either three powers (the United States (US), China, and India) or four (the US, China, India and Japan). I argue that a more multipolar Asia will reduce the likelihood of great power wars because of increasing economic interdependence and the calculations by states of their national interests. However, in terms of the stability of the distribution of power, the new distribution of power will involve a balance between the US, China and India, but it still remains contested due to questions raised about China’s and India’s legitimacy. In general, while Asia is more likely to be stable in Asia if it is multipolar, the likelihood of conflicts between China and India remains an open question. I conclude that the stability in Asia depends not only on the structure of the system but also other factors such as these major states’ uncontrolled actions and behaviors in response to other states in the system.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-349
Author(s):  
Arman Artakovich Mikaelian ◽  
Vladimir Mikhailovich Morozov

The article analyses the US influence on Israeli policy towards both China and India. The United States has had and still has a significant influence on the dynamics of Israeli-Chinese and Israeli-Indian relations. The relevance of the issue stems from the growing importance of China and India in the world affairs amid rising tensions between the US and China that are spilling into a trade war. The article aims to explore the US influence on Israels policy in Asia. It examines the way how the Israeli leadership has adapted to Washingtons influence while promoting its strategic cooperation with China and India. The study comprises historical method, comparative analysis and historical-systematic analysis. The author comes to the following conclusions. First, Washingtons influence on Sino-Israeli relations has gone through five development stages: the first stage (1971-1989): implicit US support for the development of Sino-Israeli relations; the second stage (1990-1998): American criticism of military and technical cooperation between Israel and China; the third stage (1999-2005): Washingtons shift from criticism to pressure policy in order to prevent the Israeli leadership from military cooperation with China; the fourth stage (2006-2016): Israels acceptance of US demands and refusal to supply arms to Beijing (with Tel Aviv focusing on the development of trade and economic relations with China); the fifth stage (2017 - present): U.S. criticism of Israeli-Chinese economic cooperation amid worsening contacts between Beijing and Washington. The Israeli government is trying to meet Washingtons demands as well as preserve its strategic economic relations with Beijing. Second, the US factor, on the contrary, contributed to normalization of Indian-Israeli relations, having a positive impact on the development of trade, economic and military cooperation between Tel Aviv and New Delhi. Third, the US actions can be explained by an attempt to preserve its national interests. At the same time, the author stresses that the US influence on Israels policy in Asia complies with Washingtons regional priorities set forth in the 2017 US National Security Strategy.


2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Layne

The conventional wisdom among U.S. grand strategists is that U.S. hegemony is exceptional—that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in counterhegemonic balancing against it. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, however, is weak. Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—that is, at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists' focus on the failure of new great powers to emerge, and the absence of traditional “hard” (i.e., military) counterbalancing, distracts attention from other forms of counterbalancing—notably “leash-slipping”—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the same result: the end of unipolarity. Because unipolarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony, if it ends, so too will U.S. primacy.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


Author(s):  
Terence Young ◽  
Alan MacEachern ◽  
Lary Dilsaver

This essay explores the evolving international relationship of the two national park agencies that in 1968 began to offer joint training classes for protected-area managers from around the world. Within the British settler societies that dominated nineteenth century park-making, the United States’ National Park Service (NPS) and Canada’s National Parks Branch were the most closely linked and most frequently cooperative. Contrary to campfire myths and nationalist narratives, however, the relationship was not a one-way flow of information and motivation from the US to Canada. Indeed, the latter boasted a park bureaucracy before the NPS was established. The relationship of the two nations’ park leaders in the half century leading up to 1968 demonstrates the complexity of defining the influences on park management and its diffusion from one country to another.


Author(s):  
Frédéric Grare

India’s relationship with the United States remains crucial to its own objectives, but is also ambiguous. The asymmetry of power between the two countries is such that the relationship, if potentially useful, is not necessary for the United States while potentially risky for India. Moreover, the shift of the political centre of gravity of Asia — resulting from the growing rivalry between China and the US — is eroding the foundations of India’s policy in Asia, while prospects for greater economic interaction is limited by India’s slow pace of reforms. The future of India-US relations lies in their capacity to evolve a new quid pro quo in which the US will formulate its expectations in more realistic terms while India would assume a larger share of the burden of Asia’ security.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-437
Author(s):  
Xiangfeng Yang

Abstract Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.


Author(s):  
Diomaris E.S. Jurecska ◽  
Chloe E. Lee ◽  
Kelly B.T. Chang ◽  
Elizabeth Sequeira

Abstract The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between intelligence (IQ) and self-efficacy in children and adolescents living in the United States and Nicaragua. The sample consisted of 90 (46 male, 44 female) students (mean age=11.57 years, SD=3.0 years) referred by school administrators and faculty. United States (US) participants (n=27) resided in rural counties in the Northwest. The other group consisted of 63 students from Central America. A comparison between groups revealed that in the US, sample higher grades and IQ scores are typically associated with higher levels of self-efficacy. However in the Nicaraguan sample, both IQ scores and grades were not associated with self-efficacy, although age was correlated with self-efficacy. Results suggest that the construct of self-efficacy might change depending on whether one belongs to an individualistic or collectivistic society. Additionally, the effects of socioeconomic factors might influence perceived ability even more than intellectual abilities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi ◽  
Adam Saud

In contemporary times, the geo-political agenda and geo-economic strategy of the world is being dominated by the ongoing US-China hegemonic competition. Where the United States is trying to prolong the &lsquo;unipolar moment&rsquo; and deter the rise of China; China is trying to establish itself as the hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere, an alternate to the US. The entirely opposite interests of the two Great Powers have initiated a hostile confrontational competition for domination. This paper seeks to determine the future nature of the US-China relations; will history repeat itself and a bloody war be fought to determine the leader of the pack? or another prolonged Cold War will be fought, which will end when one side significantly weakens and collapses? Both dominant paradigms of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, are used to analyze the future nature of the US-China relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Kerwin ◽  
Robert Warren

The conventional wisdom holds that the only point of consensus in the fractious US immigration debate is that the system is broken. Yet, the US public has consistently expressed a desire for a legal and orderly immigration system that serves compelling national interests. This paper describes how to create such a system. It focuses on the cornerstone of immigration reform,1 the legal immigration system,2 and addresses the widespread belief that broad reform will incentivize illegal migration and ultimately lead to another large undocumented population. The paper begins with an analysis of presidential signing statements on seminal immigration legislation over nearly a century. These statements reveal broad consensus on the interests and values that the United States seeks to advance through its immigration and refugee policies. They constitute additional common ground in the immigration debate. To serve these interests, immigration and refugee considerations must be “mainstreamed” into other policy processes. In addition, its policies will be more successful if they are seen to benefit or, at least, not to discriminate against migrant-sending states. Not surprisingly, the US immigration system does not reflect the vast, mostly unanticipated changes in the nation and the world since Congress last meaningfully reformed this system (27 years ago) and last overhauled the law (52 years ago). The paper does not detail the well-documented ways that US immigration laws fall short of serving the nation's economic, family, humanitarian, and rule of law objectives. Nor does it propose specific changes in categories and levels of admission. Rather, it describes how a legal immigration system might be broadly structured to deliver on its promises. In particular, it makes the case that Congress should create a flexible system that serves compelling national interests, allows for real time adjustments in admission based on evidence and independent analysis, and vests the executive with appropriate discretion in administering the law. The paper also argues that the United States should anticipate and accommodate the needs of persons compelled to migrate by its military, trade, development, and other commitments. In addition, the US immigration system needs to be able to distinguish between undocumented immigrants, and refugees and asylum seekers, and to treat these two populations differently. The paper assumes that there will be continued bipartisan support for immigration enforcement. However, even with a strong enforcement apparatus in place and an adaptable, coherent, evidence-based legal immigration system that closely aligns with US interests, some (reduced) level of illegal migration will persist. The paper offers a sweeping, historical analysis of how this population emerged, why it has grown and contracted, and how estimates of its size have been politically exploited. Legalization is often viewed as the third rail of immigration reform. Yet, Congress has regularly legalized discrete undocumented populations, and the combination of a well-structured legalization program, strengthened legal immigration system, and strong enforcement policies can prevent the reemergence of a large-scale undocumented population. In contrast, the immense US enforcement apparatus will work at cross-purposes to US interests and values, absent broader reform. The paper ends with a series of recommendations to reform the legal immigration system, downsize the current undocumented population, and ensure its permanent reduction. It proposes that the United States “reissue” (or reuse) the visas of persons who emigrate, as a way to promote legal immigration reform without significantly increasing annual visa numbers.


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