Abstract
The phenomenon of color revolutions has occupied a prominent place in Russian politics for a good reason. The major threat of color revolutions as modern political warfare designed by Western countries deeply affected the political process in Russia since 2005. It may have appeared that the imperative of resisting them was the result of a non-democratic regime reacting to neighboring countries’ uprisings. Some portrayed it as authoritarian learning. This paper suggests that the counteractions stemmed from the interests of disunited Russian elite groups who were seeking opportunities to reinforce their dominance and capitalize on the idea of significant external threats. The phenomenon reshaped the balance within elite groups and led to the consolidation of law enforcement networks on the eve of Putin’s third term. Further, the prevailing perception of color revolutions discouraged any elite splits that could lead to proto-democratic rules.
The second chapter covers the main characteristics of transition time in the four countries: Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. After developing the theoretical model on paths of transition, with a focus on social movement participation, the chapter looks at social movements and protest events as turning points during transition, covering in particular the specific movement actors, their organizational models, and their repertoires of action and frames. The chapter focuses on two dimensions: the role of mobilization in the transition period, which implies the analysis of how elites and masses interact, ally, or fight with each other in the process, and the outcome of transitions as continuity versus rupture of the democratic regime vis-à-vis the old one. It concludes by elaborating some hypotheses on how different modes of transition may produce different types and uses of (transition) memories.
This paper compares the corporate network strategies between multinational corporations of two different origins (United States and Spain), business groups, and state-owned enterprises in the public utility sector of a developing country going through economic and political transitions. The transitions we consider are from an import substitution industrialization model to an open market economy and from a democratic regime to a dictatorial one and back to democracy. We analyze the Chilean telecommunications sector between 1958 and 2005 and find that during a democratic regime all firms sought to build more networks with each other, while incentives decrease under an authoritarian regime. In the protectionist era, US investors built links with Chile’s corporate elite, while in times of an open economy, Spanish investors built these links with the government. State-owned corporations did not attempt to build links with other actors at any time, and business groups sought to build most networks among members of the group. Our findings challenge two commonly held assumptions: first, that open economies decrease incentives for domestic actors to build links with each other and, second, that close political regimes increase incentives to build networks among economic actors.
The present study was carried out in December, 2018 and aimed at exploring the “Yellow Vests” movement when the revolts were in full swing. It involved 260 French participants (Mage = 42.9 years, SDage 14.6, Min = 18 to Max = 88). Results confirmed our hypotheses. The people who most identified with the “Yellow Vests” are those who perceive the system to be less fair and more illegitimate, and who express more dissatisfaction with the democratic regime and are generally more politically cynical. They feel more alienated and affirm that they would be more likely to resort to violence in order to introduce a new social order. They adhere more to conspiracy theories. Finally, we found greater identification of the “Yellow Vests” with extreme compared to moderate political parties. We discuss these results from the defence of the moral economy principle.
Abstract
The COVID-19 crisis has provided an opportunity to re-evaluate how the federal relations work in authoritarian Russia. In particular, the crisis has confirmed that the regional governors are an integral part of maintaining the stability of the non-democratic regime. Since the whole system and thus, the political careers of the incumbent governors depend on Putin’s popularity, they are interested in maintaining it, even at the expense of their own popularity with the population. In Spring 2020 the regional governors have demonstrated both loyalty and willingness to shield Putin from political responsibility for unpopular measures associated with the epidemic.
A reconsideration of the precise nature and extent of the military obligations of citizens in classical Athens reveals that under Athens’ democratic regime these obligations were relatively limited and not systematically enforced. The relevant classical legislation, later historical tradition, and some contemporary archaic evidence are combined to show that in archaic Athens, by contrast, formal military obligations were more extensive and more stringently enforced, but applied only to the leisured elite. The bulk of the working population was also obliged to serve, but only in ‘general levies’, with whatever arms and armour they could afford. This system was fully developed already under Solon and remained in operation until the late fifth century BC, when social and economic changes and the exceptional strain of the Peloponnesian War caused it to be abandoned.
The place and international position of Lebanon in the world political arena today is changing and transforming under the influence of globalization. Thus, this is not deprive, but changes the vector on the international arena and does not exclude the already acquired conservative character. Prime Minister Tamam Salam, who is the executive of the President of the Republic of Lebanon, is reforming and liberalizing the law and changing the vector of foreign policy. He doing this without leaving the traditions and religious views, also without rejecting the conservative nature of foreign and domestic policies. Although Lebanon is part of the League of Arab States, which is accused of non-democracies, it has a democratic regime for a long time. Balancing the policy of the Lebanese Republic between conservatism, traditionalism, democracy and liberalization makes Lebanon a great country for analysis, since it provides an opportunity to reflect the coexistence of democracy with the stereotyped vision of the “Islamic world”.
The discussion about the development of democracy in Russia does not lose relevance 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Constitution proclaims the formation of a democratic regime, but political scientists note the development of autocratic tendencies in post-Soviet Russia. It's necessary to study its origins, consider the process of formation for a deeper analysis of the modern political system. it will be possible to study the factors that hindered the development of democracy in our country. It was at that time that the trends of authoritarian development were laid.
Adaptation Strategies of Multinational Corporations, State-Owned Enterprises, and Domestic Business Groups to Economic and Political Transitions: A Network Analysis of the Chilean Telecommunications Sector, 1958–2005
