scholarly journals Environmental Justice and Rawlsian Social Contract Theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-60
Author(s):  
Stanislav Myšička

Contemporary social and political theory is not wholly sufficient for dealing with environmental issues unless it will be more informed by political theories of justice. I present the view that environmental justice can be fruitfully approached from the point of view of contemporary social contract theory, mainly the one inspired by the work of John Rawls. Healthy natural environment is indispensable for many reasons for every human society; however, nature possesses also value going beyond pure instrumentality for human beings. Because humans can have great impact on natural environment in either positive or negative way, this entails duties on their part. Society’s dealings with the environment are regulated by laws and other publicmeasures, which in turn have their deeper justification in general theory of justice of that particular society. The article tries to show that contemporary social contract theory can fruitfully grasp principles of environmental justice, which could lead to more environment sensitive policies and be acceptable from liberal point of view at the same time.Politické myšlení nemůže adekvátně reagovat na environmentální problémy současné společnosti, pokud nebude více pracovat s konceptem environmentální spravedlnosti. V tomto článku se snažím ukázat způsob, jak může být otázka environmentální spravedlnosti uchopena pomocí teorie společenské smlouvy v podání Johna Rawlse. Lidé mají svoji činností významný dopad na životní prostředí, což má za následek nerovnou distribuci environmentálních dober a škod. Proto existují vůči ostatním lidem povinnosti vyplývající ze spravedlnosti vztahující se na environmentální oblast. Environmentální otázky se nicméně musí řešit pomocí závazných společenských pravidel, která mají podobu zákonů vynucovaných státem. Tyto zákony mají své hlubší ospravedlnění právě v určité teorii spravedlnosti, která zakládá jejich legitimitu. Ve článku se snažím ukázat, že pomoci teorie společenské smlouvy lze konstruovat soubor principů environmentální spravedlnosti pro společnost, která se chce stát více odpovědnou vůči životnímu prostředí a zároveň fungovat podle liberálních principů.

Author(s):  
Hilde Lindemann

This chapter focuses on the three moral theories that have long dominated Western philosophy. The overviews of social contract theory, utilitarianism, and Kantian ethics are followed by a criticism, from a feminist point of view, of the failings the theories have in common, described as distorted pictures of the persons who are the moral agents in the theories, the societies these people inhabit, and the understanding of rationality the theories presuppose. It then explains why the theories can’t well be employed to address these failings.


Author(s):  
Albert Weale

In the second half of the twentieth century, social contract theory flourished as a branch of moral and political theory. Its central claim was that principles of social and political organization could be derived from a hypothetical social contract that would be agreed among rational persons. It aspired to provide a theory of content, so defining justifiable principles, as well as a theory of obligation, so explicating the reasons that agents would have for following those principles. In scope it offered an account of interpersonal morality, political authority, and economic justice, although all could be regarded as departments of the theory of justice. Social contract theory also offered a method of ethics of a constructivist type. In this respect it followed the model of utilitarianism. The key authors were: Barry, Buchanan and Tullock, Harsanyi, Gauthier, Grice, Rawls, and Scanlon. Their different theories can be classified by reference to two dimensions. Are the hypothetical contracting parties behind a veil of ignorance or not? And, to what type of rationality—utility-based or deliberative—is their reasoning supposed to conform? The purpose of this work is to offer an exposition and evaluation of this body of work.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Gong Qun

AbstractGlobal justice or the lack thereof has internal connections with global poverty. Global justice is an ideal pursuit of cosmopolitanism, which regards basic human needs as its rightful object. The right to life, from the point of view of global justice, is the most fundamental in the list of Human Rights. International anarchy and the current international economic order, however, cast a utopian shadow on the realization of this right when we consider the de facto institutions and the ostensible goal of impartial love for everyone. Humanitarian aid is another approach to the problem of contemporary global poverty. Its difficulty lies first in people’s different conceptions of obligation and donation. They consider the former as duty while the latter is seen to lie beyond the call of duty. Second, in terms of a correlation between right and duty, since everyone has the right to life, the duty falls accordingly upon organizations or individuals. Meanwhile, donation as duty is not perfect obligation, thus is not compulsory either. Finally, international humanitarian aid is constrained by nationalism and partial love. Hence, in the light of either government or individual, the humanitarian aid approach is beset with challenges.Global justice has gained academic importance worldwide since John Rawls’ later works. By contrast to domestic justice, it is a theory of justice that proposes to include all human beings. Global justice stands for a kind of utopian justice in regard to both the institutional path and the humanitarian aid approach. I shall examine the theory of global justice under these two aspects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 46-63
Author(s):  
Gauthier de Beco

This chapter starts by challenging the view of independence in legal theory. It goes on to assess social contract theory, in particular Rawls’s Theory of Justice, as well as criticisms of this theory put forward regarding disability. The aim is not only to expose the vacuum in political theory as well as the failure to offer disabled people equal moral consideration but also to examine what are the possible ways forward. The chapter therefore explores how theories of justice other than the social contract theory can be used in order to determine what is needed for including disabled people. It discusses two such theories, namely capabilities and recognition theories, and investigates both their limits and their potential in making them of benefit to all disabled people. It also proposes a combination of those theories so as to gear them towards the objectives of the CRPD.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter considers why social contract accounts may seem particularly ill-suited to address justice for all persons with impairments or illnesses. Two variants of social contract theory are discussed: contractarianism and contractualism. It is argued that while contractarian theories may be able to address certain basic needs and interests of persons with impairments or illnesses, such theories are, nonetheless, unacceptable if one holds that (nearly all) human beings are owed justice because of their own value or intrinsic worth. Although Rawls did not address justice for those with impairments in his theory in any detail, it is argued that contractualists can develop quite inclusive theories. Two strategies for developing an inclusive contractualism are discussed, both of which focus on a capacity for cooperative contribution possessed by nearly all human beings and in which we can understand the intrinsic value of persons as inhering.


1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive from implicit conventions the person has accepted in dealing with other people. Gauthier's view is different from either of these sorts of contract theory. Instead, he holds that certain basic principles of impartiality are prior to actual agreements.


Res Publica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Voigt

AbstractStates of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit ‘emergency constitution’, i.e., the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. In this paper, I ask whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory. I argue that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory—as applied by economists—can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution. This paper introduces a novel argument for justifying emergency constitutions. It argues that they can serve as a commitment mechanism protecting both citizens and politicians from overreacting to rare but significant threats.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Paul Seabright ◽  
Jonathan Stieglitz ◽  
Karine Van der Straeten

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document