Personale Lebensform

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-250
Author(s):  
Matthias Wunsch

Philosophical anthropology offers two ways of structuring the concept of person, either by locating the essence of man in his being a person or by providing a bio- philosophy of personhood. Building on the work of Helmuth Plessner, this essay aims at conciliating both structurings. It argues for the thesis that personhood is the life-form of man and discusses the main structural features of human life-form.

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Wunsch

What is man? And what meaning does this question have for philosophy? For the first half of the 20th century, the Davos disputation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger is regarded as the paradigmatic dispute over man and the correct understanding of philosophy. Yet the protagonists of the dispute themselves conceived of their respective positions as being embedded in a threefold constellation with the kind of modern philosophical anthropology founded by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner. Including this third, natural-philosophical alternative opens up new ways of dealing with Heidegger's ontology of Dasein and Cassirer's cultural philosophy. At the same time, the author presents an original position instructive for a number of topics of the current question of the human – namely naturalism, the animal-human relationship, the concept of person and the relationship of human life form and objective mind.


2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-242
Author(s):  
Andreas Heinz

Abstract Mental disorders have been suggested to differ from somatic diseases because they lack an organic correlate. We show that this argument is both empirically wrong and theoretically irrelevant, because diseases are defined by functional impairments and not biological variation. Due to human diversity, a multitude of functions can be defined, and any selection of medically relevant functional impairments is necessarily value-based. We suggest that such values include individual survival and living in a shared world with others, and that their definition requires public debate and a critical reflection by Philosophical Anthropology. However, the presence of functional impairments that are generally relevant for human life and survival only fulfils the so-called disease criterion, which is necessary but not sufficient to diagnose a clinically relevant malady. This would only be justified if such functional impairments cause individual harm, either because they are accompanied by suffering (the illness criterion) or because they interfere with basic activities of daily living such as personal hygiene and food intake (the sickness criterion of a clinically relevant malady). We apply this theory to mental disorders, conclude that only a fraction of such “disorders” currently listed in international classifications of diseases are clinically relevant mental maladies, suggest focusing on the needs of persons with such maladies and recommend avoiding “pathologization” of human diversity.


Author(s):  
Federico Leoni

The chapter describes Jaspers’ debt towards XIX century philosophies - in particular Nietzsche’s Lebensphilosophie, Weber’s sociological thinking, Dilthey’s philosophy of Geisteswissenschaften, Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl offered Jaspers an access to the ground structures of human experience, beyond abstractions and intelletual reconstructions of traditional philosophy and psychology. Dilthey provided him a neat epistemological differentiation between the methods of explication (natural sciences) and comprehension (human sciences). Weber’s sociology elaborated a precious notion of “Idealtypus”, central to Jaspers phenomenological psychopatology. Nietzsche’s meditation on the Uebermensch offered Jaspers, paradoxically enough, an insight about the nature of illness on weakness, which Jaspers philosophical anthropology assumed since the Allgemeine Psychopatologie as a constitutive dimension of human life as such.


2006 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Fischer

ZusammenfassungVorgeschlagen wird, die ‚Philosophische Anthropologie‘ als eine dritte Position in der sich neu formierenden deutschen Nachkriegssoziologie zu beobachten. Inspiriert durch die im Schelerschen Theorieprogramm einer ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘ miteinander verbundenen Denker Helmuth Plessner und Arnold Gehlen, die beide von der Philosophie zu soziologischen Lehrstühlen wechselten, entwickelte sich (trotz der persönlich-akademischen und politisch- biografischen Divergenzen zwischen den Hauptprotagonisten) ein Netzwerk von Soziologen (Schelsky, Bahrdt, Popitz, Claessens et al.), die die Grundannahmen der ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘ teilten und aus dieser Voraussetzung die soziologische Forschung in Schlüsselthemen der bundesrepublikanischen Soziologie dominierten (Technik- und Industriesoziologie, Familiensoziologie, Stadtsoziologie, Soziologie der Macht etc.). So gesehen, war die Theorie der ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘ in der deutschen Soziologie bis Mitte der 1970er Jahre möglicherweise ebenso einflussreich wie die Frankfurter Schule (Horkheimer, Adorno) oder die Kölner Schule (René König). Nicht zuletzt entwickelten sich die beiden großen originären Theorieprojekte der westdeutschen Soziologie bei Habermas und Luhmann als Transformationen von Konzepten der ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘.


Ramus ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 75-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Purves

ἕρϰος Ἀχαιῶν: ἔμψυχον τεῖχος τῶν Ἑλλήνων.Bulwark of the Achaeans: living wall of the Greeks.Schol. D. Il. 6.5 (on Ajax)Now, still breathing, he is simply matter…Simone Weil, ‘The Iliad or the Poem of Force’ The two quotations at the start of this paper, one from the D scholion on the Iliad and the other from Simone Weil's famous essay on force, both make of the Homeric warrior a kind of ‘breathing material’. Two references, then, to the liveliness of objects, but each meaning very different things. For the scholiast places man on the same side as materiality, as if humans and things can equally be infused with life and can exist in a sort of continuum, but Weil argues that a human who is reduced to mere matter, even if he is a still a thing that breathes, is as good as nothing. Unlike the scholiast, Weil's interpretation is predicated on a strong belief in the duality of body and soul in the structure of human life, and since objects do not have souls they are, for her, essentially dead. Throughout her essay, Weil visits again and again the materiality of Homeric man and his propensity to turn, under the crushing power of force, into what she calls alternately a ‘thing’, ‘inert matter’, ‘stone’, and even ‘nothingness’. But for the D scholiast, the comparison of Ajax to stone does not subjugate him or turn him into a ‘mere’ or ‘inert’ object. On the contrary, the gloss ἔμψυχον τεῖχος speaks instead to the lively and permeable boundary between human and nonhuman in early Greek epic, one that suggests that objects can have their own life form, their own energy, vitality, and even creativity.


2006 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3

VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS The first essay responds to our call for articles on deep histories of the present, wide-angle lenses “combining past and present as a unitary field of vision” (CSSH 2005: 233).Judith Adler shows the lineage connecting themes of current wilderness debates with fourth-century Christian ascetic movements. Such movements idealized empty spaces as the most fitting habitat for ascetics, by virtue of whose existence the world and human life was preserved, a revaluation of wilderness propagated more widely by the Christianization of Rome. The tradition of ascetic primitivism has its origins in practical forms of early philosophical anthropology and speculative psychology, and is perpetuated in tropes of wilderness as a book of nature, an educator superior to schools, a space whose purity is necessary for the survival of the world, and a wild space that humans are called upon to protect or transform. As millennial traditions of narrative continually offer themselves to our thoughts about the radical transformation of our planet, the author suggests, historians of late antiquity might find themselves “well situated to throw new light on deeply motivating rhetorical tropes of emerging bitter debates.”


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dobeson

This article introduces the basic notions of the widely neglected Philosophical Anthropology of Helmuth Plessner. Instead of defining man as a privileged holder of consciousness, Plessner claims that all living organisms can be defined by their specific relation to their physical boundaries. In contrast to other living organisms such as plants and animals, however, the ‘eccentric’ nature of man allows for a comparatively high degree of freedom from the physical environment, which enables him to transcend, objectify, and deconstruct the boundaries of the same. The article concludes by outlining Plessner’s original contribution to contemporary debates in social theory, in particular constructivism and post-humanist studies.


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