A Logical Analysis of the Main Argument in Chapter 2 of the Proslogion by Anselm of Canterbury

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-44
Author(s):  
Peter Hinst

The primary aim is the reconstruction of the main argument of the second chapter of Anselm’s Proslogion. To be proved is the statement that God, or something than which nothing greater can be thought, exists in reality. I proceed by a piecemeal analysis of every sentence of the Latin original and its subsequent translation into a formal second-order language with choice operator. Reconstructing Anselm’s reasoning demands interpretative input and additions. For example, the formula ‘quod maius est’ has to be suitably interpreted and expanded. Furthermore, I try to explicate Anselm’s maius predicate in terms of a perfection predicate and to develop a general proof for Anselm’s theorem, i.e. the statement that something/that than which something greater cannot be thought has all greater-making attributes.

Author(s):  
Valeriy K. Zakharov ◽  
Timofey V. Rodionov

The paper is devoted to construction of some closed inductive sequence of models of the generalized second-order Dedekind theory of real numbers with exponentially increasing powers. These models are not isomorphic whereas all models of the standard second-order Dedekind theory are. The main idea in passing to generalized models is to consider instead of superstructures with the single common set-theoretical equality and the single common set-theoretical belonging superstructures with several generalized equalities and several generalized belongings for rst and second orders. The basic tools for the presented construction are the infraproduct of collection of mathematical systems different from the factorized Los ultraproduct and the corresponding generalized infrafiltration theorem. As its auxiliary corollary we obtain the generalized compactness theorem for the generalized second-order language.


2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco Gericke

In this article, a supplementary yet original contribution is made to the ongoing attempts at refining ways of comparative-philosophical conceptual clarification of Qohelet’s claim that הבל הכל in 1:2 (and 12:8). Adopting and adapting the latest analytic metaphysical concerns and categories for descriptive purposes only, a distinction is made between הבל as property of הכל and the properties of הבל in relation to הכל. Involving both correlation and contrast, the second-order language framework is hereby extended to a level of advanced nuance and specificity for restating the meaning of the book’s first-order language on its own terms, even if not in them.Contribution: By considering logical, ontological, mereological and typological aspects of property theory in dialogue with appearances of הכל and of הבל in Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 12:8 and in-between, a new way is presented in the quest to explain why things in the world of the text are the way they are, or why they are at all.


1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-340
Author(s):  
Scott K. Lehmann

This note describes a simple interpretation * of modal first-order languages K with but finitely many predicates in derived classical second-order languages L(K) such that if Γ is a set of K-formulae, Γ is satisfiable (according to Kripke's 55 semantics) iff Γ* is satisfiable (according to standard (or nonstandard) second-order semantics).The motivation for the interpretation is roughly as follows. Consider the “true” modal semantics, in which the relative possibility relation is universal. Here the necessity operator can be considered a universal quantifier over possible worlds. A possible world itself can be identified with an assignment of extensions to the predicates and of a range to the quantifiers; if the quantifiers are first relativized to an existence predicate, a possible world becomes simply an assignment of extensions to the predicates. Thus the necessity operator can be taken to be a universal quantifier over a class of assignments of extensions to the predicates. So if these predicates are regarded as naming functions from extensions to extensions, the necessity operator can be taken as a string of universal quantifiers over extensions.The alphabet of a “finite” modal first-order language K shall consist of a non-empty countable set Var of individual variables, a nonempty finite set Pred of predicates, the logical symbols ‘¬’ ‘∧’, and ‘∧’, and the operator ‘◊’. The formation rules of K generate the usual Polish notations as K-formulae. ‘ν’, ‘ν1’, … range over Var, ‘P’ over Pred, ‘A’ over K-formulae, and ‘Γ’ over sets of K-formulae.


1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Bauval

This article is a rewriting of my Ph.D. Thesis, supervised by Professor G. Sabbagh, and incorporates a suggestion from Professor B. Poizat. My main result can be crudely summarized (but see below for detailed statements) by the equality: first-order theory of F[Xi]i∈I = weak second-order theory of F.§I.1. Conventions. The letter F will always denote a commutative field, and I a nonempty set. A field or a ring (A; +, ·) will often be written A for short. We shall use symbols which are definable in all our models, and in the structure of natural numbers (N; +, ·):— the constant 0, defined by the formula Z(x): ∀y (x + y = y);— the constant 1, defined by the formula U(x): ∀y (x · y = y);— the operation ∹ x − y = z ↔ x = y + z;— the relation of division: x ∣ y ↔ ∃ z(x · z = y).A domain is a commutative ring with unity and without any zero divisor.By “… → …” we mean “… is definable in …, uniformly in any model M of L”.All our constructions will be uniform, unless otherwise mentioned.§I.2. Weak second-order models and languages. First of all, we have to define the models Pf(M), Sf(M), Sf′(M) and HF(M) associated to a model M = {A; ℐ) of a first-order language L [CK, pp. 18–20]. Let L1 be the extension of L obtained by adjunction of a second list of variables (denoted by capital letters), and of a membership symbol ∈. Pf(M) is the model (A, Pf(A); ℐ, ∈) of L1, (where Pf(A) is the set of finite subsets of A. Let L2 be the extension of L obtained by adjunction of a second list of variables, a membership symbol ∈, and a concatenation symbol ◠.


2002 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 1623-1638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agustín Rayo

AbstractI show that any sentence of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed with no loss of compositionality as a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and use this result to prove a completeness theorem for applied arithmetic. More specifically. I set forth an enriched second-order language L. a sentence of L (which is true on the intended interpretation of L), and a compositionally recursive transformation Tr defined on formulas of L, and show that they have the following two properties: (a) in a universe with at least ℶn−2 objects, any formula of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed as a formula of L, and (b) for any sentence of is a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and


1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilbur John Walkoe

In [3] Henkin made the observation that certain second-order existential formulas may be thought of as the Skolem normal forms of formulas of a language which is first-order in every respect except its incorporation of a form of partially-ordered quantification. One formulation of this sort of language is the closure of a first-order language under the formation rule that Qφ is a formula whenever φ is a formula and Q, which is to be thought of as a quantifier-prefix, is a system of partial order whose universe is a set of quantifiers. Although he introduced this idea in a discussion of infinitary logic, Henkin went on to discuss its application to finitary languages, and he concluded his discussion with a theorem of Ehrenfeucht that the incorporation of an extremely simple partially-ordered quantifier-prefix (the quantifiers ∀x, ∀y, ∃v, and ∃w, with the ordering {〈∀x, ∃v〉, 〈∀y, ∃w〉}) into any first-order language with identity gives a language capable of expressing the infinitary quantifier ∃zκ0x.


Author(s):  
Rafal Urbaniak

It is a commonplace remark that the identity relation, even though not expressible in a first-order language without identity with classical set-theoretic semantics, can be defined in a language without identity, as soon as we admit second-order, set-theoretically interpreted quantifiers binding predicate variables that range over all subsets of the domain. However, there are fairly simple and intuitive higher-order languages with set-theoretic semantics (where the variables range over all subsets of the domain) in which the identity relation is not definable. The point is that the definability of identity in higher-order languages not only depends on what variables range over, but also is sensitive to how predication is construed. This paper is a follow-up to (Urbaniak 2006), where it has been proven that no actual axiomatization of Leśniewski’s Ontology determines the standard semantics for the epsilon connective.


Author(s):  
Abraham L. Newman ◽  
Elliot Posner

Chapter 2 is a detailed development of the book’s central argument that emphasizes soft law’s second-order consequences, including the way it disrupts the politics of economic governance. The chapter provides a clear and parsimonious definition of soft law: written advisory prescriptions. It reviews existing literature, which has often centered on soft law’s ability to solve governance problems at a given moment in time and focused on issues surrounding compliance. The chapter then turns to the book’s main argument, outlining the logic behind two important temporal mechanisms of political disruption: legitimacy claims and arena expansion. This theoretical chapter thus sets up the key concepts and propositions used in the following empirical chapters, detailing the specific ways that soft law, as a political institution, transforms politics over time.


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