scholarly journals Assessing Public Support for Terrorism Over Time

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandy Schumann ◽  
Bettina Rottweiler ◽  
Paul Gill

Public support for terrorism reflects people’s sympathy for terrorist groups or tactics; it is influenced by and, in turn, shapes terrorists’ campaigns as well as counter-terrorism measures. To date, long term trends of public opinion about terrorism have been assessed in case studies and through descriptive statistics. Systematic analyses that specify whether and how public support for terrorism has changed over time are not available. We addressed this gap in the literature and conducted time-series analyses of eight waves of data (2004 2011) from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Including responses from 15 Muslim majority countries (N =43255), we showed that the percentage of people who believed that suicide terrorism was justified decreased between 2005 and 2007 after which support remained at a lower level (one structural breakpoint). Results also highlighted that depending on how public opinion was operationalised, the same data could inform an opposing narrative about support for terrorism. Notably when analyses were replicated with a mean composite score of the answer options ‘often', 'sometimes‘ and ‘rarely justified’ the percentage of people who thought that terrorism was ‘ever justified’ was reduced in 2005 before increasing again in 2008 (two structural breakpoints). Pre-registration of studies is therefore crucial to avoid selective analyses.

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Mishler ◽  
Reginald S. Sheehan

Although normative questions about the role of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian institution have long excited controversy in democratic theory, empirical questions about how far the Court acts contrary to majoritarian opinion have received less attention. Time series analyses for the period 1956–89 indicate the existence of a reciprocal and positive relationship between long-term trends in aggregate public opinion and the Court's collective decisions. The Court's ideological composition changes in response to previous shifts in the partisan and ideological orientation of the president and Congress. The Court also responds to public opinion at the margins even in the absence of membership change. Since 1981, the relationship has vanished or turned negative in direction. The Court's ideological balance has been upset by an unbroken string of conservative-to-moderate appointments, thereby undermining the dynamics that promote judicial responsiveness and raising questions about the majoritarianism of the contemporary and future Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J Anderson ◽  
Jason D Hecht

To determine how public opinion matters for the politics of European integration, we need to know what Europeans say about Europe. Yet, despite a proliferation of analyses of public support for Europe, fundamental questions remain. First, does aggregate opinion reflect a single preference for Europe? Second, is the content of opinions similar across countries? Third, have opinions about Europe become more structured over time? Finally, what are the long-term dynamics in opinions about Europe? To answer these questions, we construct a new dataset of historical public opinion since 1952 in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Over the long run, aggregate opinion toward Europe reflects one dominant underlying dimension and its content is similar across countries. We examine the trends in support for Europe.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


Author(s):  
Edda Humprecht ◽  
Linards Udris

The way news is produced and consumed has changed dramatically during the first two decades of the 21st century due to digitalization and economic pressures. In a globalized world, current events are reported in almost real time in various countries and are diffused rapidly via social media. Thus much scholarly attention is devoted to determining whether these developments have changed news content. Comparative research in the area of journalism focuses on whether news content across countries converges over time and to what degree national differences persist across countries. When studying the research on long-term trends in news content, three main observations can be made. First, theoretical assumptions are often rooted in different models of democracies, but they are rarely explicitly discussed. Second, many studies focus on the organizational level using theoretical concepts related to increased market orientation of news outlets, such as personalization, emotionalization, or scandalization. Furthermore, commercialization is associated with the effects of digitalization and globalization, namely, decreased advertising revenues and increased competition. A commonly expressed fear is that these changes have consequences for democracy and informed citizenship. Third, in recent years, there has been a steady increase of studies employing international comparisons as well as a growing standardization for measurements. These developments lead to more multicountry studies based on large samples but come at the expense of more fine-grained analysis of the way news content changes over time. Finally, the vast majority of cross-national and single-country studies focus on Western democracies. Thus our knowledge about recent changes in news content is limited to a small set of countries. Overall, many studies provide evidence for constant changes of news content driven by social, political, and economic developments. However, different media systems exhibit a sustained resilience toward transnational pressures reflected in a persistence of national differences in news content over time.


Author(s):  
Anand Menon ◽  
Luigi Scazzieri

This chapter examines the history of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European integration process. The chapter dissects the long-term trends in public opinion and the more contingent, short-term factors that led to the referendum vote to leave the European Union. The UK was a late joiner and therefore unable to shape the early institutional development of the EEC. British political parties and public opinion were always ambiguous about membership and increasingly Eurosceptic from the early 1990s. Yet the UK had a significant impact on the EU’s development, in the development of the single market programme and eastward enlargement. If Brexit goes through, Britain will nevertheless maintain relations with the EU in all policy areas from agriculture to energy and foreign policy. Europeanization will remain a useful theoretical tool to analyse EU–UK relations even if the UK leaves the Union.


2005 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Trolldal

The research question addressed in the present study, with ARIMA time-series analyses, was the extent to which changes in economic and physical availability had an effect on sales of alcohol in four Canadian provinces during the second half of the 20th century. The annual sales, by type of beverage (spirits, wine and beer) as well as total sales, measured in pure alcohol per inhabitant age 15 and above in each province, were used as dependent variables in the analyses. The inhabitants' real disposable income, the real price of alcohol, and the number of on- and off-premise outlets per 100,000 inhabitants were used as independent variables. All the time-series were differenced to remove long-term trends. The main study period was 1951–2000. In some of the analyses the study periods were shorter, primarily due to lack of data. Changes in economic availability in general, and in price in particular, had larger effects on sales than physical availability. Among the beverages analyzed in the study, the demand for spirits was most sensitive to changes in availability. Economic availability had a greater effect on sales than the number of outlets. However, one might question to what extent the number of outlets really is a feasible measure of transaction costs associated with purchases of alcohol.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-653
Author(s):  
Timothy Hildebrandt ◽  
Leticia Bode ◽  
Jessica S. C. Ng

Abstract Introduction Under austerity, governments shift responsibilities for social welfare to individuals. Such responsibilization can be intertwined with pre-existing social stigmas, with sexually stigmatized individuals blamed more for health problems due to “irresponsible” sexual behavior. To understand how sexual stigma affects attitudes on government healthcare expenditures, we examine public support for government-provisioned PrEP in England at a time when media narratives cast the drug as an expensive benefit for a small, irresponsible social group and the National Health Service’s long-term sustainability was in doubt. Methods This paper uses data from an original survey (N = 738) conducted in September 2016, when public opinion should be most sensitive to sexual stigma. A survey experiment tests how the way beneficiaries of PrEP were described affected support for NHS provision of it. Contrary to expectations, we found that support was high (mean = 3.86 on a scale of 1 to 5) irrespective of language used or beneficiary group mentioned. Differences between conditions were negligible. Discussion Sexual stigma does not diminish support for government-funded PrEP, which may be due to reverence for the NHS; resistance to responsibilization generally; or just to HIV, with the public influenced by sympathy and counter-messaging. Social policy implications Having misjudged public attitudes, it may be difficult for the government to continue to justify not funding PrEP; the political rationale for contracting out its provision is unnecessary and flawed. With public opinion resilient to responsibilization narratives and sexual stigma even under austerity, welfare retrenchment may be more difficult than social policymakers presume.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2019 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Retting ◽  
Sergey Y. Kyrychenko ◽  
Anne T. McCartt

Author(s):  
T. Gagné ◽  
I. Schoon ◽  
A. McMunn ◽  
A. Sacker

Abstract Purpose In Great Britain, few studies documented mental health trends in young adults in the years preceding 2020, the mental health dimensions affected, and how these compare with changes observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods Long-term trends in mental health among 16–34 year old men and women between 1991 and 2018, and changes between 2018–19 and July–September 2020 were examined using all waves from the British Household Panel Study (1991–2008), the UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009–20), and the first five UKHLS COVID-19 waves administered in April, May, June, July, and September 2020. Findings are based on the GHQ-12 continuous score (0–36), clinically significant cases (4 + /12) and severe cases (7 + /12) for mental distress, and item endorsements. Results Between 1991 and 2018, the prevalence of cases (4 + /12) increased from 14–22% to 19–32% across groups. Increases were largest in women aged 16–24. In April 2020, the risk of caseness (4 + /12) increased across groups by 55% to 80% compared to the 2018–19 baseline. This increase, however, rapidly diminished over time: in July–September 2020, there was only a higher risk of caseness (4 + /12) in men aged 25–34 (prevalence ratio = 1.29, 95% CI 1.01–1.65) compared to the 2018–19 baseline. Conclusion Whereas distress surged in April 2020, its return to pre-pandemic levels by September 2020 highlights the nuanced impact that the pandemic may have over time. Given the magnitude of the decline in mental health over the past decade, attention must be given to young adults once the pandemic ends.


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 983-1011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pellumb Kelmendi ◽  
Andrew Radin

Public opinion in postconflict societies toward international missions is widely believed to be important. We offer a theory that local satisfaction critically depends on an individual’s perception of whether the mission is furthering the wartime political agenda of his or her social group. To test this theory and competing hypotheses, we examine Kosovo Albanian satisfaction with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). We use data from seventeen different representative surveys conducted in Kosovo from 2002 to 2007 as well as focus group and other primary and secondary sources. Consistent with our theory, we find that aggregate satisfaction over time reflected UNMIK’s growing acceptance of Kosovo’s independence and individuals with more radical views tended to be less satisfied with UNMIK. Our analysis implies that missions can achieve greater local satisfaction by doing what is possible to be responsive to, or at a minimum recognize, the wartime political agendas of the key social groups.


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