scholarly journals Prześladowanie, dyskryminacja czy uprzedzenie? Taksonomia działań i zaniechań wymierzonych przeciwko wyznawcom religii

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Moulin-Stozek

Some of the most important constitutional law principles of democratic societies include the principle of religious freedom and the principle of secularity. However, in many countries these principles are not being followed, which may lead to violations of human rights. Actions and omissions in this context may be carried out by state institutions, individuals and non-state actors and have wider societal consequences. For instance, state imposition of religious beliefs may affect not only the rights of religious minorities, but also other minorities and women. The purpose of this report is to create a taxonomy of these actions and omissions to help develop an adequate response. This report was requested by the Institute of Justice of the Ministry of Justice.

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Breskaya ◽  
Pål Ketil Botvar

The study of religious freedom has not received sufficient empirical attention from sociologists of religion, despite significant theoretical discussion of the governance of religious freedom. This article suggests empirical findings about the views on religious freedom in Belarus and Norway from the international research project “Religion and Human Rights.” The authors explore the effects of religiosity, spirituality, and cultural diversity on young people’s views of religious freedom in two countries. The comparative data from Belarus (N = 677) and Norway (N = 1001) examine patterns of attitudes towards religious freedom considering the effect of trust in institutions within democratic and non-democratic regimes. This two-country analysis reveals that religiosity, cultural diversity and trust in institutions exert a notable influence on religious freedom views in different ways in Belarus and Norway, on both non-religious young people and those from religious minorities.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Witte, Jr.

Leading legal scholar John Witte, Jr. explores the role religion played in the development of rights in the Western legal tradition and traces the complex interplay between human rights and religious freedom norms in modern domestic and international law. He examines how US courts are moving towards greater religious freedom, while recent decisions of the pan-European courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg have harmed new religious minorities and threatened old religious traditions in Europe. Witte argues that the robust promotion and protection of religious freedom is the best way to protect many other fundamental rights today, even though religious freedom and other fundamental rights sometimes clash and need judicious balancing. He also responds to various modern critics who see human rights as a betrayal of Christianity and religious freedom as a betrayal of human rights.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

Is the government ever justified in restricting offensive speech? This question has become particularly important in relation to communications which offend the religious sensibilities of listeners. It is often argued that insulting a person’s beliefs is tantamount to disrespecting the believer; that insults are a form of hatred or intolerance; that the right to religious freedom includes a more specific right not to be insulted in one’s beliefs; that religious minorities have a particularly strong claim to be protected from offence; and that censorship of offensive speech is necessary for the prevention of social disorder and violence. None of those arguments is convincing. Offence is an unpleasant mental state caused when our expectations of being treated in a particular way are frustrated. Drawing on law and philosophy, the book argues that there is no moral right to be protected from offence and that, while freedom of religion is an important right which grounds negative and positive obligations for the state, it is unpersuasive to interpret constitutional and human rights provisions as including a right not to be caused offence. Rather, we have good reasons to think of public discourse as a space for the expression of all viewpoints about the ethical life, including those which some listeners will find offensive, as this is necessary to sustain a society’s capacity for self-reflection and change.


2004 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raoul F. Kneucker

Abstract Whether in a new Austrian constitution a preamble, with or without reference to God I with or without reference to the religious, in particular Christian legacies, should precede the normative text, is a question that is discussed from a historical and constitutional point of view, and answered negatively: European constitutions since the Enlightenment transform the »subjects«, who would not have any other appeal than to God, into »citizens« who are protected by human rights as constitutional law; citizens are the origin and the goal of all political activities. Their participation in shaping the state's policies is based on their own concience only, even if their concience is determined by religious beliefs


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 273
Author(s):  
Jonathan Fox ◽  
Roger Finke

Understanding the restrictions placed on religious institutions and associations, or the freedoms that they are denied, is essential for understanding the limits placed on individual religious freedoms and human rights more generally. This study uses the Religion and State round 3 (RAS3) dataset to track restrictions faced by religious organizations and individuals between 1990 and 2014 and explores how reduced institutional freedoms results in fewer individual freedoms. We find that restrictions on both institutional and individual religious freedoms are common and rising. Restrictions on institutional religious freedom are harsher against religious minorities than restrictions on individual freedoms. However, against the majority religion, restrictions on individual religious freedoms are harsher.


Author(s):  
Peter Jones

Religious exemptions are frequently justified as exercises in distributive justice. This chapter examines that view, using a distinction between two types of distribuend: (a) religious freedom and (b) access to non-religious goods, an access that may be diminished for some because they hold religious beliefs. Exemptions required by indirect religious discrimination law are concerned with (b) and are primarily exercises in distributive justice, although not in a simple egalitarian form. Those required by human rights law are concerned with (a) and turn on the make-up of the distribuend rather than its distribution. Exemptions granted specifically and directly by law, such as those granted to Sikhs in relation to kirpans and safety helmets, should be understood as exercises in adhockery rather than distributive justice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan

AbstractWhile much optimism about the future was expressed at the time of the Egyptian revolution in January 2011, little progress has been made on human rights including the protection of the fundamental right of freedom of religion and belief. In fact some argued that the situation in Egypt is worse today. This paper examines why many individuals (Copts, Atheists, Shiites, etc…) are unable to freely express their beliefs or practice their religion in Egypt. Some have argued that the denial of freedom of religion and belief is due to statism. But analysis of freedom of religion and belief that focus only on statism capture one aspect of the denial of this human right in Egypt. They neglect the intolerance in society that allows non-state actors to contribute to the difficult environment of FoRB in Egypt. This essay attempts to explore both the role that statism plays concerning the denial of FoRB, as well as how social hostilities contribute to an intolerant climate. This has important policy implications for future progress on this issue. Without more attention to attitudes and dispositions, Egypt will only make limited progress in the future.


Author(s):  
Danwood M Chirwa ◽  
Christopher Mbazira

Abstract The traditional view that only states have human rights obligations and, relatedly, that a constitution operates only vertically has been changing. In Uganda, as is the case in several other African countries, the Constitution expressly states that the rights and freedoms it recognizes must be respected, upheld, and promoted by all persons and organs of state, but the practical implications of this provision remain unexplored. So far, Ugandan courts have shown willingness to hold non-state actors directly responsible for violations of constitutional rights, although they are yet to use the language of horizontality expressly. Furthermore, Ugandan courts do not seem particularly troubled by the principle of subsidiarity which holds that statutory and common law remedies must be pursued first before recourse may be had to direct constitutional remedies. This has made it possible for litigants to bring direct constitutional suits against state and non-state actors in one action or to plead both constitutional provisions and statutory provisions, or direct and indirect horizontality, to enforce constitutional rights. This is a significant departure from the existing practice of constitutional horizontality in comparative constitutional law. In other respects, however, such as recognizing the duty to protect and applying the principle of third-party effect of constitutional rights, Uganda’s constitutional jurisprudence remains underdeveloped.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 335
Author(s):  
Hurriyah Hurriyah

Much of the studies on religious freedom in Indonesia have established a striking disconnection between constitutional protections and the actual implementation of religious freedom, underlining the state’s failure as a protector of human rights. Yet, the emphasis on human rights has overlooked why the levels of governmental restrictions are substantially increased in democratized Indonesia, creating a trend of shrinking religious freedom. Using the perspective of civic space, this study analyses the dynamics of such a trend and the involvement of the state as a primary determinant. To demonstrate how and in what way the state engages in creating shrinking religious freedom, this study uses a combination of literature reviews and inspection on past measurements on the religious freedom situation in Indonesia. This study argues that rather than ideological factors, the dynamics of shrinking religious freedom is more related to the unrelenting endeavors from state-actors and agencies to control religion for the purpose of political motives and consideration due to the changing political landscape in a democratized Indonesia.


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-165
Author(s):  
Eoin Daly

In upholding France’s ban on public face coverings, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the manifestation of religious beliefs could legitimately be restricted in the interests of ‘vivre ensemble’—literally, ‘living together’—or what I label ‘fraternalism’. I will argue that fraternalism, in the French setting, is closely linked to the idea of a duty of civility in political theory: it is understood as a duty to practice a certain kind of fraternal sociability. This paper relates the Court’s judgment to France’s justificatory, ‘republican’ discourse. It argues that civility must be understood as a habitus—a set of learned orientations and bodily techniques—rather than as a set of discursive or speech constraints. In turn, this demonstrates the danger in the idea of civility (or fraternalism) as limiting religious liberties: far from simply fostering republican virtues, it will reinforce cultural and social power dynamics.


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