scholarly journals Karol Wojtyla’s Conception of Personhood from the Perspective of Cognitive Sciences

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Mariusz Wojewoda

We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century.

Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs

Overcoming the brain centrism of current neuroscience, Ecology of the Brain develops an ecological and embodied concept of the brain as a mediating or resonance organ. Accordingly, the mind is not a product of the brain: it is an activity of the living being as a whole, which integrates the brain in its superordinate life functions. Similarly, consciousness is not an inner domain located somewhere within the organism, but a continuous process of engaging with the world, which extends to all objects that we are in contact with. The traditional mind–brain problem is thus reformulated as a dual aspect of the living being, conceived both as a lived or subjective body and as a living or objective body. Processes of life and of experiencing life are inseparably linked. Hence, it is not the brain, but the living human person as a whole who feels, thinks, and acts. This concept is elaborated on a broad philosophical, neurobiological, and developmental basis. Based on a phenomenology of the lived body and an enactive concept of the living organism as an autopoietic system, the brain is conceived in this book as a resonance organ, mediating the circular interactions within the body as well as the interactions between the body and the environment. Above all, a person’s relations to others continuously restructure the human brain which thus becomes an organ shaped by social interaction, biography, and culture. This concept is also crucial for a non-reductionist theory of mental disorders, psychiatry, and psychotherapy, which is developed in a special chapter.


Author(s):  
Tatiana V. Chernigovskaya ◽  

The paper discusses current neurophysiological approach to higher cognitive functions in humans and tries to show its fundamental errors. It illustrates how important forethought and a philosophical foundation for interdisciplinary re­search is regarding the processes of brain and mind mechanisms. Unification of the efforts of various scientific domains provides qualitatively new knowledge. Hypernets and cognitoms being the top of human evolution can not be studied by multiplicating similar data revealed in other species. Brain and mind should be studied by interconnections of natural sciences, arts and humanities. Cognitive sciences will never experience sharp paradigmatic increase without looking at the problem from a different perspective – in the context of the products of the human genius. Human mind is not a Turing machine, and its principles are not based on stimulus-reaction scheme. Rather is demonstrates the principles of Barocco: it extracts faces and objects, revealing specific and unusual features, in is not linear and stable. The brain is not just processing information – rather it creates it. It is wrong to study neuronets to understand the mind.


1872 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 145-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Laycock

A few words in explanation are needed. In my summer course of lectures on Medical Psychology and Mental Diseases delivered in the University, I have to investigate the human mind in its practical relations to the body, and especially I have to teach how each influences the other, so that the physician, or any intelligent person, may be able to modify these relations beneficially. The starting-point in these inquiries is the fundamental fact of experience, that no changes in the mind or the consciousness of whatever kind can or do arise, or continue, without a corresponding series of changes somewhere in the brain-tissue.


Author(s):  
Vadim V. Vasilyev ◽  

In this paper I discuss some aspects of the problem of carriers of human mind and person. The main emphasis is placed on the origin of our idea of the identi­cal self in the stream of perceptions, the need for a physical carrier of our self and person, and on possibility of replacing the biological carriers of self and per­son with artificial analogues. I argue that the idea of identical self is constructed by reflection on memories, that its truth is guaranteed by continuous stream of perceptions kept in memories, and that the stream of perceptions presupposes the presence of a normally functioning brain, which can be considered as a car­rier of our mind and person. Therefore, personal identity turns out to be depen­dent on the identity of the brain in time. An attempt to copy the structures of mind and person onto other possible carriers can thus only lead to creation of duplicates of the original person, but not to the continuation of its existence on another carrier. I argue that the gradual replacement of their components with artificial analogues is a more promising way of transforming the biological carri­ers of human person. To access the possible consequences of such a replacement I analyze arguments of John Searle and David Chalmers, designed to show, re­spectively, the disappearance of consciousness and person with such a replace­ment and, on the contrary, their preservation in a previous state. I explain why Searle’s arguments are unconvincing, and demonstrate that Chalmers’ arguments are based on a hidden premise, the confirmation of which is possible in the con­text of dubious theories of mind-body identity, epiphenomenalism or panpsy­chism only. I conclude that in the current situation it is impossible to predict which consequences for our person would follow such a replacement.


1982 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 74-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaj Björkqvist

The biological study of man is one of today's most rapidly advancing sciences. There is no reason for not utilizing these methodologies of research and the knowledge already gained when studying ecstasy and other similar religious phenomena. Drugs have been used in all parts of the world as an ecstasy technique. Since mental states and physiological correlates always accompany each other, it is obvious that the human mind can be affected by external means, for instance by drugs. But the opposite is also true; mental changes affect the body, as they do in the case of psychosomatic diseases. Ecstasy is often described as an extremely joyful experience; this pleasure must necessarily also have a physiological basis. It is of course too early to say anything for certain, but the discovery of pleasure centres in the brain might offer an explanation. It is not far-fetched to suggest that when a person experiences euphoric ecstasy, it might, in some way or other, be connected with a cerebral pleasure center. Can it be, for example, that religious ecstasy is attained only by some mechanism triggering off changes in the balance of the transmitter substances? Or is it reached only via a change in the hormonal balance, or only by a slowing down of the brain waves, or is a pleasure centre activated? When a person is using an ecstasy technique, he usually does so within a religious tradition. When he reaches an experience, a traditional interpretation of it already exists.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
Lidya Ariyanti ◽  
Redia Indira Putrianti ◽  
Setiawati Setiawati

ABSTRAK Kosentrasi merupakan keadaan pikiran atau asosiasi terkondisi yang diaktifkan oleh sensasi di dalam tubuh. Cara mengaktifkan sensasi di dalam tubuh adalah dengan membuat tubuh berada dalam keadaan yang rileks dan suasana yang menyenangkan, karena dalam keadaan yang tegang seseorang tidak akan dapat menggunakan otaknya dengan maksimal oleh karena pikiran menjadi kosong. Fenomena yang terjadi di lapangan diketahui bahwa penurunan konsentrasi belajar pada anak belum mendapatkan penanganan yang maksimal. Selama ini teknik yang digunakan memiliki kelemahan tersendiri yang tentunya tujuan dari peningkatan konsentrasi belajar belum dapat dirasakan oleh semua siswa, seharusnya teknik peningkatan konsentrasi belajar di buat lebih mudah dan efektif. Salah satunya adalah teknik Brain Gym. Tujuan setelah diberikan terapi senam otak diharapkan dapat meningkatkan konsentrasi belajar pada anak. Adapun kegiatan yang dilakukan berupa penyuluhan dan demonstrasi terapi senam otak. Terdapat peningkatan konsentrasi belajar pada anak setelah diberikan terapi senam otak di Desa Rawajitu Selatan. Dengan demikian, pemberian terapi senam otak efektif dalam meningkatkan konsentrasi belajar. Kata Kunci: Konsentrasi, Senam Otak, Peningkatan Konsentrasi Belajar  ABSTRACT Concentration is a state of mind or conditioned association that is activated by sensations in the body. How to activate sensations in the body is to make the body in a relaxed state and pleasant atmosphere, because in a tense situation a person will not be able to use his brain to the maximum because the mind becomes empty. The phenomenon that occurs in the field is known that the reduction in the concentration of learning in children has not gotten the maximum treatment. During this time the technique used has its own weaknesses which of course the purpose of increasing concentration of learning can not be felt by all students, the technique of increasing the concentration of learning should be made easier and more effective. One of them is the Brain Gym technique. The goal after being given brain exercise therapy is expected to increase the concentration of learning in children. The activities carried out in the form of counseling and demonstration of brain exercise therapy. There is an increase in the concentration of learning in children after being given brain exercise therapy at Rawajitu Selatan Village. Thus, the administration of brain exercise therapy is effective in increasing concentration of learning. Keywords: Concentration, Brain Exercise, Increased Learning Concentration


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Young

ArgumentThroughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the “evolutionary Freud” is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the “Overview of the Transference Neurosis” (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called “Freud wars.” Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the “Overview” and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.


Author(s):  
Emanuele Castrucci

The human mind has phased out its traditional anchorage in a natural biological basis (the «reasons of the body» which even Spinoza’s Ethics could count on) – an anchorage that had determined, for at least two millennia, historically familiar forms of culture and civilisation. Increasingly emphasising its intellectual disembodiment, it has come to the point of establishing in a completely artificial way the normative conditions of social behaviour and the very ontological collocation of human beings in general. If in the past ‘God’ was the name that mythopoietic activity had assigned to the world’s overall moral order, which was reflected onto human behaviour, now the progressive freeing of the mind – by way of the intellectualisation of life and technology – from the natural normativity which was previously its basic material reference opens up unforeseen vistas of power. Freedom of the intellect demands (or so one believes) the full artificiality of the normative human order in the form of an artificial logos, and precisely qua artificial, omnipotent. The technological icon of logos (which postmodern dispersion undermines only superficially) definitively unseats the traditional normative, sovereign ‘God’ of human history as he has been known till now. Our West has been irreversibly marked by this process, whose results are as devastating as they are inevitable. The decline predicted a century ago by old Spengler is here served on a platter....


Author(s):  
Edward Shorter

In 1996 the Wall Street Journal noted, “The nervous breakdown, the affliction that has been a staple of American life and literature for more than a century, has been wiped out by the combined forces of psychiatry, pharmacology and managed care. But people keep breaking down anyway.” Indeed they do keep breaking down. Kitty Dukakis, wife of former presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, remembered lying in bed doing nothing. “I couldn’t get up and get dressed, but I couldn’t sleep either.” What was the matter with Kitty Dukakis and millions of sufferers like her? Depressed? What does psychiatry think? In psychiatry there are a few distinct, sharply defined diseases that would be difficult to miss, such as melancholia and catatonia. These tend to be psychotic illnesses, involving loss of contact with reality in the form of delusions and hallucinations, though not always. Then there is the great mass of nonpsychotic ill-defined illnesses whose labels are constantly changing and that are very common. Today these are called depression, oft en anxiety, and panic as well. These are all behavioral diagnoses, suggesting that the main problem is in the mind rather than the brain and body. Yet there is a tradition, now almost lost, of viewing psychiatric symptoms as a result of body processes, and it has always been convenient to speak of these as “nervous” diseases, even though much more of the body than the physical nerves may be involved. Writing in 1972, English psychiatrist Richard Hunter directed attention toward the body as a whole. “Many diseases are ushered in by a lowering of vitality which patients appreciate as irritability and depression. The mind is the most sensitive indicator of the state of the body. An abnormal mental state is equivalent to a physical sign of something going wrong in the brain.” The term symptom cluster is popular today, but that is jargonish, so let us call these patients “nervous.” Their distinguishing characteristic is that they do not have the “C” word, as Eli Robins at Washington University in St. Louis used to call it, meaning that they are not “crazy.”


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document