scholarly journals Social evaluation boosts contribution in public goods game: an effect depends on primary psychopathic trait

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
wu xiaoyan ◽  
Ruida Zhu ◽  
Xu Gong ◽  
Yuejia Luo ◽  
Chao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Sample ◽  
Monetary Incentive ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Psychopathic Trait ◽  
Mediation Model ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Social Strategies ◽  
Social Evaluation ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

The association between psychopathic trait and noncooperative behaviors has been recognized. However, studies on how individuals with psychopathic personality elevate cooperation are scarce. Here, we probed the effects of monetary incentive and social evaluation on promoting social cooperation among individuals vary in psychopathic trait. In an adapted public good game (PGG), we showed that monetary incentive generally improved the contribution across all participants. While the effect of social evaluation on promoting cooperation depended on primary psychopathic trait, the contribution of individuals with high psychopathic trait were less likely to be influenced by social evaluation. This effect was driven by an upvaluation of the weight of self-interest; the individuals with high psychopathic trait valued self-interest more than collective interests. The mediation model further confirmed that primary psychopathic trait impacted cooperative behaviors through its effect on the weight of self-interest. These findings extend our knowledge of the adaptive variation in social strategies among non-clinical sample and may have implications for the education field.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas [pre-print]

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

Profit Versus Prejudice

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Stagnaro ◽  
Yarrow Dunham ◽  
David G. Rand
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Monetary Incentive ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Substantial Bias

We examine the possibility that self-interest, typically thought to undermine social welfare, might reduce in-group bias. We compared the dictator game (DG), where participants unilaterally divide money between themselves and a recipient, and the ultimatum game (UG), where the recipient can reject these offers. Unlike the DG, there is a self-interested motive for UG giving: If participants expect the rejection of unfair offers, they have a monetary incentive to be fair even to out-group members. Thus, we predicted substantial bias in the DG but little bias in the UG. We tested this hypothesis in two studies ( N = 3,546) employing a 2 (in-group/out-group, based on abortion position) × 2 (DG/UG) design. We observed the predicted significant group by game interaction, such that the substantial in-group favoritism observed in the DG was almost entirely eliminated in the UG: Giving the recipient bargaining power reduced the premium offered to in-group members by 77.5%.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

scholarly journals Alcohol unleashes homo economicus by inhibiting cooperation

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. e0253296
Author(s):  
Paul J. Zak ◽  
Kylene Hayes ◽  
Elizabeth Paulson ◽  
Edward Stringham
Keyword(s):  
Alcohol Consumption ◽  
Blood Alcohol Concentration ◽  
Alcohol Concentration ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Standard Task ◽  
Socially Motivated ◽  
The Brain

Human behavior lies somewhere between purely self-interested homo economicus and socially-motivated homo reciprocans. The factors that cause people to choose self-interest over costly cooperation can provide insights into human nature and are essential when designing institutions and policies that are meant to influence behavior. Alcohol consumption can shed light on the inflection point between selfish and selfless because it is commonly consumed and has global effects on the brain. The present study administered alcohol or placebo (N = 128), titrated to sex and weight, to examine its effect on cooperation in a standard task in experimental economics, the public goods game (PGG). Alcohol, compared to placebo, doubled the number of free-riders who contributed nothing to the public good and reduced average PGG contributions by 32% (p = .005). This generated 64% higher average profits in the PGG for those who consumed alcohol. The degree of intoxication, measured by blood alcohol concentration, linearly reduced PGG contributions (r = -0.18, p = .05). The reduction in cooperation was traced to a deterioration in mood and an increase in physiologic stress as measured by adrenocorticotropic hormone. Our findings indicate that moderate alcohol consumption inhibits the motivation to cooperate and that homo economicus is stressed and unhappy.

scholarly journals The Durand Adaptive Psychopathic Traits Questionnaire: development and preliminary validation

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume Durand
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Sample ◽  
Community Sample ◽  
Questionnaire Development ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Adaptive Traits ◽  
Social Deviance ◽  
Convergent And Divergent Validity ◽  
As Stress

In recent decades, psychopathic personality has become synonym to a pervasive personality disorder characterized by a lack of empathy, callousness, impulsivity, social deviance and aggressive behavior. However, evidences point to the existence of another form of psychopathy, which involves adaptive traits such as stress and anxiety immunity, remarkable social skills, noteworthy leadership ability, and an absence of fear. The newly developed Durand Adaptive Psychopathic Traits Questionnaire (DAPTQ) aims to assess adaptive traits known to correlate with the psychopathic personality. Validation of the questionnaire among 765 individuals from the community gave support for a 4-factor solution within the DAPTQ: Extroverted Leading, Rational Thinking, Risk Taking, and Composure. The DAPTQ and its four subscales demonstrated high internal consistency in a community sample (0.78 - 0.88) and in a clinical sample (0.79 - 0.90). Good convergent and divergent validity was established by administering the DAPTQ alongside established measures of psychopathic personality. Subscales validation against well-established personality assessments further confirm the DAPTQ’s strength. These findings indicate that the DAPTQ is a reliable and valid tool for measuring psychopathy-associated adaptive traits. Limitations of the present study and potential directives for future research are also discussed. Further studies are needed to validate the DAPTQ and its subscales against a wider range of personality traits and behaviors.

scholarly journals Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sixie Yu ◽  
David Kempe ◽  
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Acting Out ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Algorithmic Question ◽  
Conventional Models ◽  
Individual Self

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents' decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal's actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.

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