scholarly journals The moral judgment of unconditional honesty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Levine ◽  
Sarah Jensen ◽  
Michael White
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Error

Four main experiments (and six supplementary experiments, total N = 6970) document a preference for unconditional honesty: people believe it is more ethical for communicators to tell the truth without finding out the social consequences of doing so than to find out how their honesty affects others before communicating. However, people also believe that communicators should condition their decisions on the social consequences of truth-telling (and lie when truth-telling causes harm) when the consequences of truth-telling are known. We suggest that these seemingly inconsistent preferences are driven by the belief that moral actors should strive to avoid moral error more than they should strive to optimize moral goodness. This research deepens our understanding of people’s preferences for moral principles, sheds light on how information acquisition influences moral judgments, and explains how people can genuinely believe that honesty is the best policy, while also recognizing that lying is often ethical.

Folklorisation and the Emergent Moral Degeneration: A Functionalist Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siziwe Mandubu
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
South African ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Norms ◽  
South African Society ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Societal Norms ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
The Social ◽  
Functionalist Approach

Living in an egalitarian society has resulted in the corrosion of the moral base among certain sectors in the community. Some people misconstrue egalitarianism as an authorisation to act as they see fit. Young people, in particular, are gradually losing touch with reality in relation to acceptable behavioral norms in the South African society. Based on the functionalist theory of balancing the social equilibrium among people, the article delineates moral standards as the most fundamental and general principles of behaviour and reflects on how the society expects one to act in certain situations. The article, therefore, explores the primary concepts within functionalism and attempts to outline that the society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of stability and social cohesion. The article will use the folktale “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) to reflect on the expected societal norms. It demonstrates that folktales, which used to transfer values, morals and shape the conduct of people in the olden days are still appropriate in reshaping the outlook and perceptions of today’s generation. As such, the shrewd nature of folklore in the moral regeneration of the current generation of young people is exposed. While there are many folktales in this category, “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) provides the theme relevant for the analysis of the topic to highlight that moral standards generate moral principles and moral judgments.

scholarly journals Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Brian D. Earp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
Total N ◽  
Two Dimensional Model ◽  
Do So

Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH—as suggested by previous work—but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Wpływ moralności na przeciwdziałanie zmianom klimatycznym

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 17-41
Author(s):  
Thomas Pölcer ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
General Conditions

Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of mak-ing such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical im-plications than refl ections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to a particularly important matter, namely climate change. First, I establish general conditions for when a moral judgement has any eff ect on those who accept it. Second, I show that the judgement that in-dividuals in industrialized countries are morally obliged to act against climate change does not fulfi l these conditions, and is thus neither benefi cial nor harm-ful. Finally, I sketch several strategies for increasing people’s non-moral moti-vation to act against climate.

Metaethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Finlay
Keyword(s):  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Many ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) normative ethical theory, and (iii) metaethics. Applied ethics seeks answers to moral questions about specific practices like abortion, euthanasia and business, while normative ethics seeks abstract moral principles that apply generally. We can loosely define metaethics as seeking answers to questions about normative ethics. It does not, at least directly, seek answers to moral or normative questions about (e.g.) which acts are right, what things are good, or how we ought to live our lives; instead it asks a variety of nonmoral questions about morality. While it is sometimes claimed that metaethics is morally neutral in the sense that it leaves normative questions open, metaethical theories can have normative implications, and it is sometimes argued that they all do. Since there is in principle no limit to the kinds of nonmoral questions one might ask about morality, there is no limit to the possible kinds of metaethical questions other than their relation to the subject of morality. One central kind of question is semantic, concerning the meaning of moral language. For example, what do we mean by saying that something is ‘right’ or ‘good’? Another central kind of question is metaphysical. For example, what kind of property is moral goodness, and does such a thing exist? A third central kind of question is epistemological, concerning how we might come to know moral truths. Some of the many other kinds of metaethical questions are psychological (concerned with the mental attitudes we call ‘moral judgments’ and how they motivate us to action), logical (concerning the inferences we can legitimately draw between different moral claims), sociobiological (concerning how humans may have evolved as beings with a moral sense), and – although it may blur the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics – normative (concerning the rational justification for acting morally). The boundaries of metaethics are vague. For example, just as normative ethics on a broader conception concerns itself not merely with morality narrowly construed but with all practical or normative questions about how to act, choose and live, so too metaethics on a broader conception asks nonnormative questions about normativity more generally.

Teaching Cyberethics

2013 ◽  
pp. 56-69
Author(s):  
Peter Holtz
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Value Orientations ◽  
Moral Competence ◽  
Final Exam ◽  
The Social ◽  
Materialistic Values ◽  
High Degree

The discussion of moral dilemmas is often proposed as one way to teach ethics. But can ethics be taught to everyone? Do participants’ value orientations predict the acquisition of moral competence in an educational context? This study presents data from an evaluation of a course on the social consequences of information technology (IT). IT-related dilemma discussions were used extensively in the course. The participants answered questionnaires at the beginning of the course and before their final exam at the end of term. Moral competence was measured with the Moral Judgment Test (MJT). A questionnaire on individual reflexive values was used for the assessment of value orientations. Although the participants’ average level of moral competence did not change significantly, there was evidence that participants with a high degree of materialistic values were less likely to acquire moral competence during the course.

scholarly journals Morality and Epistemic Judgement

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

scholarly journals People Systematically Update Moral Judgments of Blame

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Elliott Monroe ◽  
Bertram F. Malle
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Load ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Social Constraints ◽  
Normal Process ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
Human History ◽  
Systematic Processing ◽  
The Social

Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially-regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other’s behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for “warrant”— evidence that one’s moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and even-handed in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test two sets of predictions derived from the socially-regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed—as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent.

scholarly journals Moral metaphorical effect of cleanliness on immoral workplace behaviors

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 183449092110342
Author(s):  
Gang Huangfu ◽  
Lu Li ◽  
Zhen Zhang ◽  
Cheng Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Social Significance ◽  
Clean Environment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Workplace Behaviors

Cleanliness connotes cleanness, hygiene, and beauty. Physical cleanliness is also a metaphor for moral purity, as proposed in recent literature. However, cleanliness means not only physical cleanliness but also environmental cleanliness. The article proposes that environmental cleanliness and physical self-cleanliness may metaphorically influence immoral behaviors in the workplace, and their effects may be different. The current study conducted a 2 (environmental cleanliness: clean vs. dirty) × 3 (self-cleanliness: hands-cleansing vs. face-cleansing vs. non-cleansing) between-subjects field experiment with employees as participants in a Chinese enterprise. One-hundred-seventy-seven employees volunteered to participate in the experiment. It was found that a clean workplace, rather than physical self-cleansing, renders harsh moral judgment regarding immoral workplace behaviors. The participants were less willing to accept immoral workplace behaviors in a clean environment than in a dirty environment, while self-cleanliness (hands-cleansing or face-cleansing vs. non-cleansing) had no significant influence on employees’ moral judgments of immoral workplace behaviors. In addition, the significant effects of environmental cleanliness were found in all the ten dimensions of immoral workplace behaviors. The findings reveal the metaphorical association between environmental cleanliness and the concept of higher social moral norms, and confirm that environmental cleanliness is a key factor leading to moral metaphorical effects. This result provides unique insight to the social significance of environmental cleanliness, and has important implications to prevent immoral workplace behaviors. A theoretical framework is proposed to explain why environmental cleanliness is more likely to affect moral judgment involving organizational interests than self-cleanliness. Considering most previous research has been done with samples of college students, this study is especially valuable through a field experiment on actual employees.

Moral principles in May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Marshall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principles

Abstract Joshua May offers four principles that might serve as the rational foundations of moral judgments. I argue that these principles, if they are independent of affect, are too weak to be the basis of any substantive moral judgment and do not fit with the idea that morality is categorical.

scholarly journals Public Theology: An Ever-Changing Task

Horizons ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-367
Author(s):  
Vincent J. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Public Debate ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Public Theology ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
The Social ◽  
Christian Discipleship ◽  
Christian Commitment

Public theology involves political and rhetorical engagement in political debates about the social consequences of Christian commitment, and prudential attempts to judge and form public debate with Christian theological and moral principles. It has consequences for our understanding of Christian discipleship as much as it does for public debate.

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