scholarly journals Wpływ moralności na przeciwdziałanie zmianom klimatycznym

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 17-41
Author(s):  
Thomas Pölcer ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
General Conditions

Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of mak-ing such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical im-plications than refl ections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to a particularly important matter, namely climate change. First, I establish general conditions for when a moral judgement has any eff ect on those who accept it. Second, I show that the judgement that in-dividuals in industrialized countries are morally obliged to act against climate change does not fulfi l these conditions, and is thus neither benefi cial nor harm-ful. Finally, I sketch several strategies for increasing people’s non-moral moti-vation to act against climate.

Emotivism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Rational Argument

Emotivists held that moral judgments express and arouse emotions, not beliefs. Saying that an act is right or wrong was thus supposed to be rather like saying ‘Boo!’ or ‘Hooray!’ Emotivism explained well the apparent necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation. If people judge it wrong to lie, and their judgment expresses their hostility, then it comes as no surprise that we can infer that they are disinclined to lie. Emotivism did a bad job of explaining the important role of rational argument in moral practice, however. Indeed, since it entailed that moral judgments elude assessment in terms of truth and falsehood, it suggested that rational argument about morals might be at best inappropriate, and at worst impossible.

scholarly journals Moral Judgment: An Overlooked Deficient Domain in Multiple Sclerosis?

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samar Ayache ◽  
Moussa Chalah
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Sclerosis ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Clinical Population ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Information Processing Speed ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
The Central Nervous System

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic inflammatory and neurodegenerative disease of the central nervous system through which patients can suffer from sensory, motor, cerebellar, emotional, and cognitive symptoms. Although cognitive and behavioral dysfunctions are frequently encountered in MS patients, they have previously received little attention. Among the most frequently impaired cognitive domains are attention, information processing speed, and working memory, which have been extensively addressed in this population. However, less emphasis has been placed on other domains like moral judgment. The latter is a complex cognitive sphere that implies the individuals’ ability to judge others’ actions and relies on numerous affective and cognitive processes. Moral cognition is crucial for healthy and adequate interpersonal relationships, and its alteration might have drastic impacts on patients’ quality of life. This work aims to analyze the studies that have addressed moral cognition in MS. Only three works have previously addressed moral judgement in this clinical population compared to healthy controls, and none included neuroimaging or physiological measures. Although scarce, the available data suggest a complex pattern of moral judgments that deviate from normal response. This finding was accompanied by socio-emotional and cognitive deficits. Only preliminary data are available on moral cognition in MS, and its neurobiological foundations are still needing to be explored. Future studies would benefit from combining moral cognitive measures with comprehensive neuropsychological batteries and neuroimaging/neurophysiological modalities (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging, tractography, evoked potentials, electroencephalography) aiming to decipher the neural underpinning of moral judgement deficits and subsequently conceive potential interventions in MS patients.

scholarly journals Morality and Epistemic Judgement

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

scholarly journals Prospects for Moral Success Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Emma Susan Wood
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Ideal Observer ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
External Reasons ◽  
Moral Facts

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments.  The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them.  In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality.  My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

scholarly journals Prospects for Moral Success Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Emma Susan Wood
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Ideal Observer ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
External Reasons ◽  
Moral Facts

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments.  The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them.  In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality.  My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

scholarly journals The moral judgment of unconditional honesty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Levine ◽  
Sarah Jensen ◽  
Michael White
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Error

Four main experiments (and six supplementary experiments, total N = 6970) document a preference for unconditional honesty: people believe it is more ethical for communicators to tell the truth without finding out the social consequences of doing so than to find out how their honesty affects others before communicating. However, people also believe that communicators should condition their decisions on the social consequences of truth-telling (and lie when truth-telling causes harm) when the consequences of truth-telling are known. We suggest that these seemingly inconsistent preferences are driven by the belief that moral actors should strive to avoid moral error more than they should strive to optimize moral goodness. This research deepens our understanding of people’s preferences for moral principles, sheds light on how information acquisition influences moral judgments, and explains how people can genuinely believe that honesty is the best policy, while also recognizing that lying is often ethical.

scholarly journals The Role of Emotions and Circumstances in Moral Judgments

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-187
Author(s):  
T.O. Yudina
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Negative Emotions ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Mixed Emotions ◽  
Degree Of Control ◽  
Emotional Resonance

Objective. To study the variety of the moral luck demonstration depending on the level of the agent’s degree of control, personal condemnation of the agent, emotional resonance and compassion to the agent, circumstances and the harm degree of the outcome. Background. Modern theoretic approaches explain the moral luck phenomenon as a coincidence or a mistake but do not explain the variety of its demonstration. Design. Within five situations there were varied the level of control, circumstances, personal characteristics and the harm degree. After each situation we offered the five categories of questions: emotions towards the agent, emotions towards the result, punishment, moral judgement, personal condemnation of the agent, emotional resonance and compassion to the agent. Testing the relations of the variables by means of contingency tables. Subjects. 54 subjects (male 28), age from 18 to 45. Methods. Author’s five moral vignettes with questionnaire containing five categories of questions after each of the situation. Results. Punishment depends on the level of control, circumstances and the outcome. Negative mixed emotions related to punishment without regard of the harm degree. The emotions, personal condemnation and moral judgment related to the agent’s level of control. Compassion can be demonstrated notwithstanding the punishments and condemnation. Conclusions. Punishment judgment is the mental system which flexibility is provided by the attitude to punish in the case of bad behavior, the variety and intensity of negative emotions towards the agent or the outcome, the agent’s level of control.

Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Psychological Profile ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Additional Support

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this thesis through a critical examination of Hume’s sentimentalism and the role of empathy in its account of moral judgment. The main objection to Hume’s account is its exclusion of people whom one can describe as making moral judgments though they have no motivation to act on them. Consideration of such people, particularly those with a psychopathic personality, argues for a distinction between different types of moral judgment in keeping with the essay’s main thesis. Additional support for the main thesis is then drawn from Piaget’s theory of moral judgment in children.

Megadrought and Collapse

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Agricultural Landscapes ◽  
15Th Century ◽  
Societal Collapse ◽  
The Face ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
Paleoclimate Proxy ◽  
Habitat Tracking

This is the first book to treat the major examples of megadrought and societal collapse, from the late Pleistocene end of hunter–gatherer culture and origins of cultivation to the 15th century AD fall of the Khmer Empire capital at Angkor, and ranging from the Near East to South America. Previous enquiries have stressed the possible multiple and internal causes of collapse, such overpopulation, overexploitation of resources, warfare, and poor leadership and decision-making. In contrast, Megadrought and Collapse presents case studies of nine major episodes of societal collapse in which megadrought was the major and independent cause of societal collapse. In each case the most recent paleoclimatic evidence for megadroughts, multiple decades to multiple centuries in duration, is presented alongside the archaeological records for synchronous societal collapse. The megadrought data are derived from paleoclimate proxy sources (lake, marine, and glacial cores; speleothems, or cave stalagmites; and tree-rings) and are explained by researchers directly engaged in their analysis. Researchers directly responsible for them discuss the relevant current archaeological records. Two arguments are developed through these case studies. The first is that societal collapse in different time periods and regions and at levels of social complexity ranging from simple foragers to complex empires would not have occurred without megadrought. The second is that similar responses to megadrought extend across these historical episodes: societal collapse in the face of insurmountable climate change, abandonment of settlements and regions, and habitat tracking to sustainable agricultural landscapes. As we confront megadrought today, and in the likely future, Megadrought and Collapse brings together the latest contributions to our understanding of past societal responses to the crisis on an equally global and diverse scale.

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