scholarly journals Christian No More: Christian Americans are Threatened by Their Impending Minority Status

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Lyn Al-Kire ◽  
Michael H. Pasek ◽  
Jo-Ann Tsang ◽  
Wade C. Rowatt

Christian Americans are on track to become a minority of the U.S. population by midcentury. Research on racial demographic shifts shows majority-group members experience status threat when reminded of similar demographic changes. Public debate about religious freedom and the role of Christianity in America suggest that fast-changing religious demographics similarly elicit threat, and trigger defensive political stances, among Christian Americans. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 766 Christian Americans), reminders of religious demographic shifts evoked perceived threat to religious rights and freedoms, which in turn accounted for increases in Christian nationalism, conservative political ideology, and support for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election. Results illustrate how America’s fast-changing religious landscape can evoke threat for Christians and how this threat may influence political reasoning.

2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-481
Author(s):  
Conor J. O’Dea ◽  
Bayleigh N. Smith ◽  
Donald A. Saucier

We examined majority group members’ perceptions of racial slurs, compared to what we have labeled as combination terms. These combination terms possess the same semantic and pragmatic linguistic functions as racial slurs, functioning to express negative emotion toward, and to describe, a target. Across three studies (total N = 943) racial slurs were not perceived as significantly different from combination terms. We then examined whether participants higher in social dominance beliefs reported greater perceived justification for using combination terms over racial slurs because of their lack of historical denigration of marginalized groups that racial slurs have. Participants, even those higher in socially dominant attitudes, did not perceive greater justification for the use of combination terms than racial slurs. Indeed, an important implication is that race-marking, an understudied area of social psychology, paired with general derogative terms produces terms which may function similarly to racial slurs, but, fortunately, are also similarly vilified in modern society.


Author(s):  
Eugenio M. Rothe ◽  
Andres J. Pumariega

The chapter on culture and identity defines the current use of these terms and discusses how culture influences identity formation from a developmental perspective, starting in early childhood and throughout the life span. It also introduces new neurobiological findings related to theory of mind, neural mapping, object representation, and emotional reactivity and how these exert an influence on culture and identity formation. It covers a historical perspective that includes the contributions of pioneers such as Freud, Vigotsky, Montessori, Bandura, Mead, and Erikson. It also discusses ethnicity and race and the social and biological origins of prejudice and explains the meaning of ethnic-racial socialization messages, the dynamics of biracial identities, the importance of language in the development of the American identity and the role of culture and identity in psycho-social functioning and resiliency, including such variables as religion and spirituality. It also describes the influences of globalization and the diminishing importance of national boundaries on cultural identity for both minority and majority group members. Some of the concepts are illustrated and explained with clinical cases.


2020 ◽  
pp. 136843022091577
Author(s):  
Özden Melis Uluğ ◽  
Brian Lickel ◽  
Bernhard Leidner ◽  
Gilad Hirschberger

Previous research in the Turkish–Kurdish conflict context highlighted two opposing conflict narratives: (a) a terrorism narrative and (b) an independence narrative. In this article, we argue that these narratives are relevant to protracted and asymmetrical intergroup conflict (e.g., independence struggles), and therefore have consequences for conflict- and peace-related outcomes regardless of conflict contexts. We tested this generalizability hypothesis in parallel studies in the context of Turkish–Kurdish (Study 1) and Israeli–Palestinian relations (Study 2) among majority group members (Turks and Jewish Israelis, respectively). We also investigated competitive victimhood as a potential mediating variable in the relationship between conflict narratives on the one side and support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support for aggressive policies on the other, in parallel studies with the two aforementioned contexts. We argue that the terrorism narrative is essentially a negation of the narrative of the other group, and the independence narrative is a consideration of that narrative; therefore, competitive victimhood would be lower/higher when the narrative of the other is acknowledged/denied. Results point to the crucial relationship between endorsing conflict narratives and conflict- and peace-related outcomes through competitive victimhood, and to the possibility that these conflict narratives may show some similarities across different conflict contexts.


Psihologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 39-39
Author(s):  
Zoran Pavlovic ◽  
Bojan Todosijevic ◽  
Dragan Stanojevic

There is growing research evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of complying with the rules and recommendations aimed at fighting the coronavirus. This paper analyses the role of the left-right ideology self-positioning in supporting the government measures in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and practicing the physical distancing guidelines in Serbia. The study was conducted online on a sample of 656 respondents. Two hierarchical multiple regression models with age, the COVID-19 experience, the perception of risk posed by the coronavirus, and political ideology predicting: (1) policy support and (2) physical distancing were tested. The results show that policy support was predicted by increasing risk perception and the right-leaning ideology. Risk perception predicted physical distancing practices, and so did age and the COVID-19 experience. The results also indicate that the relationship between risk perception and both policy support and physical distancing is moderated by political ideology. Perceiving the ongoing pandemic as a greater threat is related to higher policy support and physical distancing among the right-leaning persons only. They seem especially sensitive to the perceived threat.


2020 ◽  
pp. 136843022095162
Author(s):  
Krystal M. Perkins ◽  
Alexia Toskos Dils ◽  
Stephen J. Flusberg

Research shows that people exhibit a conservative shift in their politics when their majority group status is threatened. We reasoned that perceptions of threat posed by shifting demographics might depend on individuals’ folk economic beliefs. Across three experiments, White Americans read about projected demographic changes (“threat”) or changes in online dating (“control”) before expressing support for political policies. They also indicated whether they viewed the U.S. economy as a zero- or non-zero-sum system. Relative to controls, participants in the threat condition expressed more support for conservative policies, but only if they conceptualized the economy in zero-sum terms; those who conceptualized the economy in non-zero-sum terms actually endorsed slightly more liberal positions under “threat.” However, these effects obtained only when participants expressed their economic views before their political attitudes. This suggests folk economic beliefs shape how people respond to threats to their majority status, provided those beliefs are first made explicit.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (14) ◽  
pp. e2023985118
Author(s):  
Hannah B. Waldfogel ◽  
Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington ◽  
Oliver P. Hauser ◽  
Arnold K. Ho ◽  
Nour S. Kteily

Contemporary debates about addressing inequality require a common, accurate understanding of the scope of the issue at hand. Yet little is known about who notices inequality in the world around them and when. Across five studies (N = 8,779) employing various paradigms, we consider the role of ideological beliefs about the desirability of social equality in shaping individuals’ attention to—and accuracy in detecting—inequality across the class, gender, and racial domains. In Study 1, individuals higher (versus lower) on social egalitarianism were more likely to naturalistically remark on inequality when shown photographs of urban scenes. In Study 2, social egalitarians were more accurate at differentiating between equal versus unequal distributions of resources between men and women on a basic cognitive task. In Study 3, social egalitarians were faster to notice inequality-relevant changes in images in a change detection paradigm indexing basic attentional processes. In Studies 4 and 5, we varied whether unequal treatment adversely affected groups at the top or bottom of society. In Study 4, social egalitarians were, on an incentivized task, more accurate at detecting inequality in speaking time in a panel discussion that disadvantaged women but not when inequality disadvantaged men. In Study 5, social egalitarians were more likely to naturalistically point out bias in a pattern detection hiring task when the employer was biased against minorities but not when majority group members faced equivalent bias. Our results reveal the nuances in how our ideological beliefs shape whether we accurately notice inequality, with implications for prospects for addressing it.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ruisch ◽  
Courtney A. Moore ◽  
Javier Granados Samayoa ◽  
Shelby Boggs ◽  
Jesse T. Ladanyi ◽  
...  

The COVID-19 disease pandemic is one of the most pressing global health issues of our time. Nevertheless, responses to the pandemic exhibit a stark ideological divide, with political conservatives (versus liberals/progressives) expressing less concern about the virus and less behavioral compliance with efforts to combat it. Drawing from decades of research on the psychological underpinnings of ideology, in four studies (total N = 4,441) we examine the factors that contribute to the ideological gap in pandemic response—across domains including personality (e.g., empathic concern), attitudes (e.g., trust in science), information (e.g., COVID-19 knowledge), vulnerability (e.g., preexisting medical conditions), demographics (e.g., education, income) and environment (e.g., local COVID-19 infection rates). This work provides insight into the most proximal drivers of this ideological divide, and also helps fill a longstanding theoretical and empirical gap regarding how these various ideological differences shape responses to complex real-world sociopolitical events. Among our key findings are the central role of attitude- and belief-related factors (e.g., trust in science and trust in Trump)—and the relatively weak influence of more domain-general personality factors (e.g., empathic concern, disgust sensitivity). We conclude by considering possible explanations for these findings and their broader implications for our understanding of political ideology.


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