scholarly journals Promoting Vaccination with Lottery Incentives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M Taber ◽  
Clarissa A. Thompson ◽  
Pooja Gupta Sidney ◽  
Abigail O'Brien ◽  
John Updegraff

Background: In May, 2021, U.S. states began implementing “vaccination lotteries” to encourage vaccine-hesitant individuals to get a COVID-19 vaccine. Purpose: Drawing on theories from math cognition and behavioral economics, we tested several monetary lottery structures and their framing to determine which would best motivate unvaccinated individuals. Methods: In two online experiments conducted in May, 2021, U.S. adults were asked to imagine that their state had implemented a vaccination lottery. In Experiment 1, participants (n=589) were randomly assigned to 1 of 12 conditions that varied the monetary amount and number of winners, holding constant the total payout ($5 million). In Experiment 2, participants (n=274) were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 conditions in a 2 (Message Framing: Gain versus Loss) by 2 (Numeric Framing: 5 total winners versus 1 winner for 5 weeks) factorial design; in all four conditions, 5 people would each win $1 million. Following the manipulation, participants rated their COVID-19 vaccination intentions, perceived likelihood of winning, and anticipated regret. Results: Vaccination intentions did not differ across conditions in either experiment, and post-manipulation vaccination intentions were strongly associated with baseline vaccination willingness. When asked to choose from 12 different lottery structures, participants tended to prefer options that awarded less money to more people, with 41.9% of participants across experiments indicated they would not vaccinate for any lottery-based monetary incentive. Conclusion: Findings suggest that multiple lottery structures could be equally motivating for unvaccinated adults, although states could consider structures that distribute incentives across more people.

1972 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-845
Author(s):  
Harold R. Keller ◽  
Ronald K. Parker

2 probability learning studies were conducted, each employing 64 Ss (one with sixth graders and one with college females) in a 2 × 4 factorial design combining external incentives (noncontingent feedback and monetary incentive for accuracy) and event schedules (25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%). All Ss were given state instructions which, in effect, required Ss to indicate (via a written “yes” or “no” response) whether they were in an experimental state of acquisition or extinction. While there were no differences in acquisition for the college Ss, there were differences in terminal acquisition among the sixth graders—contrary to prediction. The partial reinforcement effect was supported. The interaction between external incentive, event schedule, and trials was also significant, suggesting that monetary incentive for accuracy, with Ss responding under state instructions, served to elicit more accurate discriminations of the acquisition and extinction phases.


Author(s):  
Marta Serra-Garcia

This chapter provides a review of the literature on deception in the field of economics. Until recently, the standard assumption in economics was that individuals would lie whenever there was a material incentive to do so. Recent work in behavioral economics and psychology has shown that this assumption is wrong. In fact, many will not lie, even if there is a large monetary incentive to do so. This chapter begins with a review of studies that measure individuals’ aversion to lying, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of different methodologies. Thereafter, there is an overview of studies examining factors that influence lying, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of future potential venues of research on deception.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahyoung Yoon ◽  
Daeyoung Jeong ◽  
Jinhyung Chon ◽  
Ji-Hwan Yoon

Since responsible tourism (RT) emerged as a critical issue in the tourism literature in the early 2000s, the challenge has been how to encourage consumers to practice RT. In this context, the goal of this study is to examine effective ways to promote individuals’ RT behavior using message framing and appeals. The present study used campaign advertisements as a stimulus and employed a 2 × 2 factorial design ((message framing: gain framing vs. loss faming) × (appeal: rational appeal vs. emotional appeal)) in the experiment. In addition, the study investigated the moderating impact of involvement on people’s attitude towards advertising and intention to participate in RT. Independent-sample t-tests and a two-way analysis of variance were used to verify the hypotheses. The results of the study revealed that gain-framed messages had a greater influence on individuals’ attitude towards the advertisement and their intention to participate in RT than loss-framed messages in the low-involvement group. Furthermore, rational and emotional appeals had a greater influence on people’s attitude towards the advertisement in the high- and low-involvement groups, respectively.


Author(s):  
Mikhail Sokolov

The paper looks into sociological implications of two discussions currently developing in behavioral economics and organizations theory: (1) regret theory, exploring the proposition that human decision making is governed by avoiding anticipated regret, rather than maximizing expected utility, and (2) studies of sunk cost fallacy, consisting in making decisions aimed at justifying previous decisions. We argue that these two areas of theorizing, presently isolated, are dealing with essentially the same phenomenon. This becomes evident if we recognize that choices are organized in sequences, with the merits of each particular choice being evaluated in the light of outcomes of the whole sequence. We then explore some general conditions of the ability to anticipate regret: interaction with one’s future Self and sequential organizations of states an individual find him/herself. We then discuss some widely spread forms of individual adaptations to the threat of experiencing regret: dissonance avoidance, prospective rationalization, cultivation of prescience, de-sequencing and open endings. We further explore various forms of collective actions involving regret avoidance, using the development of the sociological discipline as an example.


1963 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 547-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald R. Hoffeld

Using a static decision situation, 120 Ss were run in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design in which the main variables were number of choice alternatives (2 or 8), likelihood that the information provided was correct (higher or lower than chance), and presence or absence of monetary incentive. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) Ss in monetary incentive groups tend to behave in a manner more statistically advantageous in relation to use of information than Ss in non-incentive groups. (2) The more choice alternatives available, the more likely Ss are to use information. (3) Previous results were confirmed showing that, when faced with the option of making a random choice between equally likely alternatives and using available information, an S is inclined to use the information some of the time, even when it is statistically disadvantageous to do so, i.e., when S could do better by simple guessing behavior.


GeroPsych ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 233-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pär Bjälkebring ◽  
Daniel Västfjäll ◽  
Boo Johansson

Regret and regret regulation were studied using a weeklong web-based diary method. 108 participants aged 19 to 89 years reported regret for a decision made and a decision to be made. They also reported the extent to which they used strategies to prevent or regulate decision regret. Older adults reported both less experienced and anticipated regret compared to younger adults. The lower level of experienced regret in older adults was mediated by reappraisal of the decision. The lower level of anticipated regret was mediated by delaying the decision, and expecting regret in older adults. It is suggested that the lower level of regret observed in older adults is partly explained by regret prevention and regulation strategies.


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