scholarly journals Three levels of naturalistic knowledge

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephens
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Memory ◽  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Level Of Analysis

A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in cognitive neuroscience and are mapped to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory respectively. This article investigates and integrates the neuroscientifically grounded account with knowledge-accounts from cognitive ethology and cognitive psychology. It is found that procedural and semantic memory, on a neuroscientific level of analysis, matches an ethological reliabilist account. This formation also matches System 1 from dual process theory on a psychological level, whereas the addition of episodic memory, on the neuroscientific level of analysis, can account for System 2 on the psychological level. It is furthermore argued that semantic memory (conceptual knowledge-what) and the cognitive ability of categorization are linked to each other, and that they can be fruitfully modeled within a conceptual spaces framework.

scholarly journals The psychology of diagnostic error

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-98
Author(s):  
L. Zwaan
Keyword(s):  
Diagnostic Errors ◽  
Diagnostic Error ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Diagnostic Process ◽  
Cognitive Errors ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Analytic Reasoning

Diagnostic errors in medicine occur frequently and the consequences for the patient can be severe. Cognitive errors as well as system related errors contribute to the occurrence of diagnostic error, but it is generally accepted that cognitive errors are the main contributor. The diagnostic reasoning process in medicine, is an understudied area of research. One reason is because of the complexity of the diagnostic process and therefore the difficulty to measure diagnostic errors and the causes of diagnostic error. In this paper, I discuss some of the complexities of the diagnostic process. I describe the dual-process theory, which defines two reasoning modes, 1. a fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning mode called system 1, and a slow and analytic reasoning mode called system 2. Furthermore, the main cognitive causes of diagnostic error are described.

Advancing the rationality debate

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 701-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West
Keyword(s):  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Behavioral Regulation ◽  
Thinking Dispositions ◽  
Target Article ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1

In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily integrated into our generic dual-process account. We further explicate how we view the relation between System 1 and System 2 and evolutionary and normative rationality. We clarify our attempt to fuse the contributions of the cognitive ecologists with the insights of the original heuristics and biases researchers.

scholarly journals Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 503-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys ◽  
Gordon Pennycook
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Process Characterization ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Reasoning Tasks ◽  
System 1

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.

Two retrievals from a single cue: A bottleneck persists across episodic and semantic memory

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (5) ◽  
pp. 1005-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Orscheschek ◽  
Tilo Strobach ◽  
Torsten Schubert ◽  
Timothy Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Episodic Memory ◽  
Semantic Memory ◽  
Retrieval Practice ◽  
Memory Systems ◽  
Verbal Response ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Keypress Response ◽  
Unique Word

There is evidence in the literature that two retrievals from long-term memory cannot occur in parallel. To date, however, that work has explored only the case of two retrievals from newly acquired episodic memory. These studies demonstrated a retrieval bottleneck even after dual-retrieval practice. That retrieval bottleneck may be a global property of long-term memory retrieval, or it may apply only to the case of two retrievals from episodic memory. In the current experiments, we explored whether that apparent dual-retrieval bottleneck applies to the case of one retrieval from episodic memory and one retrieval from highly overlearned semantic memory. Across three experiments, subjects learned to retrieve a left or right keypress response form a set of 14 unique word cues (e.g., black—right keypress). In addition, they learned a verbal response which involved retrieving the antonym of the presented cue (e.g., black—“white”). In the dual-retrieval condition, subjects had to retrieve both the keypress response and the antonym word. The results suggest that the retrieval bottleneck is superordinate to specific long-term memory systems and holds across different memory components. In addition, the results support the assumption of a cue-level response chunking account of learned retrieval parallelism.

scholarly journals Neurofeedback Training Improves Long-Term Memory Performance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Hsuan Tseng ◽  
Kaori Tamura ◽  
Tsuyoshi Okamoto
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Memory ◽  
Theta Rhythm ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Memory Performance ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Beta Power

Abstract Understanding and improving memory is vital to enhance human life. Theta rhythm is associated with memory consolidation and coding, but the trainability and effects on long-term memory of theta rhythm are unknown. This study investigates the ability to improve long-term memory using a neurofeedback (NFB) technique reflecting the theta/low-beta power ratio on an electroencephalogram (EEG). Our study consisted of three stages: First, the long-term memory of participants was measured. In the second stage, the participants in the NFB group received three days of theta/low-beta NFB training. In the third stage, the long-term memory was measured again. The NFB group had better long-term memory than the control group and significant differences in brain activity between episodic and semantic memory during the recall tests were revealed. These findings suggest that it is possible to improve the long-term memory abilities through theta/low-beta NFB training, which also improves episodic and semantic memory.

scholarly journals A cue for rational reasoning: Introducing a reference point in cognitive reflection tasks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaja Damnjanović ◽  
Vera Novković ◽  
Irena Pavlović ◽  
Sandra Ilić ◽  
Slobodan Pantelić
Keyword(s):  
Reference Point ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Reasoning Problem ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Rational Reasoning ◽  
Adaptive Toolbox

The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our “adaptive toolbox”. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items.

The rationality debate as a progressive research program

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Major Theme ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Target Article ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Level Of Analysis ◽  
Genetic Fitness ◽  
Do So

We did not, as Brakel & Shevrin imply, intend to classify either System 1 or System 2 as rational or irrational. Instrumental rationality is assessed at the organismic level, not at the subpersonal level. Thus, neither System 1 nor System 2 are themselves inherently rational or irrational. Also, that genetic fitness and instrumental rationality are not to be equated was a major theme in our target article. We disagree with Bringsjord & Yang's point that the tasks used in the heuristics and biases literature are easy. Bringsjord & Yang too readily conflate the ability to utilize a principle of rational choice with the disposition to do so. Thus, they undervalue tasks in the cognitive science literature that compellingly reveal difficulties with the latter. We agree with Newton & Roberts that models at the algorithmic level of analysis are crucial, but we disagree with their implication that attention to issues of rationality at the intentional level of analysis impedes work at the algorithmic level of analysis.

Cognitive Structure of Moral Reasoning, Development, and Evolution With Age and Pathology

2020 ◽  
pp. 30-57
Author(s):  
Veronique Salvano-Pardieu ◽  
Leïla Oubrahim ◽  
Steve Kilpatrick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Moral Orientation ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Difference ◽  
System 1

This chapter presents research on moral judgment from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day. First, the authors will present the contribution of Piaget and Kohlberg's work on moral development from childhood to adulthood as well as the work of Gilligan on moral orientation and the difference observed between men and women. Then, the authors will analyze underlying structures of moral judgment in the light of the Dual Process Theory with two systems: system 1: quick, deontological, emotional, intuitive, automatic, and system 2: slow, utilitarian, rational, controlled, involved in human reasoning. Finally, the model of Dual Process Theory will be confronted with data from moral judgment experiments, run on elderly adults with Alzheimer's disease, teenagers with Autism Spectrum Disorder, and children and teenagers with intellectual disability in order to understand how cognitive impairment affects the structures and components of moral judgment.

Construct Concept Structure for Abstract Algebra

2013 ◽  
Vol 711 ◽  
pp. 587-592
Author(s):  
Jeng Ming Yih
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Fuzzy Theory ◽  
Logic Model ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Interpretive Structural Modeling ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Integrated Method ◽  
Effective Use ◽  
Combined Algorithm

Building relationship between conceptual knowledge and the procedures of mathematics contributes to long-term memory of procedures and to their effective use. So we know that symbols could enhance concept and procedures apply concepts to solve problem efficiently. The purpose of this study is to provide an integrated method of fuzzy theory basis for individualized concept structure analysis. This method integrates Fuzzy Logic Model of Perception (FLMP) and Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM). The combined algorithm could analyze individualized concepts structure based on the comparisons with concept structure of expert.

Use of Long-Term Memory in Impression Formation

1974 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 939-945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Rywick ◽  
Paul Schave
Keyword(s):  
Impression Formation ◽  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Stimulus Presentation ◽  
Memory Storage ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Term Memory

Based on a dual-process theory of memory, it was hypothesized that the primacy effects often observed in impression-formation studies are due to a reliance on information in long-term, as opposed to short-term, memory storage. Variables which have been shown to affect either long-term or short-term memory were therefore manipulated in two impression-formation experiments. It was found that a delay following stimulus presentation (which reduces short-term memory) had no effect on impressions while inclusion of an irrelevant task during stimulus presentation (which reduces long-term memory) significantly reduced the degree of impression primacy.

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