How the positivity of new information influences belief updating in depression - The more, the better?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Lukas Kirchner ◽  
Gunnar Lemmer ◽  
Julia Glombiewski
Keyword(s):  
Depressive Symptoms ◽  
Traditional Learning ◽  
False Feedback ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Positive Information ◽  
New Information ◽  
New Learning ◽  
Interaction Task ◽  
Disconfirming Information

Aberrant belief updating has been linked to psychopathology, e.g., depressive symptoms. While previous research used to treat belief-confirming vs. -disconfirming information as binary concepts, the present research varied the extent to which new information deviates from prior beliefs and examined its influence on belief updating. In a false feedback task (Study 1; N = 379) and a social interaction task (Study 2; N = 292), participants received slightly positive, moderately positive or extremely positive information in relation to their prior beliefs. In both studies, new information was deemed most reliable if it was moderately positive. Yet, differences in the positivity of new information had only small effects on belief updating. In Study 1, depressive symptoms were related to difficulties in generalizing positive new learning experiences. The findings suggest that, contrary to traditional learning models, the larger the differences between prior beliefs and new information, the more beliefs are not updated.

scholarly journals How the Discrepancy Between Prior Expectations and New Information Influences Expectation Updating in Depression—The Greater, the Better?

2021 ◽  
pp. 216770262110246
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Lukas Kirchner ◽  
Gunnar Lemmer ◽  
Julia Anna Glombiewski
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Prediction Error ◽  
Tipping Point ◽  
Small Study ◽  
Traditional Learning ◽  
Learning Models ◽  
False Feedback ◽  
New Information ◽  
Interaction Task ◽  
Disconfirming Information

Previous research on expectation updating in relation to psychopathology used to treat expectation-confirming information and expectation-disconfirming information as binary concepts. Here, we varied the extent to which new information deviates from prior expectations and examined its influence on expectation adjustment in both a false-feedback task (Study 1; N = 379) and a social-interaction task (Study 2; N = 292). Unlike traditional learning models, we hypothesized a tipping point in which the discrepancy between expectation and outcome becomes so large that new information is perceived as lacking credibility, thus entailing little updating of expectations. Consistent with the hypothesized tipping point, new information was deemed most valid if it was moderately positive. Moreover, descriptively, expectation update was largest for moderate expectation violations, but this effect was small (Study 2) or even nonsignificant (Study 1). The findings question the assumption of traditional learning models that the larger the prediction error, the larger the update.

Factors influencing the update of beliefs regarding controversial political issues

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
New Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Disconfirming Information ◽  
Selective Integration

When updating beliefs in light of new information, people preferentially integrate information that is consistent with their prior beliefs and helps them construe a coherent view of the world. Such a selective integration of new information likely contributes to belief polarisation and compromises public discourse. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the factors that underlie biased belief updating. To this end, I conducted three pre-registered experiments covering different controversial political issues (i.e., Experiment 1: climate change, Experiment 2: speed limit on highways, Experiment 3: immigration in relation to violent crime). The main hypothesis was that negative reappraisal of new information (referred to as “cognitive immunisation”) hinders belief updating. Support for this hypothesis was found only in Experiment 2. In all experiments, the magnitude of the prediction error (i.e., the discrepancy between prior beliefs and new information) was strongly related to belief updating. Across experiments, participants’ general attitudes regarding the respective issue influenced the strength of beliefs, but not their update. The present findings provide some indication that the engagement in cognitive immunisation can lead to the maintenance of beliefs despite disconfirming information. However, by far the largest association with belief updating was with the magnitude of the prediction error.

scholarly journals How reappraisal of new information contributes to optimistic belief updating

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Julia Glombiewski
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Good News ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
New Information ◽  
N 93

People update their beliefs selectively in response to good news and disregard bad news, referred to as the optimism bias. Yet, the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying this asymmetry in belief updating are largely unknown. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that cognitive immunisation against new information contributes to optimistic belief updating (e.g. through questioning the reliability of new information). In each study, participants received new information in relation to their prior beliefs, and we examined the influence of cognitive immunisation on belief updating by using a three-group modulation protocol: In one group, cognitive immunisation against new information was promoted; in another group, cognitive immunisation was inhibited; and a control group received no manipulation. This modulation protocol was applied to beliefs about the self, i.e. performance expectations (Experiment 1&2; N=99 and N=93), and beliefs about climate change (Experiment 3; N=227) as an example of factual beliefs. The results of Experiments 1&2 showed that the cognitive immunisation manipulation had no influence on the update of performance-related expectations. In Experiment 3, we did find significant group differences in belief updating, and this effect interacted with participants’ general attitudes towards climate change: people who were sceptical about man-made climate change lowered their estimates of the projected temperature rise particularly if they perceived scientific information on climate change as being fraught with uncertainty. These findings suggest that the importance of cognitive immunisation in belief updating may depend on the content of beliefs (i.e. self-related vs. factual) and participants’ attitudes to the subject in question.

scholarly journals Placebo response and psychosis: a putative shared mechanism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Hird
Keyword(s):  
Side Effects ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Placebo Response ◽  
Placebo Treatment ◽  
Primary Treatment ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
New Information ◽  
New Treatments ◽  
Sensitive Method

Computational cognitive theory proposes that our experiences represent an optimisation between new information and prior beliefs, which are updated to best reflect reality. However, experiences can be biased. One example is the placebo response (PR), where a persistent belief in the effectiveness of a treatment relieves symptoms, even though the ‘treatment’ is an inert sugar pill. Another example is psychosis, which is characterised by unusual percepts and beliefs in the form of hallucinations and delusions. Antipsychotic medication, the primary treatment for psychosis, is often ineffective and accompanied by severe side-effects, but we have not identified an effective alternative. This is likely because the large and heterogenous placebo response in psychosis is likely to create noise in trials and so disrupts attempts to identify new treatments. This well-recognised issue could be solved if we can predict how an individual is likely to respond to placebo treatment and account for placebo responses. Importantly, biomarkers predicting the placebo response have been identified chiefly in pain and depression, but not in psychosis. Quantifying individual belief-updating, and tendency to rely on prior beliefs versus new information, would provide a sensitive method to predict the PR in psychosis.

scholarly journals No Evidence for the Involvement of Cognitive Immunisation in Updating Beliefs About the Self in Three Non-Clinical Samples

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Julia Anna Glombiewski
Keyword(s):  
Depressive Symptoms ◽  
Negative Feedback ◽  
Performance Feedback ◽  
Positive Feedback ◽  
Clinical Samples ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Increased Sensitivity ◽  
Disconfirming Information

Abstract Background Cognitive immunisation against disconfirmatory evidence (i.e., devaluing expectation-disconfirming information through cognitive mechanisms) has recently been discussed as an obstacle to the revision of dysfunctional beliefs in mental disorders such as depression. Yet, it is unclear whether cognitive immunisation is also involved in belief updating in non-clinical samples. Methods Using a three-group modulation protocol (promotion vs. inhibition of cognitive immunisation vs. control group), we examined how cognitive immunisation influences belief updating in response to performance feedback in three non-clinical samples. In Experiments 1 (N = 99) and 2 (N = 93), participants received unexpectedly negative feedback, whereas participants from Experiment 3 (N = 118) received unexpectedly positive feedback. Depressive symptoms and dispositional optimism were examined as additional predictors of belief updating. Results In all experiments, participants adjusted their expectations in line with the feedback received, but this effect was not influenced by the cognitive immunisation manipulation. In Experiment 3, expectation change remained stable over 2 weeks. Depressive symptoms were associated with a reduced integration of positive feedback, but not with an increased sensitivity to negative feedback. Conclusions Whereas previous research has shown that cognitive immunisation contributes to persistent beliefs in clinical populations, the present findings suggest that it does not affect belief updating in non-clinical samples.

scholarly journals Bayesian or biased? Analytic thinking and political belief updating

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M Tappin ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
New Information ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
Biased Processing ◽  
Surprising Finding ◽  
Cognitive Sophistication

A surprising finding from U.S. opinion surveys is that political disagreements tend to be greatest among the most cognitively sophisticated opposing partisans. Recent experiments suggest a hypothesis that could explain this pattern: cognitive sophistication magnifies politically biased processing of new information. However, the designs of these experiments tend to contain several limitations that complicate their support for this hypothesis. In particular, they tend to (i) focus on people’s worldviews and political identities, at the expense of their other, more specific prior beliefs, (ii) lack direct comparison with a politically unbiased benchmark, and (iii) focus on people’s judgments of new information, rather than on their posterior beliefs following exposure to the information. We report two studies designed to address these limitations. In our design, U.S. subjects received noisy but informative signals about the truth or falsity of partisan political questions, and we measured their prior and posterior beliefs, and cognitive sophistication, operationalized as analytic thinking inferred via performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test. We compared subjects’ posterior beliefs to an unbiased Bayesian benchmark. We found little evidence that analytic thinking magnified politically biased deviations from the benchmark. In contrast, we found consistent evidence that greater analytic thinking was associated with posterior beliefs closer to the benchmark. Together, these results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication magnifies politically biased processing. We discuss differences between our design and prior work that can inform future tests of this hypothesis.

scholarly journals Optimistic amnesia: how online and offline processing shape belief updating and memory biases in immediate and long-term optimism biases

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziqing Yao ◽  
Xuanyi Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu
Keyword(s):  
Active Role ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Estimation Task ◽  
Memory Biases ◽  
Brain Potentials ◽  
Adverse Life Event ◽  
Offline Processing

Abstract When people are confronted with feedback that counters their prior beliefs, they preferentially rely on desirable rather than undesirable feedback in belief updating, i.e. an optimism bias. In two pre-registered EEG studies employing an adverse life event probability estimation task, we investigated the neurocognitive processes that support the formation and the change of optimism biases in immediate and 24 h delayed tests. We found that optimistic belief updating biases not only emerged immediately but also became significantly larger after 24 h, suggesting an active role of valence-dependent offline consolidation processes in the change of optimism biases. Participants also showed optimistic memory biases: they were less accurate in remembering undesirable than desirable feedback probabilities, with inferior memories of undesirable feedback associated with lower belief updating in the delayed test. Examining event-related brain potentials (ERPs) revealed that desirability of feedback biased initial encoding: desirable feedback elicited larger P300s than undesirable feedback, with larger P300 amplitudes predicting both higher belief updating and memory accuracies. These results suggest that desirability of feedback could bias both online and offline memory-related processes such as encoding and consolidation, with both processes contributing to the formation and change of optimism biases.

scholarly journals Pedarchitecture: Which Learning Environments for the Personalisation of Teaching and Learning? An Educational Architecture for the Schools of the Future

2020 ◽  
pp. 85-107
Author(s):  
Mariagrazia Francesca Marcarini
Keyword(s):  
Learning Environments ◽  
Teacher Collaboration ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
First Grade ◽  
Traditional Learning ◽  
New Learning Environments ◽  
New Learning ◽  
Teachers And Students ◽  
Improved Learning

AbstractThis project investigates how to overcome traditional learning environment’s rigidity; those established practices that may hinder full use of what we might call new learning environments. It addresses how teachers adapt their teaching to changing learning environments, what impact new educational spaces have on teachers and students, how to organise students with different criteria, and how learning environments can be redesigned in old schools with limited investments. The research studies four schools: in Denmark, the Hellerup Folkeskole in Gentofte and the Ørestad Gymnasium in Copenhagen; in Italy, the Enrico Fermi High School in Mantua and IC3 Piersanti Mattarella secondary first grade in Modena. New learning environments are intended to enhance teacher collaboration and stimulate the exchange of new teaching methods, enabling learning personalisation. This is often facilitated by team teaching, which in this chapter is seen as a “bridge-culture” concept, offering a wider vision including structural and organisational details. The chapter discusses how this strategy lead to students improved learning skills, them taking on greater personal responsibility and displaying aptitude to study in different ways. In this sample of “architecture feeds pedagogy” schools, some key concepts are explored that might guide future learning environments design: readability, “semantic-topical”, flexibility, invisible pedagogy and affordances.

scholarly journals Electroencephalographic Correlates of Temporal Bayesian Belief Updating and Surprise

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonino Visalli ◽  
Mariagrazia Capizzi ◽  
Ettore Ambrosini ◽  
Bruno Kopp ◽  
Antonino Vallesi
Keyword(s):  
Event Related Potentials ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Bayesian Brain ◽  
Eeg Data ◽  
Electrode Space ◽  
Related Potentials ◽  
Brain Data ◽  
The Brain

The brain predicts the timing of forthcoming events to optimize responses to them. Temporal predictions have been formalized in terms of the hazard function, which integrates prior beliefs on the likely timing of stimulus occurrence with information conveyed by the passage of time. However, how the human brain updates prior temporal beliefs is still elusive. Here we investigated electroencephalographic (EEG) signatures associated with Bayes-optimal updating of temporal beliefs. Given that updating usually occurs in response to surprising events, we sought to disentangle EEG correlates of updating from those associated with surprise. Twenty-six participants performed a temporal foreperiod task, which comprised a subset of surprising events not eliciting updating. EEG data were analyzed through a regression-based massive approach in the electrode and source space. Distinct late positive, centro-parietally distributed, event-related potentials (ERPs) were associated with surprise and belief updating in the electrode space. While surprise modulated the commonly observed P3b, updating was associated with a later and more sustained P3b-like waveform deflection. Results from source analyses revealed that surprise encoding comprises neural activity in the cingulo-opercular network (CON). These data provide evidence that temporal predictions are computed in a Bayesian manner, and that this is reflected in P3 modulations, akin to other cognitive domains. Overall, our study revealed that analyzing P3 modulations provides an important window into the Bayesian brain. Data and scripts are shared on OSF: https://osf.io/ckqa5/?view_only=f711e6f878784d4ab94f4b14b31eef46

scholarly journals Pre-commitment and Updating Beliefs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Ebersole
Keyword(s):  
Hindsight Bias ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Verbal Ability ◽  
Motivated Cognition ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Actual Performance ◽  
Final Study ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Evidence

Beliefs help individuals make predictions about the world. When those predictions are incorrect, it may be useful to update beliefs. However, motivated cognition and biases (notably, hindsight bias and confirmation bias) can instead lead individuals to reshape interpretations of new evidence to seem more consistent with prior beliefs. Pre-committing to a prediction or evaluation of new evidence before knowing its results may be one way to reduce the impact of these biases and facilitate belief updating. I first examined this possibility by having participants report predictions about their performance on a challenging anagrams task before or after completing the task. Relative to those who reported predictions after the task, participants who pre-committed to predictions reported predictions that were more discrepant from actual performance and updated their beliefs about their verbal ability more (Studies 1a and 1b). The effect on belief updating was strongest among participants who directly tested their predictions (Study 2) and belief updating was related to their evaluations of the validity of the task (Study 3). Furthermore, increased belief updating seemed to not be due to faulty or shifting memory of initial ratings of verbal ability (Study 4), but rather reflected an increase in the discrepancy between predictions and observed outcomes (Study 5). In a final study (Study 6), I examined pre-commitment as an intervention to reduce confirmation bias, finding that pre-committing to evaluations of new scientific studies eliminated the relation between initial beliefs and evaluations of evidence while also increasing belief updating. Together, these studies suggest that pre-commitment can reduce biases and increase belief updating in light of new evidence.

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