Current security concerns of Europe: radicali-zation in Central Asia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Novikova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Natural Factor ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Western Values ◽  
Islam And Secularism

The purpose of the paper is to track processes of radicalization in Central Asia (CA) leading to acts of terrorism in Europe and to show the Western approach to the multiple drivers for violent extremism in СА. The revival of Islam throughout the region was a natural factor, as it filled the ideological vacuum formed after the collapse of the communist ideology, and the radicalization of Muslims could not be a consequence of these processes. Western scholars are viewing the efforts of the CA governments to counter radicalization and violent extremism through the lens of the «Western values» framing them in human-rights terms. The authoritarian states of Central Asia do monitor the activities of all religious groups and individuals but the author is sure that such religious restrictions cannot lead to violent extremism in Central Asia. The conflict is not between Islam and secularism, the real dispute unfolds within Islam: the traditional faith opposes radical brands of Islam. The governments of Central Asian states are not opposed to Islam per se, but rather to radical, politicized Islam, which serves as a framework for political opposition. Hundreds of Central Asian citizens travelled to the Middle East to support Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. The populations most at risk of radicalization are residents of the border regions of the CA states, ethnic minorities, youth, migrants, divorced women and orphans. Geographic proximity of the region to Afghanistan also matters. Now the exodus to wage jihad in the Middle East or in Afghanistan is not an immediate threat, but it should be borne in mind that the surviving IS fighters are returning to Europe, Central Asia and Russia.

Central Asia drives Syria repatriations to reduce risk

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Direct Link ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Women And Children ◽  
Muslim Majority ◽  
Reduce Risk

Subject Central Asian policies on repatriating nationals associated with Middle East insurgency. Significance Central Asian governments' concerns about radicalisation among Muslim-majority populations were amplified when hundreds of nationals went to Syria and Iraq in 2014-15 to join Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist groups. They are prioritising the repatriation of women and children, in contrast to European governments' reluctance to approve blanket returns. Impacts The security drive against local extremists will be sustained across Central Asia. Policies towards returning women will not be affected by IS-attributed attacks unless a direct link is made. In Russia, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is leading on repatriation efforts focused on children.

Problems of military-political interaction between the countries of the West and Central Asia at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
Boris G. Koybaev
Keyword(s):  
Central Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Bases ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Environment ◽  
Western Influence ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Political Interaction ◽  
The Military

Central Asia in recent history is a vast region with five Muslim States-new actors in modern international relations. The countries of Central Asia, having become sovereign States, at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries are trying to peaceful interaction not only with their underdeveloped neighbors, but also with the far-off prosperous West. At the same time, the United States and Western European countries, in their centrosilic ambitions, seek to increase their military and political presence in Central Asia and use the military bases of the region’s States as a springboard for supplying their troops during anti-terrorist and other operations. With the active support of the West, the Central Asian States were accepted as members of the United Nations. For monitoring and exerting diplomatic influence on the regional environment, the administration of the President of the Russian Federation H. W. Bush established U.S. embassies in all Central Asian States. Turkey, a NATO member and secular Islamic state, was used as a lever of indirect Western influence over Central Asian governments, and its model of successful development was presented as an example to follow.

Islamic State will face obstacles to Afghan relocation

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Large Expansion ◽  
Central Asian Republics

Subject The Islamic State group's ambitions in Afghanistan. Significance In a bid to offset its reverses in Syria and Iraq, Islamic State (IS) is strengthening its Afghan presence with members arriving from abroad to join local recruits. Despite having a presence in Afghanistan since 2015, IS has not achieved the swift and large expansion it saw in the Middle East as it is competing with the long-established Taliban. Impacts If IS grows stronger in northern Afghanistan, it might revive plans to infiltrate Central Asian republics. Differences on how to deal with IS will divide the Taliban leadership. Russia and Iran will engage with parts of the Taliban and encourage them to fight IS.

Modeling Ethnic Protest: The Case of the Middle East and Central Asia

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILE SAHLIYEH ◽  
SANGEETA SINHA ◽  
VIJAYAN PILLAI
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Mobilization ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Organizational Cohesiveness

ABSTRACT Theory: Literature on ethnic protest in the Middle East and Central Asia does not provide empirical measures necessary for rigorous hypothesis testing, nor does it incorporate a comprehensive theoretical foundation needed to identify the conditions for ethnic protest. There is also no consensus on the causes of ethnic protest in the Middle East and Central Asia. Hypotheses: To improve our ability to explain ethnic protest in the Middle East and Central Asia and to identify the necessary conditions for ethnic dissent, we test five hypotheses embodied in grievance and political mobilization. The literature on ethnic protest in the Middle East and Central Asia references both models but does not systematically test their relevance. Methodology: We use Logistic Regression to test the explanatory potential of the five hypotheses of the Grievance and Mobilization models. We use Ted Gurr's Minorities at Risk data set, which presents data on 40 ethnic groups in the Middle East and Central Asia. The dependent variable is protest for 1990-95. Findings: Our research does not lend much empirical support for the grievance model, which dominates the Middle Eastern and Central Asian area study literature. Cultural identity and religious freedom variables of grievance model do not provide sufficient condition for the outbreak of ethnic protest. The mobilization model has better explanatory power. It lends significant support to the three hypotheses associated with the mobilization model and suggests that ethnic protest is more likely to occur under conditions of organizational cohesiveness, low levels of autocracy, and international support.

scholarly journals Un-Islamic or Non-Muslim

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. i-vi
Author(s):  
Zakyi Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Muslim Majority

The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attractedpsychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffectedpopulations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preachedby its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretationsof Islam.”1This editorial analyzes the phenomenon of violent extremism and its identificationand association with Islam by analysts and critics. In my 29:1 editorial“The Stigma of Extremism on Muslims,” I suggested that the violent elementsin Islam are no more than “a fraction of the 7 percent of global Muslim populationconsidered to be ‘politically radicalized,’ including [non-violent] sympathizers”2 and “an inescapable nuisance and … regrettable stigma [to] thelarger Muslim majority.”3 I stand by these points, the iteration of which, in thiscurrent editorial, gains its prime relevance.Here, I argue further that despite the Prophet’s prohibition of labeling otherself-confessed practicing Muslims as “non-Muslims”4 regardless of their actions(i.e., takfīr), extremists nevertheless use it to give themselves the licenseto kill other Muslims, a fact that makes their actions “un-Islamic.” I also maintainthat the peace-loving Muslim majority has the moral right and intellectualprerogative to denounce this violent minority and to get their denunciation appreciatedand deemed supreme.

Prospects for Central Asia in 2016

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
World Bank ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
The World ◽  
State Group ◽  
The Imf

Subject Prospects for Central Asia in 2016. Significance In October, both the World Bank and the IMF downgraded Central Asia's economic growth outlook for 2016. The previous month, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had signalled the rising influence of extremist organisations, first and foremost the Islamic State group (ISG) across the region. Central Asian regimes are faced with a multitude of risks, including political destabilisation.

ISAF WITHDRAWAL AND AN UPSURGE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN AFGHANISTAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 112-124
Author(s):  
Dinara Aytzhanova ◽  
Daniyar Aytzhanov
Keyword(s):  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
White House ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Religious Extremism ◽  
Central Asian Countries ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
International Security Assistance Force

An upsurge of religious extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan that followed the 2014 withdrawal of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) confirmed the pessimistic forecasts for the country’s future: a far greater number of terrorist attacks and their victims among non-combatants across the country was the most obvious repercussion. The civil war continued unabated, while the negative additional factors—the Taliban that had grown much stronger, as well as the activation of ISIS militants, who had come from Iraq and Syria to continue fighting—contributed to its further exacerbation. All sorts of extremist religious groups in Afghanistan consolidated their positions and even created an unwelcome possibility of their transit to the Central Asian countries. The authors have clearly demonstrated that there is a direct interdependence between the presence of ISAF under U.S. command and the degree of violence of the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—Khorasan Chapter, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan operating in Afghanistan. They have also analyzed the impact of the statement made by the U.S. regarding the signed agreement with the Taliban that envisaged the removal of U.S. troops from the country in the next fourteen months and the release of Taliban prisoners. Since the Government of Afghanistan had been left in the cold, many doubted that the agreement would be fully realized any time soon. An analysis of the events that followed demonstrated that the Taliban would not stick to its part of the agreement, while the White House treated the document as an election promise (formally) fulfilled. There are enough extremist organizations (i.e., ISIS) that operate in the provinces and, free from obligations and in pursuit of their own aims, might interfere in the attempts to fulfill the agreement in its optimistic version. An assessment of certain processes suggests that the threats coming from ISIS are somewhat overestimated. The studies are based on the following methods: comparative analysis of relevant literature, statistical analysis of the dynamics of time series to identify the developing trends of terrorist activities of religious extremists in Afghanistan.

Afghan Challenges and their Impact on Reconfiguration of Foreign Military Presence

2015 ◽  
pp. 118-125
Author(s):  
M. Konarovskiy
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Military

Against the background of wide range of the “Islamic state” terrorismin the Middle East, the aggravating civil war in Afghanistan does not reduce the threat of destabilization beyond Russia’s southern borders. The Taliban’s terrorism in IRA is recently becoming even more diversified through the infiltration of the IS ideology and militancy to IRA northern enclave. Reshaping of the US and NATO military presence in that country did not help to stabilize the situation that is facing the whole complex of unresolved problems. This reality urged Washington to prolong the military presence till 2017 amid new efforts to strengthen its positions in Central Asia.

scholarly journals Assessment of the effectiveness of the EUROFORGEN NAME and Precision ID Ancestry panel markers for ancestry investigations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Truelsen ◽  
T. Tvedebrink ◽  
H. S. Mogensen ◽  
M. S. Farzad ◽  
M. A. Shan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
North Africa ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
North African ◽  
Likelihood Ratios ◽  
North East ◽  
Asian Populations ◽  
South Central ◽  
Central Asian

AbstractThe EUROFORGEN NAME panel is a regional ancestry panel designed to differentiate individuals from the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. The first version of the panel was developed for the MassARRAY system and included 111 SNPs. Here, a custom AmpliSeq EUROFORGEN NAME panel with 102 of the original 111 loci was used to sequence 1098 individuals from 14 populations from Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, North-East Africa, and South-Central Asia. These samples were also sequenced with a global ancestry panel, the Precision ID Ancestry Panel. The GenoGeographer software was used to assign the AIM profiles to reference populations and calculate the weight of the evidence as likelihood ratios. The combination of the EUROFORGEN NAME and Precision ID Ancestry panels led to fewer ambiguous assignments, especially for individuals from the Middle East and South-Central Asia. The likelihood ratios showed that North African individuals could be separated from European and Middle Eastern individuals using the Precision ID Ancestry Panel. The separation improved with the addition of the EUROFORGEN NAME panel. The analyses also showed that the separation of Middle Eastern populations from European and South-Central Asian populations was challenging even when both panels were applied.

scholarly journals Assessment of the effectiveness of the EUROFORGEN NAME and Precision ID Ancestry panel markers for ancestry investigations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ditte Truelsen ◽  
Torben Tvedebrink ◽  
Helle Smidt Mogensen ◽  
Maryam Sharafi Farzad ◽  
Muhammad Adnan Shan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Central Asia ◽  
North Africa ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Likelihood Ratios ◽  
North East ◽  
Asian Populations ◽  
South Central ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Second Tier

Abstract The EUROFORGEN NAME panel is a second-tier ancestry panel designed to differentiate individuals from the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. The first version of the panel was developed for the MassARRAY® system and included 111 SNPs. Here, a custom AmpliSeq™ EUROFORGEN NAME panel with 102 of the original 111 loci was used to sequence 1,098 individuals from 14 populations from Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, North-East Africa, and South-Central Asia. These samples were also sequenced with the first-tier Precision ID Ancestry Panel. The GenoGeographer software was used to assign the AIM profiles to reference populations and calculate the weight of the evidence as likelihood ratios. The combination of the EUROFORGEN NAME and Precision ID Ancestry panels led to fewer ambiguous assignments, especially for individuals from the Middle East and South-Central Asia. The likelihood ratios showed that North African individuals could be separated from European and Middle Eastern individuals using the Precision ID Ancestry Panel. The separation improved with the addition of the EUROFORGEN NAME panel. The analyses also showed that the separation of Middle Eastern populations from European and South-Central Asian populations was challenging even when both panels were applied.

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