scholarly journals “We, the defenders of nations and liberties”. How the EU populist radical right discursively constructs identities: the case of the Rassemblement National

2020 ◽  
pp. 128-156
Author(s):  
Ivan Fomin ◽  
◽  
Alexander Alexeev

The article explores how the EU populist radical right in opposition to its national governments uses the concept of rights and freedoms when constructing identities. The research is based on a discourse analysis of speeches given by the leader of the French Rassemblement National Marine Le Pen in the run-up to the 2019 European parliamentary elections. The analysis of discursive strategies employed in these texts allows to empirically demonstrate and elaborate some of the existing theories on key ideological and discursive features of the populist radical right and its positions on rights and freedoms. It also shows, however, that these models need to be reviewed or altered in a number of aspects. The research corresponds to the existing models as it shows the opposition the Self vs. the Other to be one of the central elements in the populist radical right discourse. For instance, when speaking about rights and freedoms, Marine Le Pen constructs the identity of the French people and European peoples by opposing them to the negative Other along two axes: vertically – by constructing a populist opposition to the elites – and horizontally – by constructing a nativist opposition to alien identities. The people is predicated to possess various rights, the Rassemblement National is represented as the defender of these rights, while the elites and the aliens are depicted as a threat to these rights. Yet, these oppositions are not always clearly articulated with numerous ‘grey zones’ systematically constructed: the research demonstrates that the depiction of some actors in a positive or negative way depends on context. The European identity constructed by the populist radical right is also ambivalent: it is not completely rejected although the ongoing European integration project – the EU – is reproached for infringing rights and freedoms. In general, the analysis allows to conclude that the populist radical right in the EU should be regarded as an active contester in the ongoing interpretive struggle over the concept of rights and freedoms rather than its enemy.

2021 ◽  
pp. 2336825X2110529
Author(s):  
Alexander Alekseev

The article explores how the European populist radical right uses references to rights and freedoms in its political discourse. By relying on the findings of the existing research and applying the discourse-historical approach to electoral speeches by Marine Le Pen and Jarosław Kaczyński, the leaders of two very dissimilar EU PRR parties, the Rassemblement National and the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, the article abductively develops a functional typology of references to rights and freedoms commonly used in discourses of European PRR parties: it suggests that PRR discourses in Europe feature references to the right to sovereignty, citizens’ rights, social rights, and economic rights. Such references are used as a coherent discursive strategy to construct social actors following the PRR ideological core of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. As the PRR identifies itself with the people, defined along nativist and populist lines, rights are always attributed to it. The PRR represents itself as the defender of the people and its rights, while the elites and the aliens are predicated to threaten the people and its rights. References to rights in PRR discourses intrinsically link the individual with the collective, which allows to construct and promote a populist model of ethnic democracy.


Author(s):  
Alexander Alekseev

Abstract This article explores how the concept of democracy is constructed, conveyed, and instrumentalised in the discourses of the populist radical right in the current EU context. The comparative analysis of the speeches of the leaders of two dissimilar PRR parties in government (Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) and in opposition (French Rassemblement National) in the run-up to the 2019 European elections using tools of the discourse-historical and discourse-conceptual approaches to CDS highlights the common core of PRR interpretations of democracy, influenced by the shared axiological, institutional, and discursive framework of the EU. It shows that in the EU the PRR constructs the concept of democracy as an ideological complex, by diluting its essentially populist interpretation of democracy with liberal democratic elements. Only by advancing nativist and authoritarian interpretations of the people, does the PRR bring the concept of democracy in line with its ideological core of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 96-131
Author(s):  
Nick Vaughan-Williams

Chapter 4 shifts the analytical focus from elite claims made in the name of ‘the people’ to EU citizens’ vernacular knowledge of migration. Particular emphasis is given to the vernacular knowledge and categories used by citizens to discuss the issue of migration as it is perceived to impact and disrupt their everyday lives, the underpinning assumptions about hierarchies of race and gender used to position citizens in relation to perceptions about different ‘types’ of people on the move, and citizens’ awareness of/support for dominant governmental and media representations of the issue of migration in Europe. As well as offering a map of these contours, the discussion identifies three overriding themes. First, vernacular conversations problematize the notion of a linear transmission between elite crisis narratives and their reception among diverse publics. Second, the claim that elite narratives merely ventriloquize what ‘the people’ think about and want in regard to about migration is challenged by the complexity and nuance of vernacular narratives. Third, EU citizens repeatedly spoke of what they perceived to be a series of ‘information gaps’, which led to a widespread distrust of mainstream politicians and media sources, anxieties about their individual and collective futures, and demands for more detailed, higher quality, and accessible knowledge about migration from the EU, national governments, media sources, and academics. By taking vernacular views and experiences of migration seriously we can better understand how the propagation of misinformation, confusion, and uncertainty among EU citizens set the scene for populist notions of ‘taking back control’ to thrive.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 438-470
Author(s):  
Alexandra Snipes ◽  
Cas Mudde

AbstractAlthough the populist radical right is generally seen as a particularly masculine and misogynist phenomenon, several of its parties have female leaders. The most prominent is Marine Le Pen, president of the French National Rally (formerly the National Front) and unofficial leader of the European populist radical right. Using insights from intersectionality theory, we posit that Marine Le Pen, as a female populist radical right politician, faces qualitatively different media coverage than both her female and her radical right counterparts. In this study, we analyze her media framing in two French (Le Figaro and Le Monde) and two U.S. (New York Times and Wall Street Journal) newspapers, focusing on the application of gender and populist radical right frames. We find that the “harder” populist radical right frame dominates the “softer” gender frame in all four newspapers, but, paradoxically, the combination of the two frames leads to overall less biased coverage of Marine Le Pen compared with both other female and other populist radical right politicians. In the conclusion, we discuss some of the consequences of the findings for the broader study of female politicians, most notably, theories of intersectionality and the double bind for women in leadership.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Věra Stojarová

AbstractThe paper looks at the political party scene in Visegrad countries before and after the influx of refugees and compares how much the negative reactions were instrumentalised not only by the extremist and radical right parties but by the newly emerged populist formations as well as the well-established mainstream parties across the whole political spectra. Until the “migration crisis”, the far right parties focused mainly on Roma issue, anti-Semitism, anti-communism, anti-establishment and used anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-German, anti-Czech, anti-Slovak or anti-Hungarian card. Since 2015, the parties re-oriented against immigrants, more precisely against the Muslims presenting them as a threat and also increased their criticism on the EU. However, the mainstream parties also accepted far right topics and actively promoted them. The result is then mainstreaming of xenophobia, nationalism and marginalization of far right parties as their flexible voters move to the populist subjects.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Onvara Vadhanavisala

Radical right-wing politics and ultra-nationalism have always been important issue across Europe's political spectrum. However, the recent flourishing of right-wing and populist parties in Europe in the past couple years were provoked by the European migrants and refugee crisis. The European institutions fail to solve the crisis. We witnessed various terrorist attacks occurred in major cities in Europe such as Paris, Berlin, and Italy etc. This had led not only the European people but all over the world to grow more suspicious of the EU institutions and their capabilities to manage the incident. As a consequence, the radical right-wing nationalist and right-wing political parties in Europe have taken this opportunity to claim and run their campaigns on a strong anti-refugees and immigrants. As a result, right-wing politicians and parties tend to gain more popularity among voters and achieved electoral success in many European countries such as Marine Le Pen in France, Andrej Babiš in Czech Republic, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in Hungary and elsewhere in Europe. These right-wing nationalists and political parties represent themselves as a defender of European Christian values, the protector of Europe, the savior of Christianity. They are working in every way to prevent the land of Europe from Muslims. This kind of rhetoric is spreading across Europe and developed as an anti-refugee/immigrant campaign which can be seen in both online and offline media especially in the case of Hungary. It has signified as a backlash against the political establishment and a wave of discontent. Furthermore, the rise of right-wing politics has created concerns over human rights, national identity, refugee and migrant issues.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 112-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Moffitt

Populism, particularly in its radical right-wing variants, is often posited as antithetical to the principles of liberalism. Yet a number of contemporary cases of populist radical right parties from Northern Europe complicate this characterisation of populism: rather than being directly opposed to liberalism, these parties selectively reconfigure traditionally liberal defences of discriminated-against groups—such as homosexuals or women—in their own image, positing these groups as part of ‘the people’ who must be protected, and presenting themselves as defenders of liberty, free speech and ‘Enlightenment values’. This article examines this situation, and argues that that while populist radical right parties in Northern Europe may only invoke such liberal values to opportunistically attack their enemies—in many of these cases, Muslims and ‘the elite’ who allegedly are abetting the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe’—this discursive shift represents a move towards a ‘liberal illiberalism’. Drawing on party manifestoes and press materials, it outlines the ways in which these actors articulate liberal illiberalism, the reasons they do so, and the ramifications of this shift.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Forchtner ◽  
Christoffer Kølvraa

This article inquires into how contemporary populist radical right parties relate to environmental issues of countryside and climate protection, by analyzing relevant discourses of the British National Party (BNP) and the Danish People's Party (DPP). It does so by looking at party materials along three dimensions: the aesthetic, the symbolic, and the material. The article discusses to what extent the parties' political stances on environmental issues are conditioned by deeper structures of nationalist ideology and the understandings of nature embedded therein. It illustrates a fundamental difference between the way nationalist actors engage in, on the one hand, the protection of nature as national countryside and landscape, epitomizing the nation's beauty, harmony and purity over which the people are sovereign. On the other hand, they deny or cast doubt on environmental risks located at a transnational level, such as those that relate to climate. The article argues that this apparent inconsistency is rooted in the ideological tenets of nationalism as the transnational undermines the nationalist ideal of sovereignty.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document