scholarly journals Constructing a Narrative in the Standard Unexpected Transfer Test in Adolescence and Adulthood

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Białecka-Pikul ◽  
Marta Rynda ◽  
Daria Syrecka
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Transfer Test ◽  
Transfer Task ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Adolescents And Adults ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Way Of Thinking

Constructing a Narrative in the Standard Unexpected Transfer Test in Adolescence and Adulthood The aim of the presented research was the replication and extension of the research by Nelson, Plesa and Henseler (1998), which was the basis for examining the nature of the theory of mind or mentalizing ability (that is, the ability to attribute mental states to other people in order to explain and predict their behaviors) in adolescents and adults. Specifically, its experience-like versus theory-like character. The test, an unexpected transfer task (the Max story), was completed by 827 people aged 13 to 75 (average 21.9). Half of them were supposed to solve the task with a shorter version of the story (including only the facts), and the other half were given the longer version (including descriptions of emotions, beliefs of the protagonist and explanations of ongoing events). All of the answers were then categorized applying Nelson's classification and two other types of analysis. Gender, age and fields of interest were taken into account during analysis of the participants' answers. The Polish respondents rarely answered in a narrative way (only 13%, in contrast to Nelson's result of 46%). Despite the fact that age was not a factor corresponding to a narrative answer, it was proven that older respondents did indeed assume the first person perspective when justifying Max's behavior. Women, more often than men, appealed to the knowledge and the protagonist's way of thinking. The respondents' fields of interest did not seem to diversify the obtained results, nor did the version of the story. The results do not allow us to draw unambiguous conclusions about the nature of the adult's theory of mind, but they form the basis for analyzing the methodology of research on theory of mind.

scholarly journals Human Enhancements and Voting: Towards a Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities of Beings

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
S. J. Blodgett-Ford
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
To Come ◽  
Additional Option

The phenomenon and ethics of “voting” will be explored in the context of human enhancements. “Voting” will be examined for enhanced humans with moderate and extreme enhancements. Existing patterns of discrimination in voting around the globe could continue substantially “as is” for those with moderate enhancements. For extreme enhancements, voting rights could be challenged if the very humanity of the enhanced was in doubt. Humans who were not enhanced could also be disenfranchised if certain enhancements become prevalent. Voting will be examined using a theory of engagement articulated by Professor Sophie Loidolt that emphasizes the importance of legitimization and justification by “facing the appeal of the other” to determine what is “right” from a phenomenological first-person perspective. Seeking inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, voting rights and responsibilities will be re-framed from a foundational working hypothesis that all enhanced and non-enhanced humans should have a right to vote directly. Representative voting will be considered as an admittedly imperfect alternative or additional option. The framework in which voting occurs, as well as the processes, temporal cadence, and role of voting, requires the participation from as diverse a group of humans as possible. Voting rights delivered by fiat to enhanced or non-enhanced humans who were excluded from participation in the design and ratification of the governance structure is not legitimate. Applying and extending Loidolt’s framework, we must recognize the urgency that demands the impossible, with openness to that universality in progress (or universality to come) that keeps being constituted from the outside.

scholarly journals Image schemas, mimetic schemas and children's gestures

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Natural Interaction ◽  
Image Schemas ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Cognitive Linguistic ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The One

Abstract Mimetic schemas, unlike the popular cognitive linguistic notion of image schemas, have been characterized in earlier work as explicitly representational, bodily structures arising from imitation of culture-specific practical actions (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b). We performed an analysis of the gestures of three Swedish and three Thai children at the age of 18, 22 and 26 months in episodes of natural interaction with caregivers and siblings in order to analyze the hypothesis that iconic gestures emerge as mimetic schemas. In accordance with this hypothesis, we predicted that the children's first iconic gestures would be (a) intermediately specific, (b) culture-typical, (c) falling in a set of recurrent types, (d) predominantly enacted from a first-person perspective (1pp) rather than performed from a third-person perspective (3pp), with (e) 3pp gestures being more dependent on direct imitation than 1pp gestures and (f) more often co-occurring with speech. All specific predictions but the last were confirmed, and differences were found between the children's iconic gestures on the one side and their deictic and emblematic gestures on the other. Thus, the study both confirms earlier conjectures that mimetic schemas “ground” both gesture and speech and implies the need to qualify these proposals, limiting the link between mimetic schemas and gestures to the iconic category.

scholarly journals Developmental evidence for enhanced theory of mind for competitive versus cooperative contexts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lily Tsoi ◽  
Kiley Hamlin ◽  
Adam Waytz ◽  
Andrew Scott Baron ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Preschool Children ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

There is a debate regarding the function of theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to infer, attribute, and reason about mental states. On the one hand are evolutionary and psychological work suggesting that ToM is greater for competition than cooperation. On the other hand are findings and theories promoting greater ToM for cooperation than competition. We investigate the question of whether ToM is greater for competition than cooperation or vice versa by examining the period of development during which explicit ToM comes online. In two studies, we examined preschool children’s abilities to explicitly express an understanding of false beliefs—a key marker of ToM—and ability to apply that understanding in first-person social interactions in competitive and cooperative contexts. Our findings reveal that preschool children are better at understanding false beliefs and applying that understanding in competitive contexts than in cooperative contexts.

scholarly journals Christian Materialism and the Quest for Human Personhood

Perichoresis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Mikael Leidenhag
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Imago Dei ◽  
First Person ◽  
Property Dualism ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Critical Exploration ◽  
First Person Perspective

AbstractThis paper offers a critical exploration of philosopher Kevin Corcoran’s proposed Christian Materialism. Corcoran’s constitution view claimsthat we human persons are constituted by our bodies without being identical with the bodies that constitute us. I will critically evaluate this view and argue that Corcoran has not successfully managed to ground a first-person perspective and intentional states in materialism. Moreover, Corcoran’s property dualism about mental states and the idea of the causally efficacy of such states seem incompatible with materialism. Corcoran’s view ofimago Deiis also explored and evaluated. Towards the end of the paper I put forward a brief defense of dualism in light of Corcoran’s critique.

Time and Metaphysics: Kant and McTaggart on the Reality of Time

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-194
Author(s):  
Matthew Rukgaber
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
First Person ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Mctaggart’S Argument

Abstract The paper examines Kant’s theory of time in light of McTaggart’s argument that time is unreal. First, it presents McTaggart’s theory of time and his argument that a contradiction inevitably emerges in time’s analysis, leading either to an infinite regress of times or the denial that time is real. The paper then shows that Kant rejects the absolute notion of time, the idea that there are eternal coordinates that are experienced by us as being in time. It argues against subjectivist or psychological interpretations of Kant’s theory of time. The main argument is that Kant’s notion of a priori intuition, rather than being the flow of mental states in consciousness, is the subject’s self-intuition as being temporally present, and, moreover, that the present acts as a temporal metric, specifying a first-person perspective in the world and designating a temporal simple.

scholarly journals First-Person Perspective Effects on Theory of Mind without Self-Reference

PLoS ONE ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. e19320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuki Otsuka ◽  
Naoyuki Osaka ◽  
Ken Yaoi ◽  
Mariko Osaka
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Self Reference

scholarly journals Fenomenología de la cognición social y neurociencia de segunda persona

2021 ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Ivana Anton Mlinar
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Lived Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
De Se ◽  
Participatory Processes ◽  
Second Person Perspective

Gran parte de los estudios sobre la naturaleza de la cognición social, que también se ha entendido como una perspectiva de se-gunda persona, ha tenido lugar en el marco de la llamada “teoría de la mente”, entendida básicamente como capacidad inferencial de atribución de estados mentales. La fenomenología, por el contrario, advierte la naturaleza corporizada e integrada de la experiencia de sí, lo que permite, consecuentemente, el acceso inmediato a la experiencia vivida del otro. La incorporación de esta comprensión de la cognición social en el ámbito experimental ha planteado un giro interactivo: de perspectivas observacionales y mecanismos individuales a escenarios interactivos y procesos participativos. Este trabajo se propone mostrar tanto el sentido fenomenológico de la cognición social como así también las diversas interpretaciones que han encontrado aplicación en la experimentación neurocientífica en cuanto perspectivas de segunda persona, a fin de evaluar sus aportes y ofrecer posibles tareas aún pendientes.Most of the studies on the nature of social cognition, which has also been understood as second-person perspective, have taken place within the framework of the so-called "theory of mind", basically understood as inferential capacity for attribution of mental states. Phenomenology, on the contrary, shows the embodied and integrated nature of self-experience, which consequently allows immediate access to the lived experience of the other. The incorporation of this understanding of social cognition in the experimental field has proposed an interactive turn: from observational perspectives and individual mechanisms to interactive scenarios and participatory processes. This work aims to show both the phenomenological meaning of social cognition as well as the various interpretations that have found application in neuroscientific experimentation as second-person perspectives, in order to evaluate their contributions and offer possible open tasks.

scholarly journals Differentiating Real-World Autobiographical Experiences without Recourse to Behaviour

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 521
Author(s):  
Jonathan Erez ◽  
Marie-Eve Gagnon ◽  
Adrian M. Owen
Keyword(s):  
Medial Temporal Lobe ◽  
Brain Injuries ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Extrastriate Cortex ◽  
First Person ◽  
Autobiographical Memories ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Machine Learning Model ◽  
First Person Perspective

Investigating human consciousness based on brain activity alone is a key challenge in cognitive neuroscience. One of its central facets, the ability to form autobiographical memories, has been investigated through several fMRI studies that have revealed a pattern of activity across a network of frontal, parietal, and medial temporal lobe regions when participants view personal photographs, as opposed to when they view photographs from someone else’s life. Here, our goal was to attempt to decode when participants were re-experiencing an entire event, captured on video from a first-person perspective, relative to a very similar event experienced by someone else. Participants were asked to sit passively in a wheelchair while a researcher pushed them around a local mall. A small wearable camera was mounted on each participant, in order to capture autobiographical videos of the visit from a first-person perspective. One week later, participants were scanned while they passively viewed different categories of videos; some were autobiographical, while others were not. A machine-learning model was able to successfully classify the video categories above chance, both within and across participants, suggesting that there is a shared mechanism differentiating autobiographical experiences from non-autobiographical ones. Moreover, the classifier brain maps revealed that the fronto-parietal network, mid-temporal regions and extrastriate cortex were critical for differentiating between autobiographical and non-autobiographical memories. We argue that this novel paradigm captures the true nature of autobiographical memories, and is well suited to patients (e.g., with brain injuries) who may be unable to respond reliably to traditional experimental stimuli.

scholarly journals An immersive first-person navigation task for abstract knowledge acquisition

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Doerte Kuhrt ◽  
Natalie R. St. John ◽  
Jacob L. S. Bellmund ◽  
Raphael Kaplan ◽  
Christian F. Doeller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Navigation ◽  
First Person ◽  
Abstract Space ◽  
Motion Platform ◽  
Head Mounted Display ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Abstract Knowledge ◽  
Behavioural Patterns ◽  
Spatial Domains ◽  
First Person Perspective

AbstractAdvances in virtual reality (VR) technology have greatly benefited spatial navigation research. By presenting space in a controlled manner, changing aspects of the environment one at a time or manipulating the gain from different sensory inputs, the mechanisms underlying spatial behaviour can be investigated. In parallel, a growing body of evidence suggests that the processes involved in spatial navigation extend to non-spatial domains. Here, we leverage VR technology advances to test whether participants can navigate abstract knowledge. We designed a two-dimensional quantity space—presented using a head-mounted display—to test if participants can navigate abstract knowledge using a first-person perspective navigation paradigm. To investigate the effect of physical movement, we divided participants into two groups: one walking and rotating on a motion platform, the other group using a gamepad to move through the abstract space. We found that both groups learned to navigate using a first-person perspective and formed accurate representations of the abstract space. Interestingly, navigation in the quantity space resembled behavioural patterns observed in navigation studies using environments with natural visuospatial cues. Notably, both groups demonstrated similar patterns of learning. Taken together, these results imply that both self-movement and remote exploration can be used to learn the relational mapping between abstract stimuli.

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