scholarly journals Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: Controversies of the French Interpretation

Sententiae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-82
Author(s):  
Oxana Yosypenko ◽  

The author of the article focuses on the matter of Wittgenstein's philosophy reception in France. The reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy was quite late and led to different, sometimes opposite interpretations of his thought, even among French analytical philosophers. Applying a sociological approach to the problem of reception, the author identifies factors that hindered the penetration of the ideas of analytical philosophy in France, including the powerful institutionalization of philosophy in France with its inherent traditionalism and conservatism, fully expressed national character of French philosophy, as well as the extremely polemical character of French analytical philosophy, the transformation of the choice of this tradition of philosophizing into an ethical and political choice. These factors are illustrated by an analysis of Wittgenstein's conflicting interpretation of Jacques Bouveresse and Sandra Laugier. If the first creates an image of Wittgenstein as Anti-Husserl, blaming the phenomenologist for ignoring ordinary language, the second proposes a phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein's ideas using the philosophy of ordinary language. The article shows how opposing interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy reproduce the internal conflicts of the French philosophical field.

Author(s):  
G. A. Zolotkov

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.


1977 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred R. Dallmayr

For nearly three centuries, Vico's name remained virtually unknown outside narrow philosophical and literary circles; indications are, however, that he is beginning to emerge from this obscurity.1 His resurgence, it seems to me, is by no means fortuitous or the result of mere antiquarian interests. In a striking manner philosophical developments in our time have revived central themes of the Neapolitan thinker; his preoccupation with practical-historical experience and its exegesis reverberates in many facets of contemporary thought—even bypassing the barrier between Continental and Anglo-Saxon perspectives. On the Continent, Vico's legacy had been preserved to some extent in Dilthey's “life-philosophy”; in a more rigorous fashion, the implications of this legacy were exploredby existential phenomenology and hermeneutics with their focus on the human “life-world” and on the significance of prereflective understanding for cognitive operations. Comparable concerns havesurfaced in analytical philosophy. Abandoning (or at least modifying) the quest for an artificial symbolism capturing the structure of the empirical universe, linguistic analysis during recent decades has shifted attention increasingly to ordinary language as the underlying matrix of practical and theoretical endeavors. In a similar vein, philosophers of science have tended to turn from logical calculation and empirical verification to the concrete “context of discovery”—the paradigmatic frameworks in terms of which investigative procedures are sanctioned and research goals formulated.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-50
Author(s):  
Yaroslav Petik ◽  
◽  
Dmytro Sepetyi ◽  

The foreword to the very first Ukrainian translation of H. P. Grice’s article “Meaning” deals with the personality of the famous British-American philosopher, a representative of analytical philosophy, and the importance of his work in the field of semantics and ordinary language philosophy. Translators of this article focus on the features and subtleties of translation into Ukrainian. They drive attention to some concepts, for instance “belief”, “intention”, that cannot be unambiguously translated into Ukrainian, therefore a contextual translation of such concepts is methodologically justified.


1988 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 191-223
Author(s):  
Norman Barry ◽  
Keith Graham

Despite the emphasis on the state in the history of political philosophy, the twentieth century has been characterized by a remarkable lack of philosophical reflection on the concept. Until recently analytical philosophy had eschewed those evaluative arguments about political obligation and the limits of state authority that were typical of political theory in the past in favour of the explication of the meaning of the concept. However, even here the results have been disappointing. Logical Positivist attempts to locate some unique empirical phenomenon which the word state described proved unsuccessful, and indeed led to the odd conclusion that there was nothing about the state that distinguished it from some other social institutions. For example, its coercive power was said to be not unique: in some circumstances trade unions and Churches exercised similar power over their members. Ordinary language philosophers were far more interested in the complexities that surround words such as law, authority and power than in the state. In all this there was perhaps the fear that to concentrate attention on the state was implicitly to give credence to the discredited doctrine that it stood for some metaphysical entity; propositions about which could not be translated into propositions about the actions of individuals, and which represented higher values than those of ordinary human agents.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-117
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gorman

Abstract Krzysztof Brzechczyn’s important collection around Roth’s “revival” stimulates thought about the approaches adopted by analytical philosophers of history. Roth revives Danto’s 1965 pragmatic “constructivist” insights: in a narrative, earlier “events under a description” are described in terms of possibly unknowable later ones and, following Mink, in terms of possibly unknowable later concepts. Roth thinks of the resulting narrative explanation as justified in virtue of its constituting the object explained. However, earlier analytical philosophers of history faced different issues and adopted two different approaches: the positivist logical empiricist analysis used by Hempel (1942) and the nonpositivist “ordinary language” conceptual analysis of Oxford linguistic philosophers used by Dray (1957). Hempel’s Hume-sourced model of historical explanation set a scientific standard to be achieved, while Dray “tested” that analysis against historiographical practice. Both dubiously made “explanation” epistemologically central, as does Roth. Neither they nor later “narrativists” saw that more problematic was “compositionality”, the Hume-sourced view that the meanings of narratives were fully given by the meanings of their constituent sentences.


2019 ◽  
pp. 12-17
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Talalaeva

The article compares the linguophilosophical views of H.-G. Gadamer and L. Wittgenstein on one of the key aspects of poetic perspective. The founder of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer, in many ways developed and supplemented the ideas of his outstanding mentor M. Heidegger on the special ontological role of poetry as a "pure language" with the introduction of the concept of "pure poetry" into the scientific revolution. According to Gadamer, the poetic language has only its inherent tightness. This property of poetry makes it possible to preserve the semantic unity and semantic integrity of the poetic text, and also prevents the poetic word from losing its unique intrinsic value. On the other hand, the tightness of poetry excludes the possibility of voicing it, allowing only a written fixation of the poetic text. According to Gadamer's philosophical convictions, the verbal expression of poetic utterances leads to a significant distortion of the original artistic intent. Wittgenstein, in turn, standing at the origins of analytical philosophy, insists on the impossibility of expressing poetic utterances by means of ordinary language, since they do not reflect the facts and the status quo in the world, i.e. are outside factual language. In accordance with the position of the Austrian thinker, everything that does not correlate with logically correct speaking should be immersed in the sphere of silence. Nevertheless, both philosophers agreed in their arguments that the problem of the unpredictability of a poetic word can be solved with the phenomenon of showing, which can convey the meaning of a poetic work in a different way. The show does not belong to the field of language or silence, but is able to fully express the meaning of the poetic work.


1988 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 191-206
Author(s):  
Norman Barry

Despite the emphasis on the state in the history of political philosophy, the twentieth century has been characterized by a remarkable lack of philosophical reflection on the concept. Until recently analytical philosophy had eschewed those evaluative arguments about political obligation and the limits of state authority that were typical of political theory in the past in favour of the explication of the meaning of the concept. However, even here the results have been disappointing. Logical Positivist attempts to locate some unique empirical phenomenon which the word state described proved unsuccessful, and indeed led to the odd conclusion that there was nothing about the state that distinguished it from some other social institutions. For example, its coercive power was said to be not unique: in some circumstances trade unions and Churches exercised similar power over their members. Ordinary language philosophers were far more interested in the complexities that surround words such as law, authority and power than in the state. In all this there was perhaps the fear that to concentrate attention on the state was implicitly to give credence to the discredited doctrine that it stood for some metaphysical entity; propositions about which could not be translated into propositions about the actions of individuals, and which represented higher values than those of ordinary human agents.


1984 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-60
Author(s):  
Jere Brophy

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