scholarly journals Ideal Cognition

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-117
Author(s):  
Kate Kennedy

Both the nature and aim of human cognition are philosophically divisive topics. On one side, there are the evidentialists who believe that the sole purpose of cognition is to seek and find truths. In contrast, pragmatists appeal to cognition solely as a tool, something that helps people achieve their goals. In this paper, I put forward an account of cognition and its aims fundamentally based on a pragmatic viewpoint.Crucially, however, I claim that an evolutionary pragmatic picture of cognition must assert rationality as a core tenant of human thought, mooring a relative pragmatism within a system logic and rationality.

Author(s):  
Pierre Aubenque

Pierre Aubenque’s “Science Regained” (1962; translated by Clayton Shoppa) was originally published as the concluding chapter of Le Problème de l’Être chez Aristote, one of the most important and original books on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In this essay, Aubenque contends that the impasses which beset the project of first philosophy paradoxically become its greatest accomplishments. Although science stabilizes motion and thereby introduces necessity into human cognition, human thought always occurs amidst an inescapable movement of change and contingency. Aristotle’s ontology, as a discourse that strives to achieve being in its unity, succeeds by means of the failure of the structure of its own approach: the search of philosophy – dialectic – becomes the philosophy of the search. Aubenque traces this same structure of scission, mediation, and recovery across Aristotelian discussions of theology, motion, time, imitation, and human activity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 131-147
Author(s):  
Frederick D. Boley ◽  

Fr. Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) proposed that human desire can prove the existence of God. The structure of human thought implies a Final Answer to the set of all questions, which can only be what everyone calls “God”—but what implications does this fact have for human happiness, and for counseling? This paper argues that counseling must have, as its ultimate aim, helping people to know Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, which is God. The fact that we can observe the facts about human cognition means that Catholic Christian counselors can ethically and effectively work with people from any faith tradition.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorin Friesen ◽  
Angelina Van Dyke

A general theory of human cognition must be able to explain all aspects of human thought including scientific and rational thinking, normal thought, and personal identity and emotions. We present a theory that began as a system of cognitive styles, was expanded through an analysis of biographies, mapped onto neurology, developed through a study of personality, and then tested by using it to explain human thought in a number of dissimilar fields. This paper will introduce the theory, show briefly how it is consistent with neurological research, and then use it to analyze the TESOL field, a ‘specialization’ that brings together a broad range of topics related to human thought and behavior which are normally viewed in isolation. The typical second language learner is struggling to learn a new language with all of its idiosyncrasies, while acquiring new paradigms, navigating culture and negotiating personal identity. Examining the mechanisms involved in diverse elements of TESOL, such as language acquisition and learning, identity constitution, intercultural pragmatics, research methodology, critical discourse analysis, and male and female intellectual development through the lens of a general meta-theory of human cognition has application both for TESOL and for cognitive science in general.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
Ramunas Motiekaitis

Abstract In this article, invoking some terms of phenomenology and general principles of structural semiotics, I critically examine and reveal some aporetic aspects of Nishitani’s interpretation of Buddhist concept of sūnyatā presented in his seminal work Religion and Nothingness. My critics are directed to deeply ingrained claims among scholars of a “rejection of any form of dualism” and “non-substantial philosophy” as unique characteristics of the Kyoto school or “logic of the East”. My arguments are based on examining how linguistic differentiating articulation and narrative rendering that perform a fundamental role in human cognition are at work in definition of “emptiness” (sūnyatā) too. Thus emptiness is not completely empty; being certain philosophical identity it can be articulated only by differentiation from other identities, and thus different is included in it. Nishitani needed logocentric modes of thought, as a dialectical (m)other for constructing his sūnyatā ontology. Accordingly, the realms that are considered to be secondary or derivative (i.e. sensual and rational, or linguistic representations) appear to be the condition for constituting the primary (suchness of things, sūnyatā). Considering universal mechanisms of the articulation of values I am also asking whether sūnyatā paradigm indeed is so fundamentally different from Western paradigms centered on idea, God, or a rational subject as Nishitani wants to think. Since we find a clear hierarchical differentiation into truth and illusion, authentic and inauthentic modes of thought and time, and initial and derivative ontological realms, features of “strong thought” (in sense of Vattimo) are evident in his work. I am also suggesting, that possibly by considering not sūnyatā or “idea” but human languages as a universal “house of being”, we would be able to “empty” discourses of radical difference and uniqueness, and in this way become post-nationalistically modern. Philosophy, in order not to turn into a onesided ideology, should reflect on its mythological and narratological conditions, i.e. dances on certain semiotic axes. From such a perspective, the gravitational trajectory of human thought, longing for conjunction with the absolute, defined either as God or as sūnyatā, will seem similar rather than different.


Author(s):  
D. Aerts ◽  
S. Sozzo ◽  
T. Veloz

We recently performed cognitive experiments on conjunctions and negations of two concepts with the aim of investigating the combination problem of concepts. Our experiments confirmed the deviations (conceptual vagueness, underextension, overextension etc.) from the rules of classical (fuzzy) logic and probability theory observed by several scholars in concept theory, while our data were successfully modelled in a quantum-theoretic framework developed by ourselves. In this paper, we isolate a new, very stable and systematic pattern of violation of classicality that occurs in concept combinations. In addition, the strength and regularity of this non-classical effect leads us to believe that it occurs at a more fundamental level than the deviations observed up to now. It is our opinion that we have identified a deep non-classical mechanism determining not only how concepts are combined but, rather, how they are formed. We show that this effect can be faithfully modelled in a two-sector Fock space structure, and that it can be exactly explained by assuming that human thought is the superposition of two processes, a ‘logical reasoning’, guided by ‘logic’, and a ‘conceptual reasoning’, guided by ‘emergence’, and that the latter generally prevails over the former. All these findings provide new fundamental support to our quantum-theoretic approach to human cognition.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diederik Aerts ◽  
Jan Broekaert ◽  
Liane Gabora ◽  
Sandro Sozzo

AbstractWe support the authors' claims, except that we point out that also quantum structure different from quantum probability abundantly plays a role in human cognition. We put forward several elements to illustrate our point, mentioning entanglement, contextuality, interference, and emergence as effects, and states, observables, complex numbers, and Fock space as specific mathematical structures.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-352
Author(s):  
Jeffrey D. Kahn

Analogical reasoning is common in legal writing, just as analogies are a part of everyday life. Indeed, they may be inescapable features of human cognition. Used well, analogies illuminate the writer’s reasons and persuade the reader. Used poorly, however, they may obscure or even replace the precision and detail in reasoning that is crucial to the development of law. Without entering the ongoing debate about the nature of human thought, this article explores some of the dangers present in the relationship that analogy maintains with law. In particular, the article examines the risks inherent in analogizing across a technological or social divide. The article concludes by noting the long-term consequences of analogies and metaphors in shaping thought and, therefore, society.


2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 636-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edith A. Moravcsik

The paper investigates conflicts that arise in syntactic description and the resolutions of these conflicts. I will identify four logical possibilities of resolving conflicts and will cite examples from the syntactic literature for each. It will further be suggested that conflict resolution is a common goal of otherwise different linguistic theories in and outside syntax, and that it goes a long way towards motivating argumentation both in other sciences and in everyday discourse. The basic theme of the paper is that just as the study of languages provides a window into human cognition, so does the study of metalanguages — the conceptual apparatus employed by linguists in describing languages. Partonomy (whole-part relations) and taxonomy (type-subtype relations) will be represented as shared tools across various domains of human thought, with both relations serving a shared goal: resolving conflicts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-1) ◽  
pp. 108-120
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Filin ◽  

The purpose of this article is to analyze the content of Plotinus’s apophatic theology. The problem of the limit of human cognition has always been topical in the history of the human thought. The absolute reality acted as such a limit in Platonism. The apophatic aspect was the final step of its cognition. The founder of Neoplatonism systematized the Plato’s teaching about hypostases of the being and by doing so he transferred the center of the philosophical speculations in the sphere of the Unity of Oneness. Thus, his apophatics is more consequent than the Plato’s one. Narrating about the Unity of Oneness, Plotinus is sort of synthesizing certain peculiarities of the apophatic theology of his two great predecessors: Aristotle and Plato. One can say, Plotinus’s apophatic theology “vanished” in the description of the mystical blending to the Unity of Oneness of the first cause of being. However for a philosopher intuitive aspects of its cognition are as important in a certain context as logical ones. Plotinus’s philosophy is the way of antinomies, the way of upper-and-non-predicative apophatic darings. The first Unity of Oneness in his philosophy is uncertain and formless because the Unity of Oneness causes all things but doesn’t need them. The latter ones are incidental to It. In their incidental nature is the lack of Good what one can’t say about the Unity of Oneness Itself. It is neither anything qualitative nor quantitative, neither in the rest nor in the movement, neither in any place nor in any time. It is neither Intelligence nor Soul. Thus, the Unity of Oneness according to Plotinus is the energy without essence. Because it creates being transcendental to all things in existence. At the same time Plotinus has in the first place the proper experience of the ecstatic ascents to the exorbitant limit of all things in existence. Staying in It is for a thinker a happiness of the Soul, life of the gods and of the godlike happy people, “escape of the unity to the Unity of Oneness”. As a matter of fact apophatic for Plotinus is the first step taking aside from that experience to a random thought. However in the teaching of the founder of Neoplatonism the thought and the mystical life are so connected to each other that it is practically impossible to separate them—they are the unified whole of existence.


2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 657-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is de facto the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include the view that language is necessary for the acquisition of many human concepts and the view that language can serve to scaffold human thought processes. The paper also discusses the thesis that language may be the medium of conscious propositional thinking, but argues that this cannot be its most fundamental cognitive role. The idea is then proposed that natural language is the medium for non-domain-specific thinking, serving to integrate the outputs of a variety of domain-specific conceptual faculties (or central-cognitive “quasi-modules”). Recent experimental evidence in support of this idea is reviewed and the implications of the idea are discussed, especially for our conception of the architecture of human cognition. Finally, some further kinds of evidence which might serve to corroborate or refute the hypothesis are mentioned. The overall goal of the paper is to review a wide variety of accounts of the cognitive function of natural language, integrating a number of different kinds of evidence and theoretical consideration in order to propose and elaborate the most plausible candidate.


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