Model of managing of the state enterprises as new EEС of society

2018 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
V.I. Zhivitsa ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Edvard Jakopin ◽  
Aleksandar Gračanac ◽  
Jugoslav Aničić

AbstractThis study of the performance of state-owned enterprises in Serbia has shown that the state has great difficulties managing the enterprises that are in its portfolio and under its control. The adaptation of state-owned enterprises to exogenous shocks unfolds at a slow pace and is faced with many problems. The institutional environment for the strategic restructuring of the state sector is not in the service of strengthening the efficiency of its business operation. The study has shown that the economic performance of state-owned enterprises exerts a direct influence on economic growth, the budget, government balance sheets, and debt. While the “healthy” enterprises (the ones conducting their business successfully) are valuable state-owned property, enterprises with a loss or over indebted enterprises are obligations which demand intervention through the injection of additional capital or through other forms of help from the state. The main goal of restructuring state-owned enterprises is to improve responsibility and efficiency. The array of measures for improving efficiency ranges from modifications of the legal framework and corporate governance of socially owned enterprises (including corporatization and separation of activities) to the sale of property to the private sector or complete privatization. Reforms are aimed at improving the transparency and responsibility of state-owned enterprises, not just for the purpose of efficiency, but also for the purpose of harmonization with the ethical and deontological requirements.


1982 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 921-956
Author(s):  
Brian Chiplin ◽  
Mike Wright

The application of competition policy to nationalized industries (state enterprises) has been strengthened recently in the United Kingdom. Section 11(1) of the 1980 Competition Act broadened the Monopolies Commission oversight of state enterprises. In practice, the Commission will conduct an efficiency audit of each major nationalized industry every four years. The Commission will focus its review on the quality of services, manpower utilization and productivity, and pricing, distribution and purchasing methods of the state enterprise. These efficiency audits have been fairly well received. Their cost-effectiveness and the follow-through on the Commission's recommendations remain to be demonstrated.


2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 284
Author(s):  
Henny Juliany

The aim of research to determine the position of state assets set aside in BUMN. The research method used is normative empirical research by using statutory approach. The research found that the First, implementation of management and accountability for the state against state assets set aside in BUMN aims to provide an important role in contributing to the state revenue for part of the profits of BUMNs will be deposited into the state budget as Non Tax Revenue (non-tax). Second, the wealth of a country that has been transformed into the capital of state enterprises, the management should be in the business paradigm (business judgment rules), but the separation of the wealth of the country has not made   the switch into a state that in spite of the wealth of the country’s wealth .


2001 ◽  
Vol 152 (8) ◽  
pp. 343-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Hanewinkel

In order to analyse the financial consequences of a high proportion of selection forest and valuable timber, we compare private and communal forests with those run by the state. Enterprises run on a selection forest system clearly show more favourable economic indices which are a consequence of the high proportion of valuable timber harvested each year. The results are interpreted in a manner that creates an instrument to help managers of forest companies to make decisions. Preference is given to a «benchmarking» approach over a comparative economic approach between even-aged forests and selection forests.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Elman

Very soon after the establishment of the State (and as an important part of its constitutional structure) the office of State Comptroller, responsible to the Knesset alone and independent of the Government, was established under statute—the State Comptroller Law of 1949. After undergoing a number of amendments, the Law was eventually replaced in 1958 by a Consolidated Version but without any substantive change being made in the functions and powers of the Comptroller, a fact which goes far to demonstrate the proven worth of the office.Briefly, the functions of the Comptroller are to carry out “inspection of the finances and the management of the finances and the property and administration of the State and of the bodies subject to the inspection of the Comptroller, and to perform the other functions assigned to the Comptroller by this Law”.The bodies subject to inspection include, in addition to every government department, state enterprises and institutions and local authorities, persons or bodies holding, otherwise than under contract, or managing or controlling any state property or funds in the management of which the Government has a share or which are made subject to inspection by the Knesset or by agreement with the Government.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-257
Author(s):  
Andrei Lankov ◽  
Peter Ward ◽  
Ho-yeol Yoo ◽  
Ji-young Kim
Keyword(s):  

1989 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Liu Zhaonian ◽  
Fu Xiaoshuang ◽  
Wu Yanlei

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Lankov ◽  
Peter Ward ◽  
Ho-yeol Yoo ◽  
Ji-young Kim

AbstractIn the 1990s, a part of the North Korean economy underwent a process of marketization and de facto privatization. While largely spontaneous, this process was eerily reminiscent of developments in other post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe. One of the results was the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class, a nascent bourgeoisie. In order to overcome the obstacles that arose from the lack of any legal framework for their activities, they often chose to register their enterprises with state agencies, creating what we call Pseudo-state Enterprises (PSEs). Utilizing an agency theory approach, with particular emphasis on property rights and contracting problems, this article traces the origin of the PSE, their interaction with the state, how they are managed and the challenges they face. The article is based on refugee interviews with five North Koreans involved with the PSE-related activities in nine entities covering a range of different sectors.


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